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Strategy for the Western Balkans

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The Strategy for the Western Balkans (also known as "A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans") is a policy pursued by the EU with its partners and accession candidates in the western region of the Balkan Peninsula. Announced by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in his 2017 State of the Union address, this policy brings together the objectives of the global strategy for CSDP and the enlargement policy specific to the states in this region.[1]

History

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In 1999, the European Union launched the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) to strengthen its role in the region and provide long-term support for the reconstruction and development of countries in the wake of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. At international level, this approach was accompanied by the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, supported by the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the IMF, the World Bank and other major international players.[2] Since then, an annual EU-Balkans summit has been organized; the first was held in Zagreb in November 2000, and in 2003 the Thessaloniki European Council reaffirmed that all SAP countries were potential candidates for membership.[3]

In 2018, this regional sub-group comprised five of the six candidate states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) and Kosovo, which only has the status of a potential candidate. Each of these states has signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU to facilitate their approximation to EU standards (Copenhagen criteria and eventual acquis communautaire).[4]

To support and reinvigorate the candidate countries' efforts to meet the accession criteria, the European Commission, through its President, adopted a strategy at the end of 2017 focusing on priorities and areas for enhanced joint cooperation.[5] The strategy detailed by Jean-Claude Juncker in his State of the Union address in September 2017 and prepared in advance by the Commission and EEAS includes an action plan focusing on six initiatives relating to the EU's strategy in the Balkans with an increased budget allocated to pre-accession instruments and regional initiatives.[6]

According to the President of the European Commission: "If we want more stability in our neighborhood, we must offer credible prospects to the countries of the Western Balkans"; he also added that "there will be no further accessions during the term of office of this Commission" (2014-2019).[7] Beyond this regional policy, the EU is also committed to working alongside its member states and partners to resolve local issues such as the debate over the name of Macedonia,[8] or the dispute over the delineation of the border between Kosovo and Serbia.[9]

Specific features of the region

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See also: Breakup of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav Wars
Territorial entities when Yugoslavia broke up in 1991.
Ethnic distribution of populations in the Western Balkans in 2008.

With the redefinition of borders and forced population movements that followed the inter-ethnic conflicts of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, the Western Balkans were sharply divided, and deep-rooted tensions remained. The Dayton Accords put an end to the war in Bosnia (1995) by separating the country into two distinct regions and creating a federal government managed by a collective tripartite presidency and supervised by an international High Representative. The agreements also provided for the intervention of a NATO intervention force (IFOR), which was replaced by the European Union's Althea force in 2004. Kosovo became independent in 2008, at the cost of a mass exodus of Albanian and Serbian populations. Here too, a NATO force was set up (KFOR), supported by an administration mission that was replaced by the European Union's civilian mission EULEX Kosovo.[10]

Since the fall of Yugoslavia and the end of the Communist regime, economic development in the Balkans has lagged significantly behind that of other regions in Eastern Europe; for example, in 1990, Macedonia's GDP was three times lower than Slovenia's; in 2003, it was fifty times lower.[3] This lack of development has led to an expansion of black market and illegal activities in the region.[11]

Demographic trends in the Balkans are also specific: the number of inhabitants is declining for two main reasons: the fertility rate is below 1 child per woman[3] (compared with 1.4 on average in Europe - well below the generational renewal rate of 2.1), and with significant income and development gaps compared with the rest of Europe, a massive exodus (particularly of young people) is taking place; Macedonia is said to have lost almost a quarter of its population in twenty-five years; Serbia lost 160,000 people between 2002 and 2011, and the Serbian National Statistics Office estimates that the country could have fewer than 6 million inhabitants in 2030,[12] compared with 7.7 in 2016. Bosnia-Herzegovina has also been hard hit by the phenomenon, with an estimated 170,000 departures over the past five years.[13]

For High Representative Federica Mogherini: "The Western Balkans are part of Europe: we share the same history, the same geography, the same cultural heritage, as well as the same opportunities and challenges today and in the future [...] This strategy shows the path we must follow: for all our six partners, overcoming the past once and for all, and for all of us, making the process of bringing the Western Balkans closer to the European Union an irreversible one, and continuing to reunite the continent".[5]

