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Battle of Thorgo

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Coordinates: 35°18′04″N 75°44′40″E / 35.3010°N 75.74434°E / 35.3010; 75.74434
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Battle of Thorgo
Part of Kashmir Conflict and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948

Map of localities around Skardu region
Date16–18 March 1948[1]
Location
Thorgo near Skardu, Pakistan
35°18′04″N 75°44′40″E / 35.3010°N 75.74434°E / 35.3010; 75.74434
Result

Ambush successful[2]

  • Relief column defeated[3]
  • Remaining forces retreat[2]
Belligerents
Pakistan Dominion of Pakistan

India Dominion of India

Commanders and leaders
Maj.Ehsan Ali
Lieu.Babar
Capt.Nek Alam		 Faqir Singh (WIA)[4]
India Major.Coutts
Units involved

Gilgit Scouts

  • Ibex Force
  • Local Volunteers

6 J&K Infantry

  • Biscuit Column
Strength
~3 Platoons,[5] Approximately
(100-300)		 ~1 company
(350 men)[5]
Accompanied by:
~600 Jawans,400 Porters,200 horses[5]
Casualties and losses
Unknown Pakistani Sources:
150 killed, 75000 rounds of 303 ammo, (2-3) Mortar, rifles, Sten-guns, MMG's[6]
Indian Sources:
26 killed, 7 missing presumed killed, 18 wounded, 27 rifles, 5 Sten guns, 2 VB Machine guns, 64000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 84 Hand grenades, 51 HE bombs of 2-mch mortar, 204 HE bombs of 3-mch mortar.[7]

Battle of Thorgo[8] also known as Thorgo Incident[b] or Nurbachung ambush,[9] Thorgo also spelled as Thurgo[10] or Thergo,[11] took place during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 in the Gilgit-Baltistan sector, between 16 and 18 March 1948, Involving Gilgit scouts which were a paramilitary force within the Gilgit-Baltistan region in northern Pakistan, and the Jammu and Kashmir state forces.

The Gilgit Scouts, informed of a relief column dispatched by Indian Headquarters at Srinagar to reinforce the besieged Skardu garrison,[12] set up an ambush at Thorgo Pari[c] between Gol and Skardu.[5] When the relief column arrived, the Scouts launched their attack, hurling large rocks and causing panic, resulting in heavy casualties, including the injury of Brigadier Faqir Singh.[13] The remnants of the defeated relief column retreated to Kargil under Major Coutts, while the wounded Brigadier Faqir Singh was sent to Srinagar Headquarters.[14] On 18 February, Colonel Sher Jung Thapa dispatched two weakened platoons to receive the relief column after being informed by Srinagar Headquarters of its expected arrival. However, after villagers revealed the column's defeat, the Skardu detachment returned to the garrison. During the return, they were ambushed by the Scouts but managed to reach safety without casualties.[15]

Following the defeat of the relief column near Gol, the Gilgit Scouts intensified their efforts against the Skardu garrison.[16] Major Ehsan was informed that additional reinforcements, codenamed "Z Brigade," were being assembled at Kargil under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kripal Singh. In response, Major Ehsan split his forces, sending a contingent to Parkutta to intercept the new reinforcements.[17]

Prelude

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During the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948, specifically at the Siege of Skardu, Colonel Sher Jung Thapa belonging to state forces, he and his garrison successfully held off the Gilgit Scouts,[18] which were a paramilitary force within the Gilgit-Baltistan region in northern Pakistan. Colonel Thapa repeatedly requested reinforcements from the headquarters in Srinagar.[18] The Skardu garrison after receiving previous support, another relief column, codenamed "Biscuit column", was dispatched, this time led by Brigadier Faqir Singh of the State forces.[d][19]

Major Ehsan Ali the commander of Gilgit scouts, had initially planned to ambush the earlier relief column that arrived on 13 February but was unable to do so. When he learned of the new column, he prepared another ambush targeting Brigadier Faqir Singh's forces.[20] According to Mahajan, fighting intensified in the Skardu sector, including a failed attempt by the Skardu garrison to capture Point 8853, which was under the control of the scouts.[21]

Gilgit scouts Prepare a day before at Thurgo Pari/Peak to ambush incoming Relief force.
Map illustrating Preparation of Gilgit scouts for ambush

On 15 February, the Skardu garrison spotted a small force of Gilgit Scouts moving towards the direction from which the relief column was expected to arrive. The next day, a larger force was seen advancing in the same direction.[19]

Colonel Thapa, having been informed by Srinagar Headquarters that reinforcements would reach him on 18 February, realized that the Scouts were preparing to ambush the relief column.[19] However, due to a malfunctioning W/T communication set with the relief forces and no means to repair it, Thapa was unable to warn them about the Scouts' movements. Despite notifying Srinagar Headquarters and requesting airstrikes against the Scouts, no strikes were conducted.[14]

Meanwhile, the arrival of the relief column greatly concerned Major Ehsan. Orders were given to Brigadier Faqir Singh to secure Thorgo Pari and keep the Indus path open.[22] As Brigadier Faqir's column approached Parkutta and Gol, he believed that the severe cold would incapacitate the Scouts.[19] However, the Gilgit Scouts split their forces, leaving a smaller contingent at Skardu to continue shelling the garrison, while the majority of troops under Major Ehsan Ali prepared to ambush the relief column.[23]

Battle

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Ambush and casualties

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The Gilgit Scouts chose Thorgo Pari, near Gol, as the site for their ambush. The road there passed through a narrow point on the left bank of the Indus River, where the valley became constricted, allowing only one horse to proceed at a time.[24] Captain Nek Alam and his platoon took positions on the northernmost part of Thorgo Hill. Subedar Muhammad Ali[e] and Lieutenant Babar spread their two platoons opposite Nurhbuchung village near the river. Captain Mohammed Khan positioned a mortar and machine gun section at the other end of the Pari, while another machine gun section was stationed at the edge. With these placements, the Scouts were prepared for the ambush.[25]

On 17 February, Brigadier Faqir Singh and Major Coutts set out with their forces and supplies through the narrow pass under the cover of darkness.[24] To the surprise of the Scouts, the column stopped near the ambush site for lunch. After their meal, the column resumed its advance.[26] As they moved into the Scouts' firing range, the ambush was launched. The Scouts opened fire and hurled large rocks at the