Draft:Douglas Haig in 1917

Field Marshal The Right Honourable Douglas Haig 1st Earl Haig, KT GCB OM GCVO KCIE ADC
Field Marshal Douglas Haig
Born	(1861-06-19)19 June 1861 Charlotte Square, Edinburgh
Died	29 January 1928(1928-01-29) (aged 66) London

Field Marshal Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig, KT GCB OM GCVO KCIE ADC, (19 June 1861 – 29 January 1928) led the British Expeditionary Force during World War I. In 1917, he commanded the Arras Offensive, the Third Battle of Ypres, and the Cambrai Offensive.

Nivelle

On 27 December Haig was promoted Field Marshal, effective 1 January 1917. The King (George V) wrote him a handwritten note ending: "I hope you will look upon this as a New Year's gift from myself and the country". At the second Chantilly Conference, it had been agreed that Britain would take a greater share of the war on the Western Front going forward. Asquith had written to Robertson (21 November 1916) of the War Committee’s unanimous approval of the desirability of capturing or rendering inoperable the submarine and destroyer bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge. Haig and Robertson had obtained Joffre’s approval for a British Flanders Offensive, after wearing-out attacks by Britain and France. Lloyd George, who had become Prime Minister in December 1916, wanted to attack in Italy, but the Allied conference at Rome ruled this out. The alternative of an offensive by Robert Nivelle, who had replaced Joffre as French commander-in-chief, was initially popular with the French government (until March) and the British generals as it kept the focus on the Western Front, and with Lloyd George, as it kept the French in charge. Haig initially thought Nivelle was “most straightforward and most soldierly” and “more energetic” than Joffre. Haig proposed a wearing-out fight of no more than two weeks, which would also bring “such tactical success as will open the way for decisive action” – he wanted to avoid another prolonged attritional battle like the Somme. The British would also take over an extra 20 miles of French front as a preliminary. Then, accompanied by a diversionary British offensive, would come Nivelle’s own offensive which was to bring victory within 48 hours, then exploitation which at the very least would cause the Germans to pull back enough to liberate the Belgian coast. Haig was amenable to Nivelle’s plans as he had already agreed with Joffre that the British would launch wearing-out attacks in 1917, but (6 January) insisted on a contingency plan – mentioning the War Committee’s approval in October 1916 – that Nivelle, if his offensive did not progress as hoped, would take over the line from the British to allow Haig to concentrate his forces for “a rapid decision” in Flanders. Nivelle agreed to this in writing (13 January), at Haig’s insistence, after an exchange of letters In January, Northcliffe was intrigued with Clemenceau and threatened to withdraw support from Lloyd George if he agreed to Briand’s demands that two British divisions be sent to Salonika. Haig was probably not the instigator of the intrigue, but was happy to make his opinion known to Northcliffe and discuss their reservations about Lloyd George and Robertson. A further Conference followed in London (15-16 January 1917). Lloyd George, in meetings with Kiggell and Haig (15 January), deplored the high losses of the Somme and the way the French had gained more ground for less loss of life. Brushing aside Haig’s reservations – he wanted to delay his attack until May to coincide with Italian and Russian attacks, and possibly to concentrate his strength for his own Flanders attack later in the year – the War Cabinet (16 January) directed Haig to take over the line from the French, to live up to both the “letter” and “spirit” of the agreement, and not cause delays and prepare for an offensive no later than 1 April, almost certainly a result of private lobbying by Nivelle. They told Haig that the French were still the larger partner and their wishes must prevail, especially as Haig had not wanted to divert resources to Salonika. He ordered Rawlinson to prepare to take over more line as far south as the Somme, so as to free up French troops for Nivelle’s efforts. The War Cabinet had been charmed by Nivelle (Lloyd George told his mistress Frances Stevenson “Nivelle has proved himself to be a Man at Verdun … why you back the Man!”) although Hankey thought it might also be because Nivelle had promised a decisive victory within 48 hours. Haig was pleased that the French were willing to attack and do so early in the year, so did not share Robertson’s concerns that Lloyd George was jeopardizing the project of a Flanders Offensive, although he regretted that the French were now taking the leading role in the imminent victory again. Haig really began to mistrust Lloyd George after his interference and thought him “a calamity”. Haig was also angered that, despite his demands that the BEF be kept up to a strength of 1.5million men, Lloyd George wanted to reduce British divisions from 12 infantry battalions to 9. From now on and for the next two years Haig was often given limited information about the supply of manpower. Robertson suggested he complain to Nivelle, who would then tell the French government and thus embarrass Lloyd George. By February it was clear that the U-Boats were a serious problem, another reason to press on with Flanders offensive. Haig thought Jellicoe was “not … a man of great power of decision or character”. Jellicoe was far more bothered about the Belgian ports than Haig or Lloyd George.

Press Interview

Even a friendly biographer, James Marshall-Cornwall, was highly critical of Charteris’ influence over Haig, and his desire to keep up Haig's morale (p214 JMC). Unlike most of Haig’s staff who were there to execute Haig’s bidding, according to Esher, Charteris was fat, a drinker, and not a sycophant. Charteris had not wanted to be an intelligence officer, preferring operations, and disliked having to do propaganda work as well, and disliked Haig’s lack of understanding of the uncertainties of intelligence. Haig was not an innocent victim of Charteris’ intelligence - every few days he had Charteris present evidence on the deterioration of German manpower and morale, instead of allowing him to present objective reports. He predicted imminent German collapse as early as January 1916. Haig, following Esher’s advice to cultivate the British and French press, met three French journalists (1 February). Charteris censored the copy for military matters but approved it assuming Haig would give it a final check. He did not, and his comments – despite Haig’s insistence that they were not direct quotations - appeared in “The Times” in translation (15 February). “Our cavalry is awaiting the opening of the gate, so that the enemy’s defeat may be turned into a rout. The enemy will not have the possibility of entrenching himself even far behind the lines. Shall we break the German front? Why without doubt we shall, completely, and at many places.” He demanded that the German Army be defeated in the field, hopefully in 1917, but if not after as long as it took, after a “war of movement”. He referred to shortages of shells and guns, angering Lloyd George, who had been Minister of Munitions and who now advocated sending heavy guns to Italy. Haig scorned the recent “sham” German peace offers, angering many politicians – Philip Snowden MP said Haig’s “blazing indiscretion” had ruled out any negotiated peace. Major Neville Lyttelton (in charge of Haig’s foreign press relations) was summoned to be questioned by Curzon (whom Haig thought still had a grudge against the military from his days as Indian Viceroy) and Lloyd George, whom Haig thought, based on a recent editorial in “The Times”, was trying to stir up public opinion against him. Derby wrote Haig a guarded rebuke that Charteris had “let him down very badly” and had destroyed confidence in his judgment, suggesting that Charteris be removed from censorship duties and that Haig not give further interviews. Haig’s marginal scribblings on Derby’s letter indicate that he thought himself a better judge of public opinion than the government.

Calais

Haig blamed the delays, which were annoying Nivelle, on the fact that he had only 70 trains per day in February rather than the 200 per day needed to assemble supplies - he was demanding twice the railway requirements for half as many troops as the French. Haig demanded a meeting between British and French ministers to resolve matters, although on Robertson’s advice (14 February) he saw Nivelle privately with no politicians present (16 February) to discuss the matter. This meeting went well. Lloyd George had secretly (15 February) met Major Berthier de Sauvigny, Assistant French Military Attaché in London, and had told him of his confidence that Nivelle could win the war in 1917. Lloyd George had told him that Haig enjoyed too much prestige with the Army and the public to subordinate him to the French Command as Milne had been subordinated to Sarrail at Salonika, but that they would do so or sack him if the French thought this “indispensable” – Sauvigny rose to the bait and advised Lyautey and Nivelle to prepare such a scheme. Robertson – who had recently (18 February) boasted to Haig that he had been getting his own way with Lloyd George more lately - then told Haig (24 February) that Lloyd George wanted a meeting with Briand (French Prime Minister) and Lyautey (French War Minister) to draw up a formal agreement about “the operations of 1917”, but Robertson did not mention that he had been at the War Cabinet (20 February) which, despite Robertson telling them that Haig and Nivelle were in complete agreement, had agreed that the conference would discuss military operations as well as transport. The War Cabinet discussed the matter again (24 February) with neither Robertson nor Derby present (Curzon, Bonar Law, Balfour, and Hankey attended; Milner was away in Russia and Henderson absent). No minutes were circulated. They decided, according to Hankey, that “Haig is the best man we have, but that is not saying much” but Lloyd George told the other members that he intended to support Nivelle at Haig’s expense. Curzon recorded that “independent opinion” thought the French generals “immeasurably superior” in “generalship” and “knowledge of the science and art of war”, and that “the War Cabinet did not consider Haig a clever man” but had been favorably impressed by Nivelle, whilst politically Britain had to give wholehearted support to what would probably be the last major French effort of the war. Nivelle’s plan (Projet d’Organisation) was for Haig to be sidelined to personnel and discipline matters only, while Henry Wilson was to be appointed as chief of staff through whom Nivelle would give orders to the British Armies, with direct contact between Haig and London forbidden. At the Calais conference (26 February) the railway experts were soon sent away to continue their discussions in private. Lloyd George asked Nivelle, whose pretense of surprise fooled Haig at the time, to explain his disagreements with Haig “without delicacy or reserve”. Nivelle became embarrassed and praised Haig as his “veritable brother in arms”, but suggested that rules be drawn up governing the relations between the British and French armies, to be binding also on their successors going forwards. Lloyd George asked him to submit these. Haig, walking into the trap, insisted on the need to attack Vimy Ridge. Nivelle was asked to suggest a plan for the organization and submitted the plan secretly agreed a week earlier. Robertson - who lost his temper - and Haig visited Lloyd George. Haig told Lloyd George that his men would not fight under French leadership, to which Lloyd George replied that British private soldiers criticized others (ie. British generals) more strongly than they criticized General Nivelle. Lloyd George agreed that Nivelle’s proposals were "excessive", as the War Cabinet had only agreed to subordinate the British forces for the duration of the offensive, but asked Haig and Robertson to draw up a plan to implement them by 8 am. Haig, Kiggell, and Robertson met in the latter’s room and agreed that they would rather resign or be tried by court-martial than place the British forces under French command. The next morning, in a private meeting with Haig, Lyautey, and Nivelle offered him their sympathies for the “insult” to him and to the British Army by the plan, which they claimed had been cooked up by Briand and Lloyd George, and Nivelle claimed he thought Haig and Robertson already knew of it prior to the Calais conference. All of this was untrue and it would have been hard for Haig to cooperate with Nivelle if he had known of his deceit. Afterward, Robertson “ramped up and down the room, talking about the horrible idea of putting “the wonderful army” under a Frenchman, swearing he would never serve under one, nor his son either, and that no-one could order him to”. Lloyd George asked Hankey to draw up a compromise plan during the night rather than see Haig and Robertson resign, although Lloyd George insisted – lest the conference break up without agreement - that Haig still be under Nivelle’s orders for the duration of the offensive (expected to be two weeks). Hankey's plan gave Haig the right of appeal to the War Cabinet, but Haig refused to agree even to this and negotiated a free hand as to how to carry out the British part of the offensive. Haig was later told by a French general, Michelet, that the French Army would no longer be in any state to fight after the autumn. Haig wrote to the King offering to resign if he did not have the confidence of the War Cabinet. The King telegraphed back his support immediately, followed by a long letter from his adviser Lord Stamfordham explaining the King’s dismay at what had happened at Calais, and that he would have blocked it had he known in advance. Curzon also wrote to Haig claiming that he had the confidence of the War Cabinet. A critical biographer observes that it is to Haig’s credit that the events of Calais were kept from the public even though this was to Lloyd George’s advantage. After an inspection (6 March) Haig recorded his pride in his men, who now seemed much more seasoned than a year earlier: “It is beyond the power of any Frenchman to ever command such troops! They (would) not submit to the Frenchman’s underhand ways!” The Germans had recently added 300 battalions to their forces by more intensive mobilization and retreated (early March) to the Hindenburg Line, fortifications which had taken six months to build. This shortened their line by 40km and freed up an extra 15-20 divisions (135-180 battalions) which they hoped to use to knock Russia out of the war. Although it is now known from German sources (CITE) that part of the reason for the retreat was to avoid another battle like the Somme, at the time Haig privately hoped that it was the start of a general German withdrawal from Belgium, although in his report to the War Cabinet (2 March) Haig suggested that with the BEF spread more thinly by having recently taken over the line to the south, these forces might be used to attack at Ypres and cut him off from the Channel Ports through which the BEF was supplied, and that British reserves be moved north. Nivelle, assuming Haig was inventing this threat, Nivelle now wrote to Haig wanting to know about preparations for the forthcoming offensive, demanding that Henry Wilson, whom Haig distrusted, be appointed to take charge of Anglo-French liaison at Beauvais, this time reporting to Robertson, but through whom Nivelle would issue orders to Haig. Haig objected to the “very commanding tones” of the letter (“a type of letter which no gentleman could have drafted” Haig wrote in his diary) and wrote to the War Cabinet asking if he was to accept being so addressed by a foreign general who was his junior in rank (28 Feb).. When he learned of this Nivelle demanded angrily (7 March) that Haig maintain the full agreed commitment to the Arras Offensive. Haig privately wrote that given enough rope Nivelle would “hang himself”, but Nivelle suggested to Lloyd George that Nivelle now demanded that the BEF be split into two Army Groups or else that Haig be sacked and replaced by Gough. The French government also telegraphed London (7 March) criticizing Haig and demanding that he conform to the Calais Agreement. Lloyd George sacking Haig so but amongst the War Cabinet Hankey found only Bonar Law remotely in favor. Hankey warned Lloyd George (8 March) that Haig was right, that there was no obvious successor if he resigned, and that the German withdrawal made a re-examination of the plan imperative. He also pointed out that Haig enjoyed a great deal of support in the Army and amongst Conservatives, who might join with Asquith to bring down or weaken the government (and the Irish MPs might vote for this “from sheer mischief”), although he suggested that Haig be appointed commander-in-chief at Salonika rather than sacked outright. Robertson also then submitted a memorandum stating that the Calais Agreement was not to be a permanent arrangement, along with a “personal statement” which Lloyd George refused to have included in the minutes. Lloyd George was also rebuked by the King. Rumours were rife that Haig might resign. In fact, the King (letter of 11 March, preceded by a Wigram visit to GHQ 9 March) was worried that Lloyd George was looking for an excuse to demand an election (if no government could be formed with a majority in the House of Commons, the King would have had to agree to an election), blame right-wing elements for obstructing the war effort and bring in a republic, and that the Calais plan had been to split up the Army under French command to stop it being used in defense of the monarchy. Wigram begged Haig not to resign – Haig agreed that it would be “cowardly” and a “shirk” to do so. At another Anglo-French conference in London (11-14 March) Lloyd George announced that Haig had the full support of the War Cabinet, and stressed that the BEF must not be “mixed up with the French Army”. It was agreed that Haig would defer to the wishes of the French commander-in-chief, who would treat him as an ally, not a subordinate – basically the same situation which had existed before Calais, and Haig and Nivelle met with Robertson and Lyautey to settle their differences.. But Lloyd George alienated the British generals by his behavior.