Goals

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Through six main initiatives, this strategy aims to support the transformation of the Western Balkans so that the countries concerned meet the values of the European Union and, in the longer term, are able to achieve the convergence criteria:[6]

  • The rule of law: with individual and detailed action plans for compliance with EU standards and special monitoring for candidate countries; including the deployment of new advisory missions.
  • Security and migration control: with reinforced cooperation in the fight against organized crime and terrorism, as well as the strengthening of border control and migrant management, and increased cooperation with the Frontex agency.
  • Socio-economic development: this includes a range of mechanisms designed to facilitate the financing of SMEs, research and innovation. The EU also supports economic reform programs focusing on employment, social reform, education and health. Erasmus+ funding will be doubled.[14]
  • Transport and energy connectivity: in particular to secure supplies to and from the Balkans. The Energy Union should be extended to the Western Balkans.[14]
  • Digital strategy: this covers concrete areas such as reducing roaming costs, supporting broadband deployment, developing online public services, etc. ;
  • Regional reconciliation and good neighborly relations: this aims to improve cooperation in the fields of justice, education, culture, youth and sports, so that the region's tumultuous past can be put to rest.

The strategy also sets out the steps to be taken by Montenegro and Serbia to complete their accession processes, with the aim of meeting the Copenhagen criteria by 2025.[1]

Resources

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The European Parliament is responsible for managing the budget allocated to this policy; for 2018 alone, funding for pre-accession instruments has risen to 1.07 billion euros for the Western Balkans region, and is set to increase until 2020; over the period 2007-2017, it was around 9 billion euros.[1] The main program is IPA II, which forms the financial basis of the new strategy; for the 2014-2020 period, a budget of 11.7 billion euros has been voted for this pre-accession instrument alone, which is managed in line with the objectives of the European institutions and the monitoring reports drawn up by the European Commission.[15]

Monitoring of the use of aid is carried out by the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, which appoints permanent rapporteurs for all candidate and potential candidate countries; the Parliament expresses its positions in annual reports on each country.[16]

The European Commission also points out that the Union is the leading investor and trading partner in the region, with a total annual volume of trade amounting to 43 billion euros (2016).[17]

The Brdo-Brijuni and Berlin processes

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See also: Brdo-Brijuni Process and Berlin Process

The Brdo-Brijuni Process is a diplomatic initiative launched by Croatia and Slovenia in 2013 with the aim of working together to stabilize the region and accelerate the EU accession processes of the countries in the Western Balkans region.

The Berlin Process was launched by Germany in 2014, along with a number of other EU countries and all the Western Balkan states; although it is not directly overseen by European bodies, some of the objectives are similar (mainly regional cooperation and development of the region's infrastructure and economy), and funding is provided by European and external bodies (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and European Investment Bank (EIB)).[18]

