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Operation Tekbir '95

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Operation Tekbir '95
Part of the Siege of Sarajevo during the Bosnian War

ARBiH Offensive Operations in the Sarajevo Region, 15–22 June 1995
Date15 – 28 June 1995
Location
Sarajevo and surroundings, BiH
Result

Army of Republika Srpska victory

Belligerents
Republika Srpska Republika Srpska  Bosnia and Herzegovina
Commanders and leaders
Republika Srpska Ratko Mladić Rasim Delić
Strength
ARBiH claim:[1]
17,500 soldiers
41 guns
132 mortars
24 tanks
ARBIH claim:[2]
46,163 soldiers
43 guns
406 mortars
19 tanks
Casualties and losses
Republika Srpska 200 killed and 600 wounded[3] 1,200 killed and 3,000 wounded[4]

The Bosnian offensive on Sarajevo in 1995 (codenamed Operation Tekbir '95) was a military offensive executed by Bosnian Muslim forces (ARBiH) against Serb forces (VRS) in an attempt to break the Siege of Sarajevo during the Bosnian War. The Bosnian Muslim forces were superior in manpower, but not in heavy weapons, key items for Trench Warfare. This lack of weapons eventually led to commander Rasim Delić to stop the offensive due to heavy losses.[5]

Start of the Offensive

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As fighting in Sarajevo gradually widened in 1995, Bosnian Muslim forces launched a large-scale offensive in the area. In response to the attack, the Bosnian Serbs seized heavy weapons from UN-guarded depots, and began shelling their targets.[6] As a response fo these actions, the UN commander, Lt. General Rupert Smith, requested NATO air strikes. NATO honored the request on 25 May and on 26 May 1995 and bombed a Serb ammunition dump near Pale.[7] The mission was carried out by USAF F-16s and Spanish Air Force EF-18A Hornets armed with laser-guided bombs.Ripley, Tim (2001). Conflict in the Balkans, 1991–2000. London: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-84176-290-3. During this attack, the Serbs then took 377 UNPROFOR member as hostages and used them as human shields for a variety of targets in Pale, forcing NATO to end its strikes.[8]

Course of the Offensive

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The Bosnian Muslim forces initially had many successes: the 1st Corps attacked and captured Debelo Brdo, Cemerska and Route Viper, pushing the Serbs back. However, in a counterattack led by Colonel general Ratko Mladić the Serbs managed to recapture most of the land, including Cemerska, Trnovo and Stup.[9] The ARBiH attacks were stopped because of the huge losses: 1,200 men killed and over 3,000 wounded.[10]

References

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  1. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 310. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  2. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 310. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  3. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 315. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  4. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 315. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  5. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 315. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  6. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 313. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  7. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 310. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  8. ^ Buckham, p. 215
  9. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 314. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.
  10. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 315. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.