Arras & the Nivelle Offensive

Nivelle’s subordinates had doubts about his offensive after the withdrawal to Hindenburg Line. Lyautey resigned as Minister of War (16 March), to be replaced by Painleve (whom Haig thought “a revolutionary socialist”). Haig’s relations with Nivelle remained cordial and he resisted Painleve’s temptation to criticize him. But he still wanted a separate offensive of his own in Flanders if Nivelle’s offensive was not going to force a German retreat by the summer. By this time British artillery had improved its effectiveness. The BEF had 4,095 field guns and 1,468 howitzers and heavy guns, up from 3,911 and 761 in mid-1916. It is often popularly supposed that the Haig’s offensives proved shelling to be a failed tactic, a view dismissed as “thoroughly wrong-headed” – rather it took time to learn how to concentrate high explosive bombardment. Falkenhayn’s offensive at Verdun has had a better press than Haig’s offensives, but only because he probably did not set out to achieve a breakthrough in the first place, but his advance came under fire from the left bank of the Meuse so he had to attack the Mort Homme and Cote 304, thus dissipating his artillery superiority. By the end of 1916 Nivelle had retaken all the German gains. The intense fire was needed as 100 shells fired by a 60-pdr gun would fall in an area 39 yards by 4.5 yards. Artillery officers learned to adjust for barrel wear, wind and air temperature, to protect advancing infantry with creeping barrages and to target enemy batteries using air spotting, sound ranging (triangulated banks of microphones) and flash spotting. These techniques were refined in the teeth of resistance from some senior artillery officers. 10 BEF divisions attacked at Arras. Haig planned three main thrusts – First Army (including the Canadians) on Vimy Ridge, Third Army on Monchy-le-Preux (including 2 cavalry divisions – they suffered heavy losses when committed prematurely), Fifth Army on Bullecourt (1 cavalry division - Haig kept a fifth in reserve). 60 tanks were used. Allenby wanted a 2-day bombardment, but Haig insisted on 5 days. The optimal width of the attack had been calculated, as well as a 500-yard creeping barrage including heavy machine-gun fire, with the attackers then protected by a standing barrage 300 yards deep. 2,827 guns were used of which 863 were heavy howitzers, which over a shorter width was three times as strong as 1 July 1916 as well as being more effective. Allenby’s offensive which began on 9 April, penetrated 6km (3.5 miles) on a 25km front, the best one-day advance since trench warfare began (aided by poor German placement of reserves), although the Germans soon rushed reinforcements in. Haig blamed the War Cabinet for forcing him to take over the French line in January, so he had fewer reserves than he would have liked.. Arras was kept going to take the pressure off the French Nivelle attacked (16 April). Maurice on Lloyd George’s behalf (18 April) sought Haig’s opinion about the French going onto the defensive until the Americans (who had declared war on 6 April) arrived – Haig deplored this. As usual, Charteris was reporting strikes, malnutrition, and poor morale in Germany. Haig obtained an assurance from Nivelle that he would continue to attack (Haig’s aim being to liberate the Belgian coast, directly or indirectly). Painleve (French War Minister) met Haig secretly (26 April) and made similar assurances, but seems to have been encouraging Haig to criticize Nivelle, which Haig refused to do. Ribot (the elderly French Prime Minister) did not want a change in command. News broke at end of April that Nivelle was to be replaced by Petain, who favored aggressive defense and waiting for the Americans to arrive – Haig wrote to Robertson that this would leave the British doing the bulk of the offensive while the French “squatted” on the defensive. Arras dragged on till 23 May and cost 160,000 British casualties. Haig had given up any aspiration to capture Cambrai but justified the continued offensive by pointing out that it was inflicting attrition on the enemy. Nivelle’s failure improved Haig’s political standing. Gough was told (30 April) he was to command the northern part of the offensive and the seaborne landings. Haig sent the War Cabinet a memo “Present Situation and Future Plans” (1 May), in which he said he still needed to wear down Germans further, and attributed Nivelle’s recent failure to this, “If full measure of success is not attained” then would still have inflicted attritional damage in a place where Germans could not easily retreat and would have gained ground around the Ypres salient. 847,000 tons of shipping was sunk in April.

Third Ypres

Planning Third Ypres

During the second half of 1917 Haig conducted another major offensive at Passchendaele (the 3rd Battle of Ypres).

Germany had freed an extra 1.7m men for military service, and by the summer of 1917 the German Army would be an extra 1.25m men stronger, an extra 89 divisions (albeit reduced from 12 infantry battalions to 9). Lloyd George called a meeting in Paris for 4 May. (Haig had arrived a day early for a bilateral meeting with Petain, whom he initially thought “most clear-headed and easy to discuss things with”. Haig was only willing to attack the Hindenburg Line if the French also launched a major offensive on the Aisne. Petain warned him that due to manpower shortage the French army was shrinking by one division per month, but he agreed to conduct up to four limited offensives and take over the line to relieve six British divisions. French mutinies were erupting near Soissons at that moment.) Lloyd George, who went out of his way to be charming to Haig, said he would support whatever plan Haig and Robertson agreed on, but Robertson was growing skeptical that major advances would be possible, whereas Haig still hoped that after sufficient wearing out cavalry and advanced guards would be able to make much bigger moves. Robertson’s memo of the meeting said that all had rejected Nivelle’s aim of “breaking through the enemy’s front and aiming at distant objectives” and that the emphasis must now be on limited offensives with maximum use of artillery to keep Allied losses lower and that exploitation would follow “if and when” the enemy had been worn down – Haig still saw this as compatible with his Flanders plans. Lloyd George may have guessed the truth about the state of the French Army when he challenged Petain to deny that the French wouldn’t fight, causing Petain to smile and say nothing (wolff p77). There were worries that the Germans might win the war before the Americans arrived. The plan was to attack out of the salient surrounded by German-controlled high ground (clockwise around Ypres: Pilckem and Passchendaele, Gheluveld Plateau, Messines). In front of Pilckem was the Steenbeek river which became a bog. Although the concrete Hindenburg Line did not extend this far north there were 5-7 German defense lines including pillboxes and 1,150 guns. The aim was for Fifth Army to take Passchendaele Ridge, drive on Roulers and Ostend, together with Fourth Army advancing along the coast from Nieuport to Middlekirke and a seaborne landing around Ostend using specialized tanks and landing craft (1 division – Joffre had proposed 5 which was unrealistic), thus liberating the western part of Belgium.