Applications for accession to the European Union[a]
Applicant Submitted Accession /
failure rationale
Albania Albania 28 April 2009 A[19]Negotiating
Austria Austria 17 July 1989 1 January 1995
Belgium Belgium 23 July 1952Founder 23 July 1952
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina 15 February 2016 B[20]Candidate
Bulgaria Bulgaria 14 December 1995 1 January 2007
Croatia Croatia 21 February 2003 1 July 2013
Cyprus Cyprus 3 July 1990 1 May 2004
Czech Republic Czech Republic 17 January 1996 1 May 2004
Denmark Denmark 10 August 1961 1963[b]Withdrawn
11 May 1967 1 January 1973
Estonia Estonia 24 November 1995 1 May 2004
Finland Finland 18 March 1992 1 January 1995
France France 23 July 1952Founder 23 July 1952
Georgia (country) Georgia 3 March 2022 C[21]Applicant
West Germany West Germany[c] 23 July 1952Founder 23 July 1952
Greece Greece 12 June 1975 1 January 1981
Hungary Hungary 31 March 1994 1 May 2004
Iceland Iceland 17 July 2009 13 September 2013[d][22][23][24] Frozen
Republic of Ireland Ireland 31 July 1961 1963[e]Withdrawn
11 May 1967 1 January 1973
Italy Italy 23 July 1952Founder 23 July 1952
Kosovo Kosovo[25] 14 December 2022 C[20]Applicant
Latvia Latvia 13 September 1995 1 May 2004
Lithuania Lithuania 8 December 1995 1 May 2004
Luxembourg Luxembourg 23 July 1952Founder 23 July 1952
Malta Malta 16 July 1990 October 1996[f][26] Frozen
1 May 2004
Moldova Moldova 3 March 2022 B[27]Candidate
Montenegro Montenegro 15 December 2008 A[20]Negotiating
Morocco Morocco 20 July 1987 20 July 1987[g][28] Rejected
Netherlands Netherlands 23 July 1952Founder 23 July 1952
North Macedonia North Macedonia[h] 22 March 2004 A[19]Negotiating
Norway Norway 30 April 1962 1963[i]Withdrawn
21 July 1967 1972[j][29] Withdrawn
25 November 1992 1994[k][30] Withdrawn
Poland Poland 5 April 1994 1 May 2004
Portugal Portugal 28 March 1977 1 January 1986
Romania Romania 22 June 1995 1 January 2007
Serbia Serbia 22 December 2009 A[20]Negotiating
Slovakia Slovakia 27 June 1995 1 May 2004
Slovenia Slovenia 10 June 1996 1 May 2004
Spain Spain 9 February 1962 1964[l][31] Rejected
28 June 1977 1 January 1986
Sweden Sweden 1 July 1991 1 January 1995
Switzerland Switzerland 25 May 1992 2016[m][32][33][34][35] Withdrawn
Turkey Turkey 14 April 1987 E[36][37][38][20]Frozen negotiations
Ukraine Ukraine 28 February 2022 B[27]Candidate
United Kingdom United Kingdom 10 August 1961 1963[n]Vetoed
10 May 1967 1 January 1973

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ Applications to the European Coal and Steel Community, European Communities and European Union depending on date.
  2. ^ Due to veto of UK application.
  3. ^ On 3 October 1990, East Germany joined West Germany through the process of German reunification; since then, the reunited Germany has been a single member state.
  4. ^ Due to the election of new government.
  5. ^ Due to veto of UK application.
  6. ^ Due to election of new government in October 1996. Resumed following another election of a new government in September 1998.
  7. ^ By the European Council.
  8. ^ Referred to as "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" by the EU before 2019.
  9. ^ Due to veto of UK application.
  10. ^ By Norway after a referendum.
  11. ^ By Norway after a referendum.
  12. ^ By the European Council.
  13. ^ Due to public opinion.
  14. ^ By France.

