Jump to content

Hwasong-6

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Hwasong-6
TypeShort range ballistic missile
Place of originNorth Korea
Service history
In service1992[1]−Present
Used bySee operators
WarsYemeni civil war (2014–present)
Production history
Produced1990−2000?[2]
VariantsSee variants
Specifications
Length10.94 m (35.9 ft)[1]
Diameter88 cm (35 in)[1]

Maximum firing range500–550 km (310–340 mi)[1][2][3]
WarheadHE, cluster munition[4]
Warhead weight700–770 kg (1,540–1,700 lb)[1]

Accuracy700–1,000 m (770–1,090 yd) CEP[1][5]
Launch
platform
MAZ-543 TEL[2]

The Hwasong-6 (Korean화성 6; Hancha火星 6) is a North Korean tactical ballistic missile. It is derived from the Hwasong-5, itself a derivative of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus. It carries the NATO reporting name Scud.

History

[edit]

Work on an extended-range version of the Hwasong-5 began around 1984,[1] and with only relatively minor modifications, a new type was produced from 1989, designated Hwasong-6 ("Scud Mod. C" or "Scud-C"). It was first tested in June 1990, and entered full-scale production the same year, or in 1991.[2] It is likely out of production.[1] The North Koreans would later use their acquired know-how to produce domestic copies of the Scud-B to create a larger missile, the Hwasong-7.[3]

To increase range over its predecessor, the Hwasong-6 has its payload decreased to 770 kg (1,700 lb) and the length of the rocket body extended to increase the propellant by 25%; accuracy is 700–1,000 meters circular error probability (CEP).[1][5] Such range is sufficient to strike targets as far away as western Japan. Its dimensions are identical to the original Hwasong-5. Due to difficulties in procuring MAZ-543 TELs, mobile launchers were produced in North Korea. By 1999, North Korea was estimated to have produced 600 to 1,000 Hwasong-6 missiles, of which 25 had been launched in tests, 300 to 500 had been exported, and 300 to 600 were in service with the Korean People's Army.[6]

The Hwasong-6 is armed with a high-explosive (HE) fragmentation or cluster warhead,[4] but it's believed that it can also carry a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead.[1]

Before the 2015 Houthi takeover in Yemen, the country didn't had a domestic missile program, and had only a small stockpile of Soviet-made Scud-B and North Korean Hwasong-6 missiles bought in the 1980s and 1990s. These were used against the pro-Hadi forces in the summer of that year.[7][8] Since then, the Houthis have used domestically produced ballistic missiles with Iranian assistance.[7][9]

Variants

[edit]

Iran

[edit]
  • Shahab-2

North Korea

[edit]
  • NK-18 − A variant with terminal maneuverability was tested in May 2017.[10] U.S. intelligence referred to the upgraded missile as the KN-18.[11]

Yemen

[edit]
  • Burkan-2

Export

[edit]

The Hwasong-6 was exported to Iran, where it is designated as the Shahab-2, to Syria, where it is manufactured under licence with Chinese assistance[6] and to Yemen.[12] Myanmar also imported Hwasong-6 ballistic missiles in 2009.[13] About 25 Hwasong-6 ballistic missiles were purchased by Vietnam from North Korea in 1997.[14] In 1995, Libya purchased 5 Hwasong-6 missiles from North Korea, however they were never tested or deployed, and planned local production was cancelled in 2003 with the disarmament of Libya.[14]

Operators

[edit]

Current

[edit]

Non-state

[edit]

Former

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j "Hwasong-6 (Scud-C)". Missile Threat. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 23 April 2024. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g Zaloga 2013, p. 96.
  3. ^ a b Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 48.
  4. ^ a b Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 62.
  5. ^ a b Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 46.
  6. ^ a b Bermudez, Joseph S. (1999). "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK: Longer Range Designs, 1989-Present". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Archived from the original on 2013-12-14. Retrieved 2008-02-14.
  7. ^ a b Samaan 2023, p. 162.
  8. ^ Williams & Shaikh 2020, pp. 15−16.
  9. ^ Williams & Shaikh 2020a, pp. 41−43.
  10. ^ "Introducing the KN21, North Korea's New Take on its Oldest Ballistic Missile". Archived from the original on 2019-07-07. Retrieved 2019-07-21.
  11. ^ North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation. 38 North. 9 October 2019.
  12. ^ "Houthis using missiles 'supplied by N Korea': Report claims". Al Arabiya English. 4 August 2015. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  13. ^ Min Lwin and Wai Moe (25 October 2020). "Junta Forms Missile Force to Guard Against External treats". Archived from the original on 25 October 2020. Retrieved 3 July 2010.
  14. ^ a b c "Trade Registers". armstrade.sipri.org. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved 7 September 2023.
  15. ^ Hinz, Fabian (16 June 2023). "After half a century Egypt's Scuds soldier on". Military Balance Blog. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Retrieved 20 November 2024. Whether the missiles visible are the 300-km-range Scud B or the longer-range Scud C is not clear from the available [satellite] imagery. The 500-km-range Scud C – which Egypt reportedly purchased from North Korea in 1996 – is externally similar to the B model.
  16. ^ Kang 2013, p. 116.
  17. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 354.
  18. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 297.
  19. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 282.
  20. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 386.
  21. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 324.
  22. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 369.
  23. ^ Mitzer, Stijn; Oliemans, Joost (4 September 2022). "Houthi Drone And Missile Handbook". Oryx. Retrieved 20 November 2024.

Bibliography

[edit]