In January 1917 Haig had rejected Plumer’s cautious plan to seize just the ridges (1,500 – 1,700 yards at first, a shorter advance to maximize artillery intensity). Haig said that the Germans would be worn down by the forthcoming Arras offensive, so asked Rawlinson and Colonel Macmullen (who proposed a tank attack on the Gheluveld Plateau, a suggestion rejected due to woods and swamps) of GHQ for separate plans. Rawlinson was unable to agree a division of the attack with Plumer (GOC Second Army), whose assessment was that seizing Pilckem and Messines, together with a step-by-step attack on Gheluveld, simultaneously would need 5,000 artillery pieces, more than the entire BEF had by then, and 42 divisions. Plumer’s new plan was for a sequential anticlockwise attack - to take Messines, then Gheluveld, then Pilckem. Rawlinson agreed and demanded a delay of 2 or 3 (too short if anything) days between the attacks on Messines and Gheluveld. Haig wanted simultaneous attacks so sidelined Rawlinson then Plumer from planning. Haig presented a new plan at an Army Commanders conference at Doullens (7 May) after the Nivelle Offensive. Gough had been placed in charge, partly for his aggression (the “hurroosh”) and possibly because his inexperience would leave him open to Haig’s influence. Gough was fighting an offensive at Bullecourt and would take time to set up his HQ near Ypres and learn the ground. Haig now wanted an attack on Messines on 7 June, then, after a delay of six weeks, Pilckem and Gheluveld at the end of July. There is no evidence that the Messines attack was brought forward because of worry about the security of the 21 mines which had been dug there, nor did Haig yet know about the French mutinies. In order that the Germans wouldn’t realize Messines was the start of a Ypres Offensive, Haig hoped to keep the battle of Arras going, and hoped to add more British troops to Arras by handing over trenches in the Somme sector; this didn’t happen although Petain offered six divisions (Anthoine’s First French Army) on Gough’s left to lend a hand with the Ypres Offensive, and Arras petered out by mid-May. In a House of Commons debate in mid-May 1917 there was criticism of recent offensives, Churchill urged that the Allies wait for the Americans, whilst there was talk of aiding Italy or peace talks with Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary, an option already rejected by the Entente Powers. After this session Lloyd George cooled on the idea of western front offensives, and told Robertson that Haig must conserve his manpower, reneging on the early May Paris agreement. Robertson wrote to Haig (14 May) warning him that the War Cabinet would not agree to an offensive without full French participation – it is possible Lloyd George was being devious as he did not think Petain would fight. Haig wrote to Robertson (16 May) that he expected to capture Messines-Wytschaete Ridge in a few days, prior to clearing the coast, and dismissed the idea of Germans transferring divisions west – in a letter to his wife he wrote that even if Russia dropped out it would make no difference because of Germany’s desperate internal situation. Charteris told Haig (10 May) that Germany was wracked with food riots and mutinies. Petain (whom Haig thought unlike most Frenchmen “businesslike, knowledgeable and brief of speech”) visited GHQ (18 May) to discuss the limited attacks which the French would make. Haig showed Petain a phase map for his Third Ypres plans. Two days later Petain told Henry Wilson he thought Haig’s plan “impossible” given limited French help. Robertson and Derby warned Haig (26-7 May) that Lloyd George was worried about manpower, strikes (especially given the increasing unrest in Russia since the fall of the Tsar a few months earlier), and wanted limited attacks and cutting divisions from twelve battalions to nine. Haig replied that opportunities had been wasted through not keeping the British Army up to strength: “our Army is the only one with the heart and stamina” to beat the Germans. Debeney (2 June) and Petain (at Cassel near Ypres, 7 June) warned Haig of the French mutinies. It is unclear how much Haig knew of the mutinies – Petain said that two divisions had refused to go to the front line – the true number was actually nearer 50, and possibly near half the French army. Haig also knew from Esher’s visit to Charteris of the fragile state of French morale but, whatever he later claimed, there is no evidence that he launched Third Ypres for that reason. Given the lack of manpower and of French support, the rationale for the Third Ypres offensive had disappeared, but Haig didn’t see it that way. Churchill visited GHQ (2 June) and spoke of reaching a decision in August 1918; Haig thought “(Churchill)’s mind is quite unbalanced”. In a memo to the Army Commanders (5 June) Haig wrote “breaking point may be reached this year … one great victory may turn the scales finally”. Plumer attacked at Messines (7 June), using not just 19 mines but having also carefully calculated the amount of artillery required (2,164 guns of which 754 were heavy), and resisting Haig’s pressure for more ambitious objectives. The first objective was reached in thirty-five minutes, and the final by nightfall, but later the German later counterattacked. Plumer lost 25,000 killed or wounded, whilst inflicting 13,000 German casualties and capturing 7,000. Messines was a complete success but not repeatable. Haig asked Plumer to move on to Gheluveld immediately. It would have eased logistics to deal with Gheluveld first, but the very day after Messines Plumer demanded a 3-day delay to move his artillery, so Haig told him to hand VIII and II Corps over to Gough. This did not speed things up as Gough, with Haig’s permission, decided after six days that it was better to make a wider attack at the end of July. The French First Army on Gough’s left also took more time to prepare. This gave the Germans time to strengthen their defenses and Allied aerial intelligence was well aware. Robertson urged Haig (9 June) not to launch a major offensive without French backing which risked leaving the British Army short of men and suggested sending guns to Italy, especially as Austria-Hungary might make peace if pressed. Haig thought this “unsound” as “the German was now nearly at his last resources” and that the British should make maximum efforts on the Western Front. The War Policy Committee first met, at Robertson’s behest, on 11 June, but its discussions were inconclusive. Smuts supported Haig’s Flanders plan but also wanted more effort against Turkey. Haig sent them an “Appreciation” (12 June) recommending a series of bite and hold attacks, hoping for German morale collapse and “great results this summer” and which “even bring victory within reach this year”. Robertson did not agree about German morale and urged Haig not to claim that he could win the war that year, nor to include the appendix stating that German reserves were almost exhausted, not least as his own intelligence adviser MacDonogh did not share this view and it would be “regrettable” if the politicians were given two different sets of figures. Robertson urged Haig to stress that his plan was the best one so that the politicians would not overrule both Haig and Robertson if they both agreed, and also reminded Haig that the government had to worry about many other things besides the Army. Haig presented his plans to the War Policy Committee (19 June), who were evenly split. Milner said it would be worth a loss of 500,000 British soldiers to clear the Belgian Coast, but then backtracked and pointed out that such a campaign would “wear down” the British as much as the Germans. There were suggestions that the Americans, instead of sending troops, should make “an overwhelming effort in the air”. They discussed the “Petain” option of limited attritional attacks but did not pursue this possibility. Lloyd George’s preference was still to attack in Italy (he claimed Cadorna would be more favorable than in January, but this was probably with lots of Allied troops to help). Robertson was strongly opposed to Lloyd George’s plan to send 12 divisions and 300 heavy guns to Italy (“they will never go while I am CIGS”) because he thought the Italians feeble, and at risk of a German counterstroke down from the Trentino, and said that the Italians had confessed that they were “miserably afraid of the Germans”. Lloyd George claimed that this was the first he’d heard of the plan, that Haig & Robertson were seeking to mislead the committee on crucial points, that he had never heard of the French mutinies until that day, that had the French generals known of the plan they would have opposed it, and that they had indeed opposed it and Haig and Robertson were concealing this. None of this was true – minutes of the Paris meeting (early in May) and Haig’s meeting with Petain show that Lloyd George and the French knew and agreed to the plan. Also, Smuts had recently visited Petain and had reported back that the French were keen for the British to be fighting. But Lloyd George’s comments were unopposed and minuted as nobody wanted to call the Prime Minister a liar to his face. Lloyd George also wanted to husband resources for a decisive blow in 1918, protesting that the plan could not succeed without a major French offensive, which was unlikely to be forthcoming. Lloyd George expressed doubts (“all too accurate” in John Keegan’s view) about the Russian Kerensky Offensive which Haig thought a good opportunity for a British attack, and also about the narrow British superiority in strength. Haig thought the politicians pessimistic and told them “Germany was nearer her end than they seemed to think, that now was the favorable moment for pressing her … Germany was within six months of total exhaustion of her available manpower if the fighting continues at its present intensity”. Even Charteris was concerned that Haig made claims “rather further” than his own. Haig said that “he had no intention of entering into a tremendous offensive involving heavy losses. His plan was aggressive without committing us too far” and if there was not “a reasonable chance of success” he promised to halt his attack. This was the meeting at which Haig demonstrated how his proposed offensive could clear the Germans out of western Belgium with a sweep of his left hand on the map, it was later said that Lloyd George “never forgave” the little finger of Haig’s left hand. Jellicoe attended on the following day. The British Admiralty led by believed that the U-Boat threat could jeopardize Britain's ability to continue fighting into 1918 and said that “there is no good discussing plans for next spring – we cannot go on”. Jellicoe may have been motivated by faulty intelligence (only 10 U-boats were based at Zeebrugge), possibly by friction with Lloyd George over the introduction of convoys. Although even Haig admitted that “no one present shared Jellicoe’s view” that food would run out. In the aftermath of the Nivelle Affair Lloyd George did not feel it right for the War Policy Committee to overrule unanimous professional military advice from the CIGS, the First Sea Lord and the Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Haig, after re-examining the GHQ estimates of German manpower at Lloyd George’s request (21 June) retorted that, more important than arithmetic he had a better idea of the imminent collapse of German morale and that he had “no intention of entering into a tremendous offensive involving heavy losses”. Robertson also stated that he wished to avoid “disproportionate loss”. The War Policy Committee gave reluctant assent (25 June) to continued preparations, faced with a unanimous army and navy opinion, but wasting good weather. The King and Queen visited GHQ, and during discussion of the manpower shortage the King reminded Haig that men were also needed for ships and for agriculture – Haig recorded that the King did “not grasp the problem of beating the enemy”. Haig’s paper of 5 July was highly overoptimistic partly because of Petain’s assurances of a French offensive, and at least in part because of the Kerensky Offensive (which dragged on in Galicia/Bukovina until early August) – 4 German divisions were sent east, the last reinforcements to go in that direction. The Germans drove back Rawlinson’s forces on the coast (10 July) and it is unclear that the seaborne landing could ever have happened. Henry Wilson wrote that the British had to keep up the offensive owing to French indiscipline. The War Cabinet finally approved the offensive (25 July) a week before it was due to start – retaining the right to call a halt if it bogged down into prolonged “Somme” fighting with heavy losses. Haig wrote to his wife that Lloyd George was “untrustworthy” and that “the sooner he goes … the better”, complained about the War Cabinet’s lukewarm support for Third Ypres compared to the support they had given Nivelle and thought Derby “really feeble” despite his “strong and thoroughly British” appearance. Rawlinson and Plumer (14 February) had proposed a first-day advance only to the German second line, a mile distant, and had stressed the importance of clearing the Gheluveld Plateau. Haig still hoped for a breakthrough at Ypres “in the face of all available experience” – although as a series of bite and hold attacks - and in “one of the worst mistakes of his tenure in command of the BEF” chose Gough to command the offensive. Haig was much more aloof from planning at Third Ypres than he had been at the Somme, perhaps because the BEF had developed in size and effectiveness, although Gough later complained about the lack of free discussion, claiming that Haig gave the orders then delegated the execution. Gough took over (10 June), his new plan being to get to the German fourth line on the first day if possible and in his memoirs “the Fifth Army” later claimed to have objected to the plan to seize the Gheluveld Plateau beforehand as it would have put the troops employed into a vulnerable salient (in fact the point of such an attack was to command the high ground to his right and allow a wider British attack towards Passchendaele). Gough hoped to advance as quickly as possible on Roulers and Ostend, but Haig later said he’d impressed on him the importance of clearing the high ground of the Gheluveld plateau on his right first, and Haig and Kiggell told him the same again in August. Wiest argues that Haig hoped to achieve a breakthrough by wearing down the Germans in a series of bite and hold advances, and also urged the clearing of the Gheluvelt Plateau, but gave no direct order and Gough was too dense to understand the point. Gough later wrote to the Official Historian in February 1944 to say Haig had urged him to aggressive objectives. As chief of staff, Neill Malcolm managed to poison relations between Gough and the corps commanders (Goughie p227) But Uniacke was an excellent director of artillery. Gough planned to advance 3,000 yards in three jumps in the first few hours, then another 1-2,000 yards as circumstances allowed. Davidson proposed a shorter advance of 1,750 yards, which he argued would be better for morale and incur fewer casualties. When Gough canvassed opinion among the corps commanders, Maxse wrote “BALLS!!” on his copy, which is still in the Imperial War Museum. Plumer and Haig supported the Gough plan. Company commanders were sent on special courses. The infantry was trained on replica trenches, whilst moppers-up were trained to deal with German strong points. All men now carried one or two grenades and specialist grenadiers carried 10-15; lewis guns (portable machine guns had not existed in the early years of the war) and trench mortars were also used. After Messines the Germans had been strengthening their defenses in Flanders. The Germans faced the Fifth army with 1,556 guns over 7 a width of miles, whilst the British had 2,299 guns, 1 every 5 yards, ten times the density of the Somme in June 1916. A bombardment of 4.5 million shells (up from 1m before the Somme) began on 16 July, lasting 15 days, using 1,422 field guns and 752 heavy. A creeping barrage of 4 minutes per 100 yards, each gun firing 4 shells per minute, was planned. However Rawlinson had 189 heavy guns on the coast, whilst Plumer, besides the 112 heavy guns shelling the Gheluveld Plateau, was also employing 131 on a diversionary attack further east (agreed at a conference on 6 June, but too weak to be effective), so Gough’s heavies could have been increased by 50% with a greater concentration of effort. On 18 July, a month after giving provisional approval, the War Policy Committee finally gave the go-ahead (ratified by the War Cabinet 20 July) after Lloyd George had tried one more time to send guns to Italy, Robertson had “dug in his heels” and the politicians had to agree or sack the generals, as Lloyd George later recorded in his memoirs - the politicians retained the right to order a halt if results were too poor or losses too high, a proviso which Haig thought most unreasonable. Robertson visited GHQ on 22 July, and over dinner, Haig urged him to “be firmer and play the man; and, if need be, resign” if the politicians attempted to call a halt to the offensive. Lloyd George began talking of resigning and taking his case to the people when his plans for an attack in Italy were rejected at another conference at the French Foreign Office in late July – Robertson had in fact met with Foch and Cadorna on 24 July to agree to a joint line that the existing offensives had to go ahead first.

Third Ypres: Gough's Attacks

On 31 July the War Cabinet met secretly to discuss the consequences of Russia’s collapse, following the recent defeat of the Kerensky Offensive. Although they had no wish to make peace, they realized that Britain might be left carrying the main burden of the war, and even considered asking President Wilson to come to Britain and publicly swear to support the Allies. The attack was due for 25 July but was delayed for 3 days to bring up extra heavy artillery. Gough did not give enough weight to Gheluveld and pivoted towards on his left, and was not ready by 25 July despite the political delays - Haig was also at fault for not getting a proper grip of him. Gough also claimed in his memoirs that the delay was to allow Anthoine’s French First Army on his left to prepare, and so wasted good weather. There is probably little substance in this – three of Gough’s four Corps commanders (but not Jacob of II Corps) were glad of the delay as poor weather (which hampered air spotting whilst the strong west wind affected sound ranging) was hampering counter-battery work. Watts and Maxse’s Corps penetrated further than the Germans had hoped, but German guns were still strong on Gheluveld and behind Passchendaele Ridge The offensive was ruined by abnormally early rain. The 31 July attack gained 3,000 yards for 30,000casualties on the main front, going clean through the German front line, which was considered expendable, only for the lead troops of XVIII and XIX Corps to get hit by counterattack forces at 2 pm and be put to flight by German artillery. However, only 500 yards depth of penetration was achieved on the Gheluveld plateau. Haig claimed that German losses were double those of Britain. On 4 August, after Gough canceled an attack, Charteris visited the front line, evidence that GHQ was perfectly well aware of the state of the ground. The rain was premature, but at the same time shelling had a severe effect where the water table was just below the surface. Haig claimed to the War Cabinet (4 August) that German losses were almost double those of the Allies. Lloyd George was tired and suggested sending men and guns to Italy at an Allied conference (6 Aug) which Foch (French chief of staff) called “a fiasco” because of his tired and peevish chairmanship - Henry Wilson recorded “Foch thinks Lloyd George is beaten” . Sir Robert Whigham (Deputy CIGS) warned Haig (9 August) that Lloyd George was openly saying he had known all along the offensive would fail, and was again urging sending guns to Italy, and warned Haig that Robertson was having a ”real bad time” from Lloyd George. Lloyd George was “unresponsive” when Hankey pressed him for action in Italy (15 Aug). After a delay in which rain had made a bog of the low ground around the River Steenbeek where he was attacking, Gough attacked Gheluveld (10 August) in insufficient concentration, then attacked all along his front on 16 August, contrary to Haig’s urging. Haig told senior staff officers (19 August) that “final victory may be won by December”, a few days later telling his wife that the Germans would offer peace proposals soon. In September the Germans did indeed put out peace feelers through Spain but this may well have been a ruse to split the entente. Lloyd George even tried approaching the King to (14 August 1917) to enlist his support in lessening the casualties, claiming that the King and Prime Minister were “joint trustees of the nation”. In mid-August Gough told Haig that “tactical success (was) not possible” and recommended calling the offensive off (says Holmes!). Haig met with Plumer then Gough, and extended Plumer’s authority westwards to include the II Corps attack on the Gheluveld Plateau (25 August, effective 28 August) – there is no contemporary evidence that Gough requested this despite his later claims – but permitted Gough to carry on attacking in the meantime. On 30 August Haig had second thoughts and forbade Gough to make further attacks on the woods on the plateau (planned for 3 September) but Gough was still attacking at St Julien, claiming he was “training up” his divisions and that attacks were good for their morale. Haig raised his concerns about this with Gough (9 September) and after interviewing the divisional commanders urged, but did not specifically order, Gough to stop. Gough did so. Haig’s sidelining of his protégé Gough was “extraordinary”. Plumer submitted his plan (29 August) to capture the Gheluveld Plateau in jumps of 1,500 yards. The War Policy Committee in late July had only authorized the opening stage of the offensive but never made good on their promises to keep an eye on it and if necessary call it off and send guns to Italy instead. In fact, the War Policy Committee did not meet again until three weeks into September, leaving it to the War Cabinet (in practice much the same men) who spent much of their time discussing German air raids. Robertson reported to the War Cabinet on 31 July (on that occasion they were more interested in discussing the likelihood of Russia collapsing), 2 August, 17 August, and 22 August – he told them of Gough’s limited progress on the right although he seems to have slightly exaggerated the likelihood of reaching Klerken Ridge. On 11 August Maurice Hankey recorded his dismay in his diary that the War Cabinet had spent four hours composing a letter of rebuke to Arthur Henderson (the only Labour member of the War Cabinet) who had just resigned, instead of discussing whether attention should be switched from Flanders to Italy on account of the weather. In this period, in which Gough’s attacks were floundering, the War Cabinet never discussed the actual course of the Flanders campaign, let alone calling it off. Lloyd George – resting at the residence of Lord Riddell (owner of the “News of the World”) and sometimes out of telephone contact with London on account of thunder - finally sent a message to the War Cabinet (27 August) demanding the transfer of 300 guns to Italy, after the British Ambassador had reported on the Italian success at the Eleventh Battle of the Isonzo. Robertson, also absent, sent a message that Cadorna’s recent success, as well as Petain’s limited offensive at Verdun, was owed to British pressure in Flanders. The next day, Robertson returned and demanded that the War Cabinet make its mind up. Lloyd George invited Robertson and Maurice down to Riddell’s residence, where – after Lloyd George had served Robertson’s favorite dish, apple pudding, at lunch - they sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in Rome stressing the importance of the Flanders Campaign but offering to send guns to Italy provided the Italians could promise that they would help to win a great victory on the Isonzo – Robertson agreed to sign on the (correct) assumption that the Italians would make no such promise. Contrary to Lloyd George’s later claims, it was the military who had pressed the politicians to come to a decision. Esher warned Haig (3 September) that Hankey was critical of Charteris’ intelligence, as those nearer the front were less optimistic, and suggested Haig promote Charteris to Major-General as “a smack in the eye” to his critics in London. Haig was summoned to the War Cabinet (4 September), where he said that Britain must carry on attacking precisely because Russia was finished and France nearly so. Henry Wilson commented in his diary that Lloyd George was giving Haig enough rope to hang himself (Wolff 165-7), an opinion endorsed by John Keegan. The latest Italian offensive on the Isonzo had stalled. Lloyd George had wanted to send 300 guns to help. Haig objected to Foch (French Chief of Staff) – a skeptic of the Flanders campaign (WALTER REID QUOTE FOOL DUCKS and BOCHE AND BOUE) - sending 100 guns from Anthoine’s First Army (which was taking part in Third Ypres) to Italy, but Foch (4 September) said that the political implications of helping the Italians were more important than a victory in Flanders. Lloyd George thought this was a good diplomatic move and urged Haig to send guns so they were not embarrassed by the French, so on 7 September 100 British guns were found, although the Eleventh Isonzo Offensive ended before they got there.