References

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  1. ^ a b c "Stratégie pour les Balkans occidentaux". le site de la Commission européenne. 2 June 2018. Retrieved 6 October 2018..
  2. ^ "Le Pacte de stabilité pour l'Europe du Sud-Est". le site de La Documentation française. Retrieved 7 October 2018..
  3. ^ a b c Georges-Marie Chenu, «Quels Balkans pour le XXI e siècle?»
  4. ^ "Vers l'adhésion à l'UE : le processus de stabilisation et d'association". le site de La Documentation française. Retrieved 6 October 2018..
  5. ^ a b "Élargissement des Balkans occidentaux : destination commune". le site du Centre d'information Europe Direct. 7 February 2018. Retrieved 6 October 2018..
  6. ^ a b "Six nouvelles initiatives phares pour soutenir la transformation des Balkans occidentaux" (PDF). le site de la Commission européenne. Retrieved 6 October 2018..
  7. ^ "2018, année irréversible pour les Balkans occidentaux sur le chemin de l'UE". le site du Soir Plus. 22 December 2017. Retrieved 6 October 2018..
  8. ^ "Si l'accord entre la Grèce et la Macédoine est mis en œuvre, ce sera un pilier de stabilité dans les Balkans". le site du Soir Plus. 28 September 2018. Retrieved 9 October 2018..
  9. ^ "Inching closer : Serbia and Kosovo". le site de The Economist. 2 February 2013. Retrieved 9 October 2018..
  10. ^ Wolfgang Koeth. "La Bosnie, le Kosovo et l'UE : une adhésion est-elle possible en l'absence d'une pleine souveraineté ?" (PDF). le site de l'IEAP Maastricht. Retrieved 7 October 2018..
  11. ^ Debié Franck (2001). "Balkans : une criminalité (presque) sans mafias ?". Critique internationale. pp. 6–13. doi:10.3917/crii.012.0006. Retrieved 7 October 2018..
  12. ^ Jean-Arnault Dérens et Laurent Geslin. "Démographie : les Balkans à l'heure du grand exode". le site de La Documentation française. Retrieved 7 October 2018..
  13. ^ "Les Bosniens émigrent en masse vers l'Europe centrale". Le Monde.fr. 6 October 2018. Retrieved 8 October 2018..
  14. ^ a b "Questions-réponses : Une perspective d'élargissement crédible ainsi qu'un engagement de l'Union européenne renforcé pour les Balkans occidentaux". le site de la Commission européenne. 2 June 2018. Retrieved 10 October 2018..
  15. ^ "Règlement (UE) n °231/2014 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 11 mars 2014 instituant un instrument d'aide de préadhésion (IAP II), JO L 77". le site EUR-Lex. 2014..
  16. ^ "Les Balkans occidentaux". le site du Parlement européen. Retrieved 7 October 2018..
  17. ^ "Stratégie pour les Balkans occidentaux : l'Union expose de nouvelles initiatives phares et un soutien à la région axé sur les réformes". le site de la Commission européenne. 2 June 2018. Retrieved 10 October 2018..
  18. ^ Jeanne Cavelier (12 July 2017). "Les Balkans à Trieste pour se rapprocher de l'UE". le site du Monde. Retrieved 7 October 2018..
  19. ^ a b "EU launches accession talks with North Macedonia, Albania". Politico Europe. 19 July 2022. Retrieved 19 July 2022.
  20. ^ a b c d e Anonymous (6 December 2016). "Check current status". European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations – European Commission. Retrieved 7 May 2019.
  21. ^ Civil.ge (3 March 2022). "Georgia's PM Signs Application to Join the EU". Civil.ge. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  22. ^ RÚV, Application not formally withdrawn
  23. ^ "Iceland withdraws EU accession bid". Deutsche Welle. 12 March 2015. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
  24. ^ Iceland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (13 June 2013). "Minister Sveinsson meets with Stefan Füle". Archived from the original on 3 April 2015. Retrieved 19 June 2013.
  25. ^ "European Commission- Enlargement- Kosovo*". European Commission. 28 June 2013. Retrieved 28 June 2013.
  26. ^ "Chronology". European Commission. Retrieved 9 March 2014.
  27. ^ a b "EU leaders grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status". Politico. 23 June 2022.
  28. ^ "The Maghreb-Europe Paradigm" (PDF). Cambridge Scholars. 2019. Retrieved 4 September 2024.
  29. ^ European Commission (10 November 2005). "1972". The History of the European Union. Archived from the original on 14 June 2006. Retrieved 18 January 2006.
  30. ^ European Commission (10 November 2005). "1994". The History of the European Union. Archived from the original on 14 June 2006. Retrieved 18 January 2006.
  31. ^ The European Offensive Archived 11 January 2014 at the Wayback Machine. – Government of Castile and Leon. Retrieved 2 August 2013.
  32. ^ "EU membership application not to be withdrawn". swissinfo. 26 October 2005. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
  33. ^ British Embassy, Bern (4 July 2006). "EU and Switzerland". The UK & Switzerland. Archived from the original on 28 April 2006. Retrieved 4 July 2006.
  34. ^ "Retirer la demande d'adhésion à l'UE et dire les choses telles qu'elles sont". Retrieved 15 June 2016.
  35. ^ "Retrait de la demande d'adhesion de la Suisse a l'UE" (PDF). Swiss Federal Council. 27 July 2016. Retrieved 13 September 2016.
  36. ^ "Turkey condemns European parliament committee call to suspend..." Reuters. 21 February 2019. Retrieved 21 February 2019.
  37. ^ "Turkey Faces Crucial Vote on EU Accession Before Local Ballot". bloomberg.com. Retrieved 21 February 2019.
  38. ^ Perring, Rebecca (21 February 2019). "'Change it now!' Turkey FURIOUS as EU votes to STOP accession talks". Daily Express. Retrieved 21 February 2019.

Bibliography

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