Henry Wilson (5 September) learned that Rawlinson thought the planned coastal landings were “mad” and would never come off. Rawlinson also thought that Haig would not reach Roulers (29 August) and (5 Sep) “even (Haig) began to see that Goughie was quite unable to do the job”. Wilson seems to have shared these assessments. Churchill, on a visit to GHQ, told Kiggell (13 September) that he and Lloyd George were doubtful of beating the Germans on the western front. Haig objected to Churchill meddling in strategy and assumed he had come to spy for the Prime Minister.

Robertson wrote to Haig (15 September) to express his concerns that shelling, although necessary, was churning up the ground and making it harder to advance. There is no evidence to bear out the claims of the Official History that on 19 September Petain demanded a continuation of the British offensive to take the pressure off (let alone Haig’s 1927 letter to Charteris). Terraine speculated that this may refer to the single mutinous incident recorded in September, or else to some undisclosed incident in Petain’s Champagne or Verdun offensives that autumn.

Third Ypres: Plumer's Attacks

In much drier weather and after a pause of nearly a month, Plumer won Menin Road (20 September). The Germans had 6 divisions and 3 eingreif (counterattack) divisions in reserve, and 750 guns of which 200 were deployed against Plumer. They were attacked by 9 British divisions (not counting flanking fire from others). Second Army had 575 heavy guns and 750 field guns over a 5,000-yard width and fired 1.65 million shells (the same number as in the whole pre-1 July 1916 bombardment – cite Neillands). Fifth Army had 300 heavy and 600 field guns over a similar width of attack. The heaviest guns were used against bunkers. There was a creeping barrage of up to 1,000 yards depth, then a nine hours-long standing barrage to protect the attackers. The emphasis was not on geographic objectives but on seizing ground within artillery cover. But low cloud and rain hampered spotting, as well as the Germans, moving their guns around (so Allied maps showed twice as many German “batteries active” as they actually had), so even a 4:1 artillery superiority was not absolute. The sheer concentration of British artillery also made it easy for German counter-battery fire to hit some of them. 1 ANZAC Corps suffered heavily and were shelled by their own artillery. Menin Road cost 21,000 casualties for a gain of 5.5 square miles, 3,800 per square mile, whereas Gough on 31 July had suffered 27,000 casualties and captured 18 square miles, some of which was regained by German counterattacks, 1,500 per square mile. Menin Road looked better because expectations were lower and there was no subsequent floundering like Gough in August. Robertson reported this success to the War Cabinet (21 September) – they weren’t interested but recorded Cadorna’s message that there would be no further Italian offensive that year, despite all Italian preparations having seemed in hand when Derby (Secretary for War) had visited Italy the previous week. The War Cabinet met again on 24 September to discuss another message from Cadorna, then that very afternoon the War Policy Committee was at last reconvened, this time to discuss possible British operations against Turkey. Lloyd George remarked that a victory against the Turks would impress British public opinion much more than Plumer’s small advances in Flanders. In late September the War Cabinet discussed German peace feelers. One, via Spain, had made no mention of terms. Another, apparently semi-official, suggested that Germany might be willing to give up Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, and Serbia, and give up colonies to Britain and land to Italy if permitted to keep Poland and Courland. Milner advised rejecting these terms as they would still leave Germany stronger than when she entered the war. Lloyd George and Robertson went to France and discussed these terms with Haig on 26 September, warning him that with Russia finished and with France and Italy weak, Britain could not hope to win the war “singlehanded”. During this visit, Robertson sounded the opinion of the Army Commanders jointly as to whether the offensive should end but insisted that Haig be present also, and later wrote that he had not been willing to oppose Haig openly; on his return to London he wrote Haig a letter (27 Sep) agreeing that Germany “might” be nearer the end than the evidence suggested, and that “stagnation” would sap the nation’s determination. The peace feelers ended when Chancellor Michaelis declared that Germany would fight on, and Robertson urged Lloyd George to diplomatic efforts to encourage Turkey or Bulgaria to make peace. Haig now hoped to have the Gheluveld Plateau cleared by early October, to link with “Hush” which on Admiral Bacon’s advice by 5 November at the latest. The Germans were able to replace their guns (none had been captured) whilst the British had to haul theirs forward, so in the week up to 25 September German artillery inflicted losses. On that day a strong counterattack by the German 50th Division south of Polygon Wood, supported by 44 fields and 20 heavy batteries - the strongest artillery support for a division-sized attack in the war - was halted when the weather cleared mid-morning so Allied fire was able to prevent German reinforcements, but the Allies were unable to retake the ground, which hampered the attack on Polygon Wood. This time Plumer attacked over a width of only 8,500 yards to a depth of 1,000-1,250 yards (down from 14,500 yards to a depth of 1,500-1,700 yards at Menin Road); only 60% of the number of shells was fired but the artillery concentration was much the same. Polygon Wood succeeded but incurred 15,375 casualties for a gain of 3.5 square miles, 4,400 casualties per square mile, 50% higher than Menin Road. Menin Road and Polygon Wood had cost 36,000 casualties to gain 2,750 yards, but Passchendaele Ridge was still 4,500 yards away. Lloyd George thought the German prisoners he saw on 26 September were weedy compared to British troops. French attacks promised for 1 September and 25-6 September had not materialized, and Lloyd George was skeptical that the French attack planned for 10 October would happen, although he remarked that the Nivelle Offensive (along with Arras/Vimy) had actually gained the most prisoners and guns that year. Haig called a conference at Second Army HQ and wrote in his diary that “decisive results” were now possible as he believed the Germans to be in an “advanced state of demoralization”. By 10 October the cavalry should be ready to exploit to Morslede, Staden, and Roulers (a distance of 20miles, double what had so far been achieved) – Plumer and Gough cautioned him that it might take a little longer and mid-October was more feasible - and told Jellicoe and Rawlinson to prepare for coastal operations. At a further conference (2 October) Haig stressed how close Germans had come to a breakthrough at First Ypres in October 1914. Second Army had 7 brigades of infantry and mobile artillery and 2 cavalry brigades in reserve ready to exploit, and Fifth Army had similar, whilst Haig pledged to have the cavalry corps ready behind the Yser Canal, ready to advance on Roulers and Thourout. Broodseinde (4 October, brought forward 2 days) cost 20,000 casualties to gain 1,000 yards and took 5,000 prisoners. German sources do confirm that they were being hard-pressed. The Australian historian Bean called this an “overwhelming blow” , exacerbated by the Germans bringing their defense further forward, but the weather was now worsening as the British were advancing into the lower, flooded ground (even on 4 October ANZACS on left of Second Army had lost their creeping barrage protection because of mud slowing them round Hannebeek) so tanks could not be used. Plumer was now advancing into a salient, so it was harder to maintain artillery superiority, especially as the interval between attacks was getting less. However, optimism was high and the Canadian Corps was also now ready to exploit. After the 4 October success Charteris wrote in his diary that there was now no chance of clearing the coast unless the fine weather continued and that senior commanders would welcome a halt. Paddy Griffith thought that Third Ypres should have been called off after Broodseinde. But the Australian Official Historian wrote that it was reasonable in the circumstances of 4 October to carry on after the recent Plumer progress. Hagenlucke wrote that “the Germans could find no remedy, the recapturing of lost ground was impossible”, Rupprecht began preparing comprehensive withdrawal from western Belgium. Had Haig broken off on 4 October he would have been damned for evermore for failing to capitalize on Plumer’s victories. The rain started again on 4 October, and the mud was soon so bad that even heavy artillery well behind the front was finding it hard to get supplied with shells. In early October Plumer and Gough, both demanded a halt (says Holmes!) . In the Official History, Edmonds claimed there had been a meeting on 7 October at which Plumer and Gough recommended closing down the offensive, but Haig insisted on pushing on to Passchendaele Ridge, although he ordered the exploitation forces to stand down. However, there is no mention of any such meeting in the files, in Haig’s diary, nor did Gough make any such claim in his memoirs. Furthermore on 6 October Gough had written to Gwynne of the “Morning Post” that he hoped the weather would hold up as “we have a lot to do yet” whilst Harington, Plumer’s chief of staff, told war correspondents that after one or two more “bangs” the cavalry would be able to push through. Robertson had urged Haig (15 September) to reconsider how heavy shelling was making it harder to get guns forward – Haig did not reply, and warned Haig (27 Sep) that Russia was close to collapse and reminded him that France and Italy not in good shape, and the USA would not be a major presence in the war for a long time yet. The War Policy Committee reconvened on 3 October and discussed how German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian manpower was holding up but the Turks were weaker and might be induced to accept terms after being defeated in Palestine. At that meeting, Lloyd George complained that the French were not attacking and that the British would be lucky to reach Passchendaele, and certainly not Klerken as Haig had originally promised. But they still didn’t demand a halt to Third Ypres, only insisting that the generals agree to winter operations in Palestine. Robertson warned Haig (3 October) that the government had approved taking over a stretch of line from Petain (this had been decided on 25 Sep without consulting Haig, nor did Lloyd George or Robertson tell Haig when they visited GHQ on 26 Sep).

Haig wrote to Robertson (8 October), urging him to greater efforts in standing up to Lloyd George and claiming that the British could still win the war in 1917 with a proper concentration on the Western Front and that French morale was now good enough for defense and limited offensives but not for major offensives. This is not consistent with Haig’s later claim to Charteris (5 March 1927) that he could not switch from attacking at Ypres to Cambrai because Petain had begged him not to leave the Germans alone for a week. Gemeau had also told Haig that French morale was now good. The March 1927 letter may have been a justification a decade after the event. In his 8 October paper Haig claimed that since 1 April 1917 135 of the 147 German divisions on the Western Front had been driven from their positions or withdrawn after suffering losses, several of them two or three times, and argued that the Allies could beat Germany in 1918 even if Russia were to make peace. The War Cabinet was skeptical, and in his reply, Robertson cautioned Haig that German Army morale still seemed to be holding up well. Robertson replied to Haig the next day “let me do my own job in my own way” in standing up for proper principles of warfare against Lloyd George (earlier he had told Haig he was “sick of this d-d life”). He thought Haig’s memo “splendid”

Third Ypres: Passchendaele

The weather on 5-9 October made air spotting impossible. Many guns had to stay west of the Steenbeek, making artillery support a quarter of what it had been on 20 September, but now facing reinforced Germans with fresh guns. Poelcapelle (9 October) made poor progress, although Haig and Plumer were convinced otherwise (Gough and Maxse were skeptical). Groot argues that Third Ypres continued after 10 October not just to capture the high ground but also because Haig still believed victory possible. The seaborne landing had already been delayed after the Germans shelled Nieuport, and was canceled in mid-October when it became clear Roulers would not fall. Haig told Poincare (French President) that German morale was on the verge of collapse, and he thought (13? or ?15 October) McDonogh (Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office) was skeptical of German collapse because he was looking at “tainted sources” (McDonogh was Roman Catholic, and Pope Benedict had recently called for a compromise peace). The War Policy Committee met for the last time on 11 October and spent time criticizing Lynder-Bell, former chief of staff in Egypt, for his pessimistic appraisal, remarking how Murray (Allenby’s predecessor) and Milne in Salonika always stressed the importance of western front because generals were dependent on the approval of their seniors. Bonar Law suggested attacking in Italy rather than risk “another Dardanelles” by attacking Turkey but was rebutted by Smuts. Lloyd George again praised the “success” of the Nivelle Offensive. There was no mention of calling off Third Ypres, despite a week of heavy rain. t Lloyd George predicted that Klerken Ridge would still not have been gained by the time of the War Cabinet meeting in three weeks’ time. Curzon said he was ready to accept that Haig and Robertson might be wrong about the importance of the Western Front, while Smuts thought it had always been “insoluble” and would only get “hopeless” now Russia was out of the war. Nobody was impressed by Plumer’s three small victories, and they agreed to get a “second opinion” on war strategy. Haig urged Robertson, who was furious at the advice of others being sought, not to resign at least until his advice had been rejected. Haig's predecessor Viscount French and Henry Wilson were invited to give the War Cabinet a "second opinion" of Haig's strategy, although in the event French was so bitter that his report had to be toned down before Haig and Robertson were allowed to read it, and he seemed to the Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey to be full of "hatred, envy, and malice". French recommended waiting for the Americans, but neither French nor Wilson endorsed offensives against Turkey. Wilson wrote that “it is no use throwing decisive numbers at the decisive place at the decisive time if the decisive numbers do not exist, if the decisive hour has not struck or if the decisive place is ill-chosen” and recommended that an Inter-Allied Council be set up. Wilson had originally been quite keen on Third Ypres – he received Haig’s warm thanks for supporting it at the start, in July had told Bonar Law that worries about casualties was a good reason for staying out of the war but a bad reason for not fighting once you were in one, and as late as 5 October had told Lloyd George that Third Ypres should be kept going until mid-November. But on 4 September he deplored Haig’s reluctance to send guns to Italy “especially as Haig is not going to do anything really serious at Ypres this year”, so it is possible he was ingratiating himself with the Prime Minister by criticizing Haig even though they had few real differences in strategy. First Passchendaele (12 October), like Poelcappelle, “came apart” as guns couldn’t be got up. It featured a creeping barrage so feeble that it was indistinguishable from German shelling. The attackers, many of them ANZACs, came up against the strong uncut wire and took 13,000 casualties for negligible gain. The imminent transfer of a million or so German troops from the now moribund Eastern Front may well have motivated him in his eagerness to secure a decisive victory. When he asked the Canadian Corps commander Arthur Currie to capture Passchendaele Ridge Currie is said to have flatly replied "It's suicidal. I will not waste 16,000 good soldiers on such a hopeless objective". After Passchendaele was captured the number of casualties was almost exactly what Currie had predicted.

Currie was put under the command of Plumer (Second Army) with whom he got on, not Gough (Fifth Army) who had had a poor reputation with the Canadians since the Somme. Currie later wrote of Haig “I met him many times, and although he never had much to say, he always impressed me greatly. Leaving on one side his manner, his bearing, and his appearance – all of which fitted so well with his high rank, one felt that here you were dealing with a thoroughly honest, decent, manly man”. Currie predicted 16,000 losses “and we have to know if the success would justify the sacrifices”. Haig visited the Canadian Corps and addressed the officers, “asked” (not ordered) the Canadian Corps to do it, admitting that Currie had opposed the plan but that he had agreed after Haig had agreed to provide “unprecedented” artillery support. Currie insisted on attacking in three steps of 500 yards each (there was no attack till 26 September, time for Canadian Corps to relieve the exhausted ANZACs and to prepare the bombardment. It is unclear whether Haig allowed Currie leeway because he was Canadian - Haig had allowed a similar delay to Plumer (no favorite of his) in late August, whereas the British Birdwood, commanding the ANZACs, had not. Currie’s preparations included reconnaissance, by himself and other picked officers, massive artillery (587 guns, up from the Canadian Corps’ 320 normal complement - many of the extra guns were heavy and used for shelling pillboxes to stun the defenders, and despite Haig’s promise were obtained after a row with the British Artillery General Noel Birch), breach covers to protect rifles and machine guns from mud, combing his ranks for lumberjacks to saw down trees to make extra duckboards, and a massive barrage of heavy machine guns to prevent reinforcements and supplies reaching the German defenders”. After the first attack on 26 October Gough and Maxse wanted to wait for the ground to harden, but Haig and Currie wanted to press on on 30 October. Maxse’s XVIII Corps was withdrawn after 30 Oct and replaced by II Corps from the Gheluveld Plateau. The Canadians had suffered 12,000 casualties since 26 October, and by 10 November Second Passchendaele fizzled out as there were no more reserves. The French were always demanding that the British take over the extra line to free up French troops for harvest-gathering and operations in Syria (and, the British suspected, to grant more leave to French soldiers). The War Cabinet rejected this (24 October), missing a golden opportunity to demand a halt as Haig and Robertson had told them that it would mean calling off Third Ypres. The War Policy Committee (5 October) may have discussed manpower as Robertson and Lloyd George argued over sending two divisions to Palestine (no minutes exist as Hankey was ill, but Henry Wilson’s diary tells a story of how Viscount French had heard that manpower had been discussed). The War Cabinet discussed the manpower situation on 11 October and complained that they were not being given information. Figures were duly supplied by Frederick Maurice on 17 Oct and 1 Nov (estimates of German losses are now known to have been exaggerated). Contrary to Lloyd George’s later claims that the soldiers had kept the politicians in the dark, the War Cabinet had been given the figures as soon as they asked and were worried not that they were too high but about using them to correct inflated public rumors and rumors that “colonial” troops were bearing the disproportionate brunt of the fighting. The War Cabinet sent Haig a message of congratulation (16 October) for advancing “4.5 miles in conditions of great difficulty”. The elite British divisions - the Guards, 8th (formerly a regular division), 15th Scottish, 16th Irish, 38th Welsh, 56th London had all been worn out by then so, so the ANZACs and Canadians had to spearhead the final stages. Planning, tactics, and combat engineering by the Canadians took Passchendaele Ridge. Third Ypres had a severe effect on British morale. The Minister for National Service, in a December 1917 report endorsed by the Adjutant-General of the forces, wrote of morale problems, increased evidence of drunkenness, desertion, psychological problems, and bitter talk of waste of life amongst those who had fought at Third Ypres. And yet there was no British collective indiscipline, perhaps because British losses never so high proportionately as France, perhaps (WIEST HERE) because of better supplies. Philip Gibbs wrote that “for the first time the British Army lost its spirit of optimism, and there was a sense of deadly depression” among the troops. Bean thought Australian morale was nearing the end of its tether, and two official surveys of censored mail found positive and negative emotions evenly balanced in Second Army. Even Haig himself thought his forces “much exhausted and much reduced in strength” with many divisions either needing relief or rest and refitting. Lossberg never thought the British would reach the German rear lines.

Verdicts on Third Ypres

Peter Hart 1914-18 p.368 Haig was "wrong" to hope for a complete German collapse, and in the absence of such a collapse his territorial objectives - taking Roulers, let alone Ostend and Antwerp - were "always near impossible". However the offensive served to pin down German forces which might have been used elsewhere. British artillery-based tactics had proven themselves to be effective but costly and were not in themselves enough to win the war.

Steel & Hart Jutland – Pp19-23 Jellicoe born 5 Dec 1859. Passed out of Britannia 1874. Specialised in gunnery and caught the eye of Jacky Fisher, then commanding Excellent gunnery school on Whale Island – spent next few years alternating appointments to experimental ships and to HMS Excellent. In 1889 Assistant to Fisher as Director of Naval Ordinance. Commander 1891. XO on Sans Pareil then HMS Victoria where he survived the sinking (below decks with a fever). Tryon’s successor Michael Culme-Seymour kept him as XO of the new flagship Barfleur. Captain after three years then 1897 Joint Service Ordinance Committee. At end 1897 Flag Captain of HMS Centurion under Sir Edward Seymour China Station. Chief of staff to an Anglo-German naval brigade sent to rescue Western Embassy Staffs by train in June 1900. Railway line cut as Chinese imperial Army assisted Boxers. During retreat Jellicoe led an attack on a village which blocked their retreat on the banks of the Pei-Ho River. Shot in left of chest, thought he’d lost his arm at first. Made his will as both the doctor and he thought the wound mortal. He recovered but carried a bullet in his left lung for the rest of his life. 1901 Assistant to the Third Sea Lord and Controller Sir William May, inspecting the work of shipbuilders. Then commanded cruiser Drake where he trained his men in gunnery at longer ranges than had been thought practicable. 1904 served on committee developing HMS Dreadnought.1905 Director of Naval Ordinance at the Admiralty, responsible for developing heavy dreadnought guns. 1907 Rear Admiral, 2ic Atlantic Fleet on board HMS Albemarle. 1908 Controller at Admiralty. Warned repeatedly that German ships were better armoured and had broader beams allowing better underwater compartmentalisation, and was concerned at British shells. 1910 commander Atlantic Fleet then commanded 2nd Division of Home Fleet on HMS Hercules – worked on new “director” firing systems. Late 1912 Second Sea Lord. In 1913 manoeuvres he commanded Red Fleet against Callaghan’s Blue Fleet. Pp24-5 Beatty born 17/1/71 to Irish family settled in Cheshire. Undistinguished on Britannia 1884-5, family influence got him posted as a midshipman to HMS Alexandria flagship of Mediterranean Fleet, but poor examination results saw his career stalled at lieutenant. In 1896 (add wl) 2ic of river gunboats, had to take command after CO seriously wounded. Leadership qualities noticed and recalled at Kitchener’s request when advance resumed in 1897. Promoted commander and DSO, a “made man”. THE XO on Barfleur in China Station. Landed with party of 150 as part of impromptu naval brigade defending Tientsin against Chinese regulars and Boxer rebels.19 June 1900 wounded in left hand. Discharged imself from hospital and joined rescue of naval column which included the wounded Jellicoe.Married recently divorced Ethel Tree. Captain of a series of cruisers 1902-5. Rapid expansion of RN under Fisher kept him ahead of his contemporaries. 1905-8 Naval Advisor to the Army Council. From late 1908 skipper of pre-dreadnought Anne as part of Atlantic Fleet; he privately fulminated against tactical rigidity. 1 jan 1910 Rear Admiral at 38, youngest since Nelson in 1797. Declined 2ic of Atlantic Fleet but then early 1912 Naval Secretary to Churchill. Worked hard and stood up to him. 1 March 1913 appointed to command of BCF over heads of more senior officers.

CORRELLI BARNETT – The Swordbearers (1963) P109 In 1889 when he was Director of Naval Ordinance Fisher chose Lt Jellicoe as his assistant (He was currently on HMS Excellent). P110 In 1904 Jellicoe was a member of the Committee which drew up the specifications for HMS Dreadnought. In 1908-11 he was Naval Controller, responsible for ship design. Then 2ic Channel Fleet. Fisher wrote 24 Dec 1911 that Jellicoe was to be CinC Home Fleet on 17 Dec 1913. On 2 April 1912 he wrote that if war came before 1914 Jellicoe would be Nelson at St Vincent, if after that nelson at Trafalgar. By outbreak of war Jellicoe was Second Sea Lord and due to be CinC in December 1914. He was told by Churchill and Battenberg on 31 July that he was to replace Callaghan “in certain circumstances”. He protested at the meeting and six more times later. Travelled up on 1 August. P110 “Fisher had unrolled the carpet; Jellicoe stepped neatly along it”. P120 In 1913 Haig wrote Churchill a confidential comment on the Report of the Committee on the organisation and training of the naval war College. “By its own report, the navy stands condemned as inefficiently trained in the art of war”. P122-3 At and of Jan 1915 4 battleships and the battlecruiser Indomitable were out of action for mechanical failure. Jellicoe believed his fleet was technologically inferior and had only a slender numerical superiority. IN 1910 he had presided over tests and had noted that British shells were fine firing at 90 degrees but unsatisfactory for long-range plunging fire onto an armoured deck. He requested a new shell to be designed but this did not happen. On 14 July 1914, as Second Sea Lord, he commented that the British 1909-11 class were inferior in armour to their German equivalent . “It is highly dangerous to assume that our ships as a whole are superior or even equal fighting machines”. P123-4 On 30 October 1914 he sent the Admiralty an 18 paragraph letter In particular, and in order to forestall accusations that he was “refusing battle”, he warned of his intention to avoid following a retreating German fleet, lest it be a ruse to draw him into a mine or torpedo ambush. The Lords of the Admiralty concurred. P141 Beatty and his wife “an unstable neurotic” were like characters in a play by Wilde or Pinero. P295 Haig and Petain agreed (7 March)that Humbert’s Third French Army would arrive within four days of a request for help either on Gough’s flank at Montdidier-Noyon or behind Fifth Army at Amiens, or at St Pol a little later. Pp295-6 Not only did the British hold the front line too strongly, but Haig also kept too few divisions in reserve. Whereas Haig kept 30% of his divisions in reserve, Petain kept 40% of his (39 out of 99 – 19 in the East behind Verdun, Lorraine and Alsace, 18 in the centre covering Champagne and Paris (including 4 near Soissons, earmarked to assist Gough’s Fifth Army if needed), and 2 in Flanders behind the French Army there. P298-9 Instructions for three-line defence were issued on 14 December 1917. They mistakenly urged too strong a fight in the forward zone (“to compel the enemy to employ strong forces for its capture”). Based not on the December 1916 Battle Manual Die Fuehrung der Abwehrschlacht but on August 1917 Allgemeines ueber Stellenbau, a manual on the construction of trenches. In the German system 2/3 of the troops were kept mobile for counterattack, in the BEF it was the opposite. The Battle Zone lacked machine gun dugouts in Third Army and any kind of dugouts in Fifth Army, in Third Amry the rear line had been wired but not dug, whereas in Fifth Army it was simply a line of turned turf called the “Green Line”. P296 Haig, and his defenders at least as late as 1963 when Barnett was writing, believed that Third Ypres had inflicted greater losses on the Germans than the Allies. Barnett writes that this is “not certain and rests on speculative accountancy of a dubious and optimistic kind”. “in terms of demoralisation the question is equally open”. Ludendorff recorded that German troops were badly demoralised and dreaded a repetition of such a battle, However the British Army had “increasingly shaky nerves”, as evidenced by rising figures for cardiac and psychiatric disorders, drunkenness, desertion and absence. Many of the British troops who had “collapsed in rout” during the German counterattack at Cambrai were Passchendaele survivors. 309 GHQ orders to Gough 9 Feb “to secure and protect at all costs” the Peronne Bridgehead and the line of the Somme, adding “it may well be desirable to fall back to the rearward defences of Peronne and the Somme”. Terraine regards these as clear instructions to hold the front line lightly then hold Peronne and the river line at all costs, whereas Barnett describes them as “ambiguous”. 309 - OH German March Offensive p254. “No less than 19 out of 21 divisions” of Fifth and Third Armies which faced the German attack on 21 March 1918 had suffered at Third Ypres”. Their losses had often been replaced “if at all” by “raw drafts and transfers”. P311 – At 1045am on 22 March Gough ordered his corps commanders “in the event of serious hostile attack corps will fight rear-guard actions back to forward line of Rear Zone, and if necessary to rear line of Rear Zone” (Rear Zone of course was literally just a line in the ground. The OH p266 states that this was treated as “an executive order for retirement”. P312-3 At 8pm on 22 March Haig concurred with Gough’s decision to fall back to hold Peronne and the line of the Somme. He asked Petain for 3 divisions of help as agreed. Petain was already moving Humbert with 7 divisions to Gough’s assistance and the Germans noted the first French troops arriving that evening. (p318 – Haig demanded 20 divs even though Petain had “more than honoured his word already” by sending 7). By 23 March 8 out of Gough’s original 11 divisions were reduced to remnants and Haig realised he faced catastrophe. He ordered Gough to hold Peronne and the line of the Somme “at all costs” and asked Petain for 20 divisions. A GHQ Line and a Purple Line were ordered to be dug in, as Barnett puts it, “frantic haste”, defending in depth back to the 1915 BCD positions covering the Channel Ports. Over the next few weeks 5,000 miles of trench were dug, 25,500tons of barbed wire and and 15 million wire pickets were erected, a “vast achievement” which could surely have been done before. P320-1 Placing Gough under Fayolle’s command was the only outcome of the 11pm Dury meeting. Petain was also sending Debeney’s First Army with 6 divisions. On the evening of 24 March he agreed to deploy 6 divisions from the Eastern sector, but this would take several days with the French rail network full to capacity. P322 By 26 March only XVIII and XIX Corps of Fifth Army were still fighting units. P325 Petain not a fighter by temperament. P 332 acquiesced in faulty defence arrangements on the Aisne in May.

P100 Some evidence that British were worried it was a trap. If Kluck (who had been very reluctant to retreat as ordered by Lt Col Von Hentsch) had carried on fighting Maunoury and Bulow Franchet d’Esperey, Correlli Barnett argued that Sir John might have been most reluctant to risk the BEF by advancing into a trap. The Germans were wrong to think that reserves were unavailable, the German VII Reserve Corps, which had been freed up by the fall of Maubeuge on 7 September, could probably have been deployed to plug the gap in the German lines (in the event after first being ordered to clear the Belgian Coast it was instead ordered to La Fere (10 Sep) to become the nucleus of the new Seventh Army and then to Laon (12 Sep, covering 40 miles in 24 hours) – it could have marched from Noyon (where the railway was open on 8 Sep) and marched 50 miles to the Marne front by 9 Sep. (PUT IN SIR J F) P200 The Army was not alone in its dubious grasp of statistics, whether through malice or negligence. Amongst the grounds for the Admiralty’s initial reluctance, in spring 1917, to embrace convoy tactics against German U-Boats had been a belief that it would have to protect 5,000 arrivals and departures per week from British ports – in fact the true figure, after deducting coastal and cross-Channel traffic, was around 200. Historian Correlli Barnett described this as an “incredible howler”. (PUT IN MAURICE DEBATE) P244 Isly was one of the battles which contributed to the excessive faith in infantry bayonet attacks, which was to feature so heavily in French military doctrine after 1870 and which contributed to the disastrous slaughter of the early years of World War One. (PUT IN ISLY) Pp210-11 “To beat an enemy as powerful as Germany necessarily involved massacres … in the Second World War … the Sommes and Passchendaeles [were not avoided by brilliant generalship but] took place at Leningrad, Stalingrad and Moscow.” PUT IN REPUTATION P205-6 Haig and Petain met in Paris during Petain’s 15 day stint as Army Chief of Staff. Haig found him “businesslike, knowledgeable, and brief of speech. The latter is, I find, a rare quality in Frenchmen!” Petain and Serrigny went to see Haig in 18 April. Petain refused Haig’s request that he extend his line to south of Havrincourt, but agreed that the French Army on the British left (put there by Joffre to keep the British and the Belgians apart) would come under Haig’s command for the forthcoming Flanders Offensive, and promised three limited offensives, on 15km of the Chemin des Dames, to relieve Reims once German reserves had been drawn off, and on the left bank of the Meuse. Petain and Serrigny were struck by British distrust of their offensive plans. P238 Buchanan sent back gloomy reports but kept seeing signs of recovery – this may have been a factor to which Haig clung in coming up with 3Y. Paleologue, (until recently French Ambassador in Russia) and Gaston Doumergue (just returned from a special mission as Ambassador Extraordinary) were clear that Russia was in terminal decline. (PUT IN BUCHANAN AND HAIG) P239 On 9 May Robertson wrote in a paper that if Russia dropped out Germany would attain slight gun and rifle superiority on the western front and “it is obvious that offensive operations on our part would offer no chance of success” and that “strengthen our positions, economise our reserves in manpower and material, and hope that the balance will eventually be redressed by American assistance”. PUT IN ROBERTSON P240 On 19 May (according to Lloyd George’s memoirs, but consistent with what Charteris later wrote) Petain told Henry Wilson “In his opinion, Haig’s attack towards Ostend was certain to fail, and that his effort to disengage Ostend and Zeebrugge was a hopeless one”. Wilson wrote to Haig (20 May) that Petain was opposed to the offensives with distant objectives being urged on Haig by the Admiralty and the Cabinet, “but he added that it was no business of his”. Petain preferred limited offensives and “did not believe in another Somme” PUT IN WILSON P243 Haig wrote in his diary (26 May) that “for the last two years most of us soldiers have realised that Great Britain would have to take the necessary steps to win the war by herself” and that if he was given enough artillery and “drafts” (ie. men) this could be done. P240 On 2 June Debeney told Haig that the French offensive planned for 10 June was having to be put back for 4 weeks owing to the French Army’s discipline problems. P238-9 A GHQ Intelligence Report (11 June 1917) argued that even if the Russian situation deteriorated, “there appears no reason to anticipate that Russia will make a separate peace”. In his memo to the Cabinet (12 June 1917) Haig argued that the amount of future help to be expected from Russia was uncertain, but that “successes in the west would surely increase the prospects of it”. Buchananan and British military observers with the Russian Army forecast that the Kerensky Offensive would fail. Pp240-2 Barnett disagrees with Terraine “Haig’s latest and most able biographer”. It is hard to accept his claim that Haig was reliant on reliable promises of French support given the suspicion which the French suspected on 18 April and what Debeney told him on 2 June, let alone Terraine’s assumption that the French must have been deceiving him “the least convincing passage in an otherwise excellent biography”. Terraine does accept that Haig’s assumption of continued Russian help was wrong and that his acceptance of Jellicoe’s demand for an offensive to clear the Belgian Coast was simply useful to Haig’s arguments – Barnett approves of Terraine’s reasoning here. Pp242-3 “Events proved Haig wrong; his offensives failed either to take the ground expected or to ruin the German army, and in 1918 he was to be saved by the closest margin from defeat in the open field.” Motivated largely by stubborn pride in British ability to win the war before the Americans arrived in strength, and by an element of the attitude of public school “spirit” and “pluck” so evident in his diary, he failed to concentrate Allied forces by waiting for the Americans, as there was then only one US division in the line. “He also misjudged his own capabilities and possibilities and those of the enemy”. Barnett argued this was not mere hindsight as Petain, whose policy was to conduct limited offensives, build up his strength in tanks and guns, and wait for the Americans, read the situation correctly. P239 – despite the defeat of the Kerensky Offensive (1 July – 19 July) Haig still argued (25 July) for his offensive. ”Only by this means can we win”. P243 Petain would have preferred the British to take over some of his line but was happy for them to launch an offensive to draw off German attention, even though he thought a major offensive to be folly. P243 Petain ordered 2,500 Renault light tanks for July 1918 when enough artillery, aircraft, bases, road and rail improvements would be ready to resume offensive operations as the Americans began to arrive in force (US reinforcements speeded up because of spring offensive). PUT IN PETAIN

David Stevenson 1914-18 Pp336-7 offensive left a salient which haig admitted to Robertson would be indefensible. Nowhere near taking Roulers or the coast, while the Germans never planned a major offensive against the French. BEF tactics improved in 1917, but not at Ypres so there wasn’t even a learning effect as at the Somme. In terms of casualties and morale the much larger German Army was less damaged than the British, as was shown at Cambrai in November. German losses were far less than what Charteris had argued needed to be inflicted to defeat them by December. The British manpower crisis was already starting to bite by the start of 1917 and Third Ypres worsened it. German morale was badly hit, as testified by the writings of men like Ernst Juenger. The Germans were shaken by Broodseide but were still able to divert forces to Italy in October. The Etaples Mutiny took part in late September. Censorship reports revealed wobbly British morale and lack of confidence in victory – some of these reached the cabinet. “In summary, Third Ypres was a wasteful failure, even if it remains uncertain how the British army could have been better employed.” However, Petain-style limited offensives were never considered – “At times doing something may be worse than doing nothing.” “The puzzle remains of why the cabinet failed to act on its resolution to avoid a repetition of the Somme.” As in 1916 they failed to monitor Haig effectively, even though Lloyd George and Bonar Law “privately sensed the horror of the troops’ experiences”. It was reasonable to give the offensive time to work, and they were fed misleadingly optimistic reports and estimates of German losses by Robertson. In August the politicians debated peace feelers and Gotha bombing, then Lloyd George spent much of September in Wales, apparently close to a nervous breakdown. P338 “Cambrai ended as yet another Allied failure, or at best a draw … desperately disappointing to the government”

David Stevenson 1917 - p199-200 Haig wrote to Robertson (13 August) "the war can only be won here in Flanders ... I feel we have every reason to be optimistic, and if the war were to end tomorrow, Great Britain would find herself, not only the greatest Power in Europe, but in the world. The chief people to suffer would be the Socialists, who are trying to rule us all, at a time when the right-minded of the nation are so engaged on the country's battles that [the Socialists] are left free to make mischief". (NEED FN re PEACE TALKS, STRIKES & INDUSTRIAL CONSCRIPTION). Stevenson comments that it was rare for Haig to "unbutton himself" and reveal his aspirations either for Britain's imperial power or for domestic politics in this way. p201 German confidence revived towards the end, with Ludendorff, who had thought October Germany's hardest month of the war, now writing to the Rupprecht Army Group that "all is won" if they held on until winter. pp202-4 Almost all the BEF went through Third Ypres, whereas much of the German Army did not. The horrific conditions contributed to morale problems, which may well have contributed to the mass surrenders of British troops seen in March 1918. The offensive failed to gain any of its geographic objectives, although it did to a certain extent take some heat off the French Army, which was to play an important role in 1918. Haig's claim that it kept the initiative is clearly untrue, as the Germans kept pushing back the Russians and routed the Italians at Caporetto. The British Government failed to monitor the offensive as they had promised, other than to discuss sending heavy guns to Italy, even refusing a French request in October to extend their line as it would have meant closing down the offensive, although Stevenson comments that they had a lot on their plate (bombing of London, peace feelers, collapse of Russia and Italy, concessions to India and Zionists - Hankey recorded that Lloyd George was unsure how much he could interfere in military operations). "Haig was the guiding spirit behind the offensive ... Robertson ... assisted Haig against his better judgement". Limited offensives (like Vimy, Messines or Cambrai - or Petain's offensives) might have helped French morale but would still have been costly while doing nothing to win the war. Even if the offensive had started earlier, it would still only have had two months to clear the ridges before the August rain. "The [Allies] were running out of options, and without American intervention the consequences of [Nivelle's Offensive] and Passchendaele would have been still graver. Third Ypres can be ascribed in part to a surge in nationalism in the British High Command, directed to sloughing off French tutelage and winning before the Americans arrived. To that extent it was a product of hubris. Although it did not end in quite the humiliation and the impotence that Lloyd George feared, the harm to British power and confidence would be lasting." p204 Hankey wrote (14 September) "Lloyd George was also very annoyed at the way the General Staff twist their facts and estimates to suit their arguments". (PUT IN MAURICE DEBATE)

Wilson - Myriad Faces of War Pp482-4 Rawlinson recorded that there was “no cover in the forward areas” and that the mud in the low-lying areas was “appalling” – worse than the Somme the previous year – and liable to lead to “heavy losses from sickness”. Haig admitted in a letter to Robertson (15 November) that the Allied advance had fallen short of what he had hoped to achieve by winter, and would be hard to hold when the Germans, who would soon realise that they had “regained the initiative”, counterattacked. In a memo of 10 December Rawlinson pointed out that British divisions were severely below strength, whereas the Germans, who were soon to be reinforced from the moribund Russian Front, were very likely to launch a major attack before the Americans were present in strength, most likely against the indefensible Passchendaele salient, which was open to enemy artillery on two-thirds of its arc, and which he described as “defective, not to say dangerous”, and whose evacuation he recommended in the event of a major German attack. A report by Auckland Geddes (Minister of National Service) with the concurrence of Nevil Macready (Adjutant-General of the Forces) in December spoke of drunkenness, desertions psychological disorders, and grumbling at “waste of life” at Ypres. Philip Gibbs (Realities of War 1920 p.396) later wrote “For the first time the British Army lost its spirit of optimism, and there was a sense of deadly depression among many officers and men with whom I came in touch”. In political and press circles there was a loss of confidence in the military command. Haig was to some extent responding to popular craving for victories and could not have acted without the grudging endorsement of a Prime Minister (Lloyd George) whose ideas were “probably more grandiose, and certainly more insubstantial” than his own. But whilst he deserves some credit for the Allied victories in 1918 “he can hardly be excused a good share of the discredit that attaches to the calamities of Third Ypres”. The Germans also suffered under Allied bombardment, and their losses contributed to their eventual collapse a year later. However, in the short run the BEF was left weaker when Britain needed men “in good heart and in strongly prepared positions” to repel the impending German Spring Offensive , and would have been better off conserving its strength until the deployment of US troops, then expected to be later in 1918 (in the event their deployment would be speeded up to help repel the German offensive), tipped the numerical balance in the Allies’ favour.

Boff - Haig's Enemy (2019) pp186-9. Almost every BEF division fought at Third Ypres and around half the German ones. British casualties 238,000-244,000, German worst case was 217,000. It had a severe emotional effect on defenders - testified by Bavarian Official History and Ludendorff's memoirs. The British OH argued that "no great victory had been won: it was ... an ordinary, not an annihilating victory". There was no breakthrough to Roulers or Thourout and no German collapse. The OH mentions Rupprecht's plans for a major retreat - in fact Rupprecht's plan was for a tactical retreat prior to a planned counterattack. The OH claimed that the damage done to the German Army forced Ludendorff to launch his Spring Offensives while inflicting losses which doomed those offensives to fail. In fact Rupprecht's War Diary described Third Ypres as "a big defeat for the [Allies], a major victory for us"; the German OH described it as "a major German victory". The British only reached the third of Lossberg's five positions. Only 71 German divisions were engaged, just over 50% of the German Army in the West (down from 95.5, or 70%, at the Somme). 7 German divisions left the Western Front in July 1917 and were not replaced until November, after Third Ypres was closed down. German casualties in Flanders in June-November were much the same total as the casualties inflicted by both the British and the French in April and May, and less than the Germans had suffered in first six months at Verdun. Alexander Watson (Enduring the Great War 2008 pp153-5 164-7) writes that German morale was shaken but had not collapsed - morale was worse in units arriving from Russia and the Germans knew that the British also had morale problems. Ludendorff's main motivation was the collapse of Russia and the imminent involvement of the USA. Boff comments that "it seems perverse to argue that a campaign which achieved none of its strategic objectives was any kind of British victory and few modern historians have dared to do so". Sheffield argues that it kept the initiative. Other writers mention that the impact on other German operations was very limited. The worst of the French mutinies were over by the end of June. Boff comments that the lag between Messines and Third Ypres, whether or not unavoidable "significantly undercut at least one of the strategic rationales" (PRESUMABLY TO TAKE HEAT OFF THE FRENCH) and "the decision to continue attacking [at such cost] is harder to defend"; the latter decision was based in part, although not entirely, on poor intelligence. Prior & Wilson stress how Plumer had lost touch with the "bite and hold" concept by October. However JP Harris argues that British casualties were relatively modest as fewer infantry were taking part in any given attack (and more firepower instead). Boff concludes by quoting "a chilling and dis-spiriting" point made by David Stevenson (Backs to the Wall p29) - Third Ypres "promised to cripple the British Army as surely as [previous offensives] had crippled the French and the Italians", whereas limited offensives like Messines and Malmaison were too costly relative to their limited gains. Although tactical innovation continued, eg. at Cambrai in November, the Entente on general and the BEF in particular were no nearer to winning the war.

AJP Taylor (1972) p194 Taylor called Passchendaele “the blindest slaughter of a blind war”, whose sole result was to capture a deeper salient which had to be abandoned the following spring. Although Haig deserves most of the blame, “some of the Flanders mud sticks also to Lloyd George” for agreeing to the offensive in the first place and then failing to order a halt. Taylor wrote that Ludendorff’s postwar claim that Passchendaele had crippled the morale of the German Army should be discounted, as it was written to “conceal” the way in which the failure of his own 1918 offensives caused German morale to collapse.

In the 1930s “Passchendaele” as Third Ypres was sometimes wrongly called, rather than the Somme, was regarded as the main blot on Haig’s reputation. Liddell Hart thought “(Third Ypres) achieved little except loss” and was “so fruitless in its results, so depressing in its direction” that it became “like Walcheren a century before, a synonym for military failure – a name black bordered in the records of the British Army”. Robert Neillands described Third Ypres as “a battle that might almost have been a victory … (but) that the gains … were vastly exceeded by the cost is too obvious to deny”. He added that “there are few excuses” as, unlike Loos and the Somme, this offensive was not being conducted at French insistence. John Keegan wrote that “the point of … Third … Ypres defies explanation”. Keegan argues that there is no evidence that the Germans knew enough of the French mutinies to profit from them, and they were busy knocking Russia out of the war, whilst Petain was getting the French back into shape for limited offensives. The Official History claimed that the battle was an attritional success as it drew in 88 German divisions, but only 43 British Empire and 6 French – yet this ignores the fact that 88 divisions were a third of the total German army whereas 43 were two-thirds of Haig’s. “Britain had no other army” after Third Ypres, leaving her short of manpower and increasingly relying on recruits who would earlier have been rejected – the stunted, myopic, over-35 and under-20. Third Ypres reduced British morale to the “Slough of despond”. Richard Holmes wrote that Third Ypres, like the Somme, was an Allied “victory on points” but requires the historian to listen to his head rather than his heart. Prior & Wilson argue that Third Ypres was not “inevitable” (commenting that Terraine titled his 1977 book thus but never actually addressed the issue) and argue that the War Cabinet could have built on recent improvements in tactics (eg. Arras/Vimy) to order a policy of smaller attritional attacks, but since the French or Italians were not going to deliver a decisive blow they were painted into the corner of supporting Haig, and then they passed up the chance to call it off his offensive. Third Ypres was Haig’s project – Robertson was becoming skeptical of Haig in general, Petain (the new French commander-in-chief) would have preferred only limited offensives, whilst Foch (French chief of staff) warned of the folly of taking on “Boche and Boue” (Germans and mud) at the same time. Had the French argued more forcefully against Third Ypres it is possible the British government might have listened, but they seem to have been happy for the British to be fighting. Andy Simkins called Third Ypres “Good Tactics, Bad Ground” Dennis Showalter argued that if the Somme had been “the muddy grave of the German field army” then Passchendaele was the muddy grave of the German reservists and conscripts and “Haig’s determination and the perseverance of the BEF were not altogether in vain”. Sheffield thinks there is some truth in Ludendorff’s claim that it made the Spring 1918 offensives necessary. Ludendorff’s claim although “a corrective to the facile belief” that Allied offensives were entirely ineffective “cannot be accepted at face value”. Ludendorff later wrote that his heart was on the Western Front, but his mind was in the east, where Germany was gaining politically important ground – Tarnopol 24 July, Czernowitz 3 August, Riga 3 September. Germany knew by this stage that she was unlikely to win the war, but wanted to hold onto Belgium for peace negotiations – Ludendorff wanted to keep Belgium permanently, whereas Foreign Minister Kuhlmann wanted to use her as a bargaining chip (for the return of her colonies in Africa and Asia). The Kaiser had a council with Chancellor Michaelis, and Army and Navy Chiefs (11 September), after Pope Benedict’s peace call of 1 August (published 14 August) – the recent fall of Riga was mentioned as a great victory. Feelers were extended via Spain, and a meeting with former French Prime Minister Aristide Briand in Switzerland was proposed. The British felt it better to keep fighting until Germany was beaten, although Painleve was worried that France might make peace if the Germans offered to return Alsace-Lorraine. Riga was the most important harbor in the Baltic. Bruchmuller’s artillery techniques were perfected. The imminent attack on Riga helped to trigger General Kornilov’s abortive coup (25 August) - Kerensky had to arm the Bolsheviks to keep power, further alienating the army leadership. Further German advances in September (and the Oessel Islands 15 October) threatened Petrograd. Kerensky proposed moving the capital to Moscow, prompting the coup by Lenin’s Bolsheviks, who felt – correctly – that their Red Guards could mobilize enough public support to hold Petrograd. Ludendorff had to use his general reserve of six divisions – previously used to block the Kerensky Offensive and then for Riga, and now earmarked for a canceled offensive in Moldavia – to help the Austro-Hungarians who told him they could not have withstood a Twelfth Italian Isonzo Offensive. At Caporetto (24 October-19 November) the Central Powers captured 250,000 prisoners and 300 guns and penetrated 60km. At the War Cabinet on 27 October (Robertson was away in Italy), Lloyd George was rude about the General Staff, Derby was talked out of resigning by Hankey but Lloyd George said he wanted to “gain control of the war”. Robertson wrote to Haig (27 October) that two divisions under Cavan were to be sent to Italy as soon as possible; another three British divisions were later sent with Plumer in overall command(Haig would have preferred Rawlinson, currently under-employed, to be sent).

Haig told Robertson in a meeting (10 November) that he wanted to renew the Ypres Offensive the following year. Rawlinson was sent to inspect the battlefield after 10 November. All were now aware of British manpower shortage and an imminent influx of German divisions. Haig was stressing the need to switch to the defensive; Rawlinson thought the salient “untenable” and immediately called a conference of corps commanders to discuss retreating to a more defensible line when the Germans attacked.

Passchendaele casualties, should go in other article

Over the Passchendaele figures, Terraine clashed with Liddell Hart who (Spectator 6 December 1957, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution November 1959) accused Edmonds of "suppression and distortion". Terraine examined Liddell Hart's papers (at the latter's invitation) and found nothing to support this claim, although he found correspondence between Liddell Hart and Edmonds suggesting that Edmonds enjoyed being "all things to all men". I HAVE STUFF ABOUT THIS IN THE SUTTIE BOOK ABOUT DLG MEMOIRS - BUT NOT ABOUT THE LIDDELL HART v TERRAINE SLANGING MATCH IN THE LETTERS COLUMNS

Both Churchill and Lloyd George put Third Ypres casualties at around 400,000. Liddell Hart in “The Basic Truths of Passchendaele” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute November 1959 put Third Ypres at >300,000 versus <200,000 Germans.

“Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire” includes tables by groups of months, monthly totals, tables by battle.

Spectator 6 December 1957 Liddell Hart accused Edmonds of “cooking” the figures, to a degree which horrified those who worked with him. “In old age his treatment of the evidence became deplorably misleading”. Most of the statistics in the OH were compiled from unit war diaries. However, the weekly casualty totals for Third Ypres and Cambrai were taken from the information supplied to the Supreme War Council by the Adjutant-General’s office in February 1918. Terraine believes these to be accurate as the Army was desperate for manpower then.

By the time he published The Road to Passchendaele in 1977, Terraine had become aware of the work of M.J. Williams (1964 and 1966), who had refuted Edmonds' argument that German casualty figures needed to be increased by 30% to include men who were "lightly wounded". He wrote that Edmonds' addition of 30% to German casualty figures was “a practice not universally admired”. However, Terraine once again repeated the quotation from the 1916 Volume of the German Official History about not including “the wounded whose recovery was to be expected within a reasonable period of time” and once again repeated Edmonds' error of taking the comment, which referred to a single instance, to mean that the lightly wounded were as a general policy not included in German statistics. Terraine also argued that German statistics were notoriously incomplete, and taking account of these two factors a variable amount of at least 15% and sometimes nearer 30% should be added to them. Whereas adding 30% to the German casualty figures for Passchendaele would bring them up to 289,000, Terraine suggested adding 20% to bring them up to 260,400, roughly equal to what he believed the British losses to have been.

In the Road to Passchendaele 1977, p347 Terraine argues for a variable percentage of more than 15% and sometimes as much as 30%. He adds 20% to the Official German figure for Third Ypres, bringing it up from 260,000 to 312,000, which he claims makes it approximately equal to the Allied casualties in that battle, a result which Prior describes as “very convenient” for Terraine's argument. He also observed that Terraine had produced “no new evidence” for claiming that German casualty figures are any less reliable than British. FIGURES CONTRADICT PREVIOUS PARA

Wilson - Myriad Faces of War. P483 Approximately 200,000 German casualties and 250,000 British (and a small number of French) “is probably as close a figure as we are likely to get”. Claims that the German figures should be bumped up to take account of “lightly wounded” men are “easy to dispose of” – the ratio of Allied: German deaths is similar to the ratio of total casualties, and “not even the British official historian has suggested that” the German death figures need to be bumped up because the Germans did not count men who were only “lightly dead”.

Peter Hart 1914-18 p.368 puts British casualties at 275,000 and German at around 200,000

David Stevenson 1914-18 P336 OH put German losses at 400,000, but modern research puts German losses at somewhat more than half that – less than the British (275,000) but not much less.

David Stevenson 1917 - p201-2. British casualties were around 245,000 for Third Ypres, and 275,000 including Messines, broadly in line with what Haig had predicted to the War Policy Committee. German Fourth Army losses from 21 July to 31 December were 217,000 (including 38,000 dead and 48,000 missing).

Cambrai

By the end of 1917 Lloyd George felt able to begin to assert his authority over the generals (at the end of the year he would also secure the dismissal of the other service chief, First Sea Lord Admiral Jellicoe). Over the objections of Haig and Robertson, an inter-Allied Supreme War Council was set up. En route to a meeting in Paris to discuss this (1 November) Lloyd George told Wilson, Smuts, and Hankey that he was toying with the idea of sending Haig to command the British and French forces in Italy. At the meeting (4 November) Lloyd George accused Haig of encouraging press attacks on him. Haig was making similar complaints about Lloyd George, whom he privately compared to the Germans accusing the Allies of atrocities of which they were themselves guilty. Haig volunteered to write to J.A.Spender, pro-Asquith editor of the “Westminster Gazette”, but Lloyd George begged him not to. Haig wrote “I gave LG a good talking-to on several of the questions that he raised, and felt I got the best of the arguments”, a view which does not reflect the later reputations of Haig and Lloyd George. Gwynne of the “Morning Post” had visited Haig in Sep 1917 and had then written to Charteris urging an increase in Haig’s press profile. Charteris recorded that it was difficult as Haig could not give on-the-record interviews (after the earlier embarrassing incident when an interview had been published in which Haig had urged the politicians not to make a compromise peace) and any trumpeting that success was imminent might make it hard to obtain resources from the politicians. There is some evidence that both GHQ and the politicians were briefing the press against one another, and it has been suggested that the initial euphoria and then condemnation with which the press greeted Cambrai must be seen in light of this proxy war. Lloyd George, who himself went to inspect the Italian Front early in November, claimed that Caporetto would never have happened if he had been allowed to make Italy, rather than Flanders, the main theatre of operations back in January (a claim he would repeat on p2249 of his War Memoirs: “The Flanders Campaign was directly responsible for the Caporetto disaster”). On his return from Italy, at the inaugural meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles (11 November), Lloyd George attributed the success of the Central Powers to unity and scoffed at the recent Allied “great victories”, saying that when he saw "the appalling casualty lists" he "wished it had not been necessary to win so many of them”. His speech angered several leading politicians - Carson repudiated it and Derby assured Haig of his backing. Haig thought that Lloyd George’s political position was weak and he would not last another six weeks (there was talk of Austen Chamberlain withdrawing support from the government – but although Lloyd George did not have full freedom of action in a coalition government, his personal drive and appeal to certain sections of the public made him indispensable as Prime Minister). Haig and Petain objected to a common command, arguing that coalitions work better when one power is dominant, which was no longer the case now that British military power had increased relative to that of France. After Caporetto, Lloyd George finally had his wish to send British forces to Italy. Plumer was moved to Italy with 5 divisions and heavy artillery, which made renewal of the Ypres offensive impossible. Haig knew that manpower was now scarce both in the BEF and at home, and wrote to Robertson (28 October) that an offensive at Cambrai would stem the flow of reinforcements to Italy; Robertson delayed the despatch of 2 divisions. Plans for a III Corps attack at Cambrai had been proposed as far back as May. Haig had informed the War Office (5 June) that “events have proved the utility of Tanks”, and had initially (18 July) approved preparations as a deception measure from Third Ypres, and approved the operation more formally (13 October) as First Passchendaele was in swing. The plan was to trap enemy troops between the River Sensee and Canal du Nord, with the cavalry to seize the St Quentin Canal crossings, then exploit northeast. The first-day objective was the high ground around Bourlon Wood, and Haig was to review progress after 48 hours. Haig told his commanders on the eve of Cambrai (13 November) that the object was “to break through the enemy’s defenses by surprise and so to permit the Cavalry Corps to pass through and operate in open country” and after the battle minuted a document reporting on the officers of 1st Cavalry Division that they “must be blind” for being sceptical about cavalry exploitation. Byng’s Third Army attacked at Cambrai (6:20am on 20 November) with 6 infantry & 5 cavalry divisions, 1,000 guns (using a surprise predicted barrage, the brainchild of Brigadier-General “Owen” Tudor, backed by Byng, rather than a preliminary bombardment) and 9 tank battalions containing 496 tanks (325 combat, 98 support) on the unbroken ground. The area was held by only 2 German divisions over.On the first day they penetrated to 4 miles on a 6-mile frontage, further than at Third Ypres in four months (not an entirely valid comparison as the Germans had less room to retreat in Flanders). On the first day, they took only 4,000 casualties, capturing 7,500 Germans and 120 guns, limited on the first day by blown bridges and the shortness of the November day. Half of the 378 tanks were out of action after the first day but little progress was made at Bourlon Wood on the left flank. Cavalry was used but could not get through, and there was a lack of reserves after Third Ypres. The 51st (Highland) Division was held up at Flesquieres Village, which fell the following day. Haig's intelligence chief Brigadier-General Charteris told him that the Germans would not be able to reinforce for 48 hours, and James Marshall-Cornwall, then a junior intelligence officer, later an admiring biographer of Haig, alleged that Charteris refused to have reported fresh German divisions shown on the situation map as he did not want to weaken Haig’s resolution. Haig visited the battlefield himself (21 November), inspecting the fighting at Bourlon Wood through his binoculars. He thought the attacks “feeble and uncoordinated” and was disappointed at the lack of grip by corps and division commanders, and encountering 1st Cavalry Division which had been ordered to fall back, he resisted the temptation to countermand the order. At around 9 pm, he decided to continue the attack on Bourlon Wood, a decision which has been much criticized but which made good military sense at the time - to make salient more defensible - and was supported by Byng, although the political need for a clear victory may also have been a factor. The offensive continued but with diminishing returns. Bourlon Wood fell on 23 November, but by now German counterattacks were beginning. Haig arrived at a Third Army planning meeting (26 November) and personally ordered further attacks the following day, but then had to bow to Byng’s decision to go onto the defensive, having achieved a salient 4 miles deep and 9 miles wide. Haig complained that the lack of an extra two divisions had prevented a breakthrough, a view described by one biographer as “self-deception, pure and simple”. Robertson told the War Cabinet (23 November) that Cambrai proved the weakening of the Germans at Third Ypres, as they were only able to send six or seven divisions to Italy, and could not exploit Caporetto completely or complete the crushing of the small unoccupied part of Romania. The gains (after the church bells had been rung in England in celebration) were retaken after 30 November when the Germans counterattacked in earnest using their new 'sturmtruppen' tactics. GHQ intelligence had failed to piece together warnings, especially those from 55th Division. Only IV Corps in the north noticed what was about to happen – the Germans could have enveloped the British had it not been for the Guards Divisions counterattack at Gouzeaucourt. British casualties had mounted to over 40,000 by 3 December, with German losses somewhat less. The German counterattacks were halted by 2 December, with the British retaining the Flesquieres Salient. With a German Spring Offensive now seems likely, Haig and Byng ordered a further British withdrawal to more defensible lines on 4–5 December.

Baker-Carr, then commanding 1st Tank Brigade, later claimed that Kiggell had proposed cutting the number of tank battalions by 50%, as Cambrai was “a splendid show but not one that can ever be repeated”. This was not Haig’s view. One biographer argues that the initial success at Cambrai helped to save Haig’s job, but another view is that the ultimate disappointment did more damage to Haig’s political credibility than Third Ypres and that Cambrai “brought the British High Command only fleeting credit followed by anger and bewilderment”. After the counterattack, French’s secretary reported that “the situation in France was worse than it had been at the end of 1914” (included in Carson’s report to the War Cabinet, 5 December).

Aftermath of Cambrai

Reviewing recent operations at an Army Commanders Conference (7 Dec) at Doullens Haig commented how six months earlier, before Messines, the British had expected offensives from Russia, Italy, and France and had instead been left carrying the brunt of the burden. Lloyd George (6 December) was particularly angry at the embarrassing Cambrai reverse at the hands of a few German divisions after Haig had insisted for the last two years that his offensives were weakening them. When told of this Haig wrote to Robertson that Lloyd George should either sack him or else cease his “carping criticism”. Haig’s support amongst the Army, the public, and many politicians made this impossible – a plan that Haig be “promoted” to a sinecure post as generalissimo of British forces (similar to what had been done to Joffre at the end of 1916) was scotched when Lord Derby threatened resignation. Asked to provide a statement to the House of Commons, Haig quoted Byng’s telephone report to GHQ that the counterattack had been “in no sense a surprise” (in fact this was contradicted by evidence from GHQ) and attributed the German success to “one cause and one alone … lack of training on the part of junior officers and NCOs and men”, verdict support by the court of inquiry which, at Derby’s instigation, Haig ordered, although the inquiry also criticized “higher commanders” for failing to enforce defensive doctrine. There were also inquiries by a War Office Committee and by General Smuts on behalf of the War Cabinet. In a later report to Robertson (24 Dec) Haig accepted the blame, stating that the troops had been tired as a result of the attack on Bourlon Wood which he had ordered.

Esher had warned Haig (28 October) that Rawlinson was bad-mouthing Charteris (known as “the Principal Boy”), and reported that he had told Rawlinson that Charteris had “no influence” over Haig and his information had never let him down. Derby warned Haig (7 December) to sack Charteris, as the War Cabinet and General Staff were displeased at his exaggerated claims of German weakness. Haig took responsibility and defended Charteris writing to Derby (10 December) that his judgment was not formed solely from Charteris’ intelligence. Another important consequence of Cambrai was that the press baron Lord Northcliffe lessened his support of Haig. He had recently been offended on a visit to GHQ when Haig had been too busy and preoccupied to pay much attention to him. A “Times” editorial “A Case for Inquiry” (12 Dec) criticised Charteris for his “fatuous estimates” of German losses and morale and called for the sacking of “every blunderer” at GHQ – Haig assumed Lloyd George had inspired the article. Northcliffe also personally warned Haig’s aide Philip Sassoon that changes were required: “Sir Douglas is regarded with affection in the army, but everywhere people remark that he is surrounded by incompetents” and “outside the War Office I doubt whether the Higher Command has any supporters whatsoever”. Haig was required to dismiss Charteris. Robertson had arrived at Haig's Headquarters with orders (signed by Derby) for his dismissal in his pocket in case Haig refused to do as he was asked. Haig claimed to his wife (14 December) that Charteris’ work had been excellent but he felt he had to sack him because he had “upset so many people”. A common criticism is that Haig only accepted intelligence from Charteris (who told him what he wanted to hear) and did not cross-check it with other intelligence. Haig gave Charteris another job at GHQ (Deputy Director of Transportation) where he was still on hand to give advice.

Derby warned the War Cabinet (6 December) that Haig was short of 100,000 men. Lloyd George pooh-poohed this (10 December), saying that the British public needed to be reassured that the Germans would still be in a minority in the west, and scoffed again when Derby (12 December) protested that, even if this was numerically true, the British forces were weakened and the Germans mostly relatively fresh. Haig demanded 600,000 men for the Army but got only 100,000 as the government needed men for shipping and agriculture. Lloyd George wrote to Esher (1 December) that Haig had “eaten his cake. Petain had economised his”. Robertson warned (19 December) of the imminent German attack, poor British defenses, poor quality junior officers, weakness of the Belgians and Portuguese, and lack of room to retreat in Flanders. Lloyd George scoffed again and claimed the Germans were just making noises, thinking the military was trying to divert resources from his planned offensives against the Turks. The uninspiring results on the Western Front in 1917 were thrown into unwelcome contrast by Allenby's capture of Jerusalem (9 December 1917), a propaganda coup from a campaign which Haig and Robertson had regarded as a waste of resources (Allenby had been sent out to the Middle East after his failure at Arras earlier in the year), and also by the beginnings of peace negotiations between Germany and Russia at Brest-Litovsk (22 December, after the Bolshevik seizure of power in November).

Bibliography

• Bond, Brian and Cave, Nigel (eds) Haig – A Reappraisal 70 Years On. Pen & Sword. (2009 edition). ISBN 184415887
• Carlyon, Les The Great War (Sydney: Pan MacMillan, 2005)
• Corrigan, Gordon. Mud, Blood & Poppycock (London: Cassell, 2002) ISBN 0-304-36659-5
• Dixon, Dr. Norman F. On the Psychology of Military Incompetence Jonathan Cape Ltd 1976 / Pimlico 1994
• Duffy, C. (2007). Through German Eyes, The British and the Somme 1916. London: Phoenix. ISBN 978-0-7538-2202-9.
• French, David Raising Churchill's Army Oxford 2000
• Gollin Alfred Milner : Proconsul in Politics (Macmillan, London, 1964)
• Green, Andrew – Writing the Great War, (Frank Cass, London, 2003), ISBN 0-7146-8430-9
• Hart, Peter (2008). 1918: A Very British Victory, Phoenix Books, London. ISBN 978-0-7538-2689-8
• Holmes, Richard. Tommy (London: HarperCollins, 2004) ISBN 0-00-713752-4
• Keegan, John. The First World War. Pimlico. 1999. ISBN 0-7126-6645-1
• Neillands, Robin The Death of Glory: the Western Front 1915 (John Murray, London, 2006) ISBN 978-0-7195-6245-7
• Sheffield, Gary, Forgotten Victory. The First World War: Myths and Realities (Headline Review, 2002), p. 263
• Travers, Tim The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and The Emergence of Modern War 1900–1918 (Allen & Unwin 1987)
• Travers, Tim How the War Was Won (Routledge, London, 1992) ISBN – 0-415-07628-5; (Pen and Sword, London, July 2005), ISBN 978-1-84415-207-0
• Woodward, David R "Field Marshal Sir William Robertson", Westport Connecticut & London: Praeger, 1998, ISBN 0-275-95422-6

Biographies

• Arthur, Sir George Lord Haig (London: William Heinemann, 1928)
• De Groot, Gerard Douglas Haig 1861–1928 (Larkfield, Maidstone: Unwin Hyman, 1988)
• Harris, J.P. Douglas Haig and the First World War. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-521-89802-7
• Marshall-Cornwall, General Sir James Haig as Military Commander (London: Batsford, 1973)
• Mead, Gary, The Good Soldier. The Biography of Douglas Haig (London: Atlantic Books, 2008) ISBN 978-1-84354-281-0
• Reid, Walter. Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig (Birlinn Ltd, Edinburgh, 2006.) ISBN 1-84158-517-3
• Sheffield, Gary, “The Chief” (Aurum, London, 2011) ISBN 978-1-84513-691-8
• Sixsmith, E.K.G. Douglas Haig (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976)
• Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. (London: Hutchinson, 1963) ISBN 0-304-35319-1
• Warner, Philip Field Marshal Earl Haig (London: Bodley Head, 1991; Cassell, 2001)
• Winter, Denis Haig’s Command (London: Viking, 1991)

Primary sources

• Charteris, Brigadier-General John. Field Marshal Earl Haig. (London: Cassell, 1929)
• Charteris, Brigadier-General John. Haig. (London: Duckworth, 1933)
• Haig, Countess The Man I Knew (Edinburgh & London: The Moray Press, 1936)
• Haig, F-M Sir Douglas Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915-April 1919). Ed. by Lt.-Col. J.H. Boraston, OBE, Private Secretary to Earl Haig. Dent. 1919
• Secrett, Sergeant T Twenty-Five Years with Earl Haig (London: Jarrods, 1929)
• Sheffield, Gary & Bourne, Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-18, (Phoenix, London, 2005) ISBN 0-7538-2075-7

External links

• Hansard 1803–2005: contributions in Parliament by the Earl Haig
• Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. (Accessed 30 March 2006.)
• Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig (1861-1928), Field Marshal: Sitter in 41 portraits (National Portrait Gallery)
• Tim Travers’s Haig: A Deist Being
• Bob Bushaway Haig and the Cavalry Journal of the Centre for First World War Studies
• Haig
• GALASHIELS WAR MEMORIAL (1925) (archive film of Field Marshal Earl Haig from the National Library of Scotland: SCOTTISH SCREEN ARCHIVE)
• SCOTLAND ON SCREEN (Earl Haig Unveils Peebles War Memorial (1922) - archive film and learning resources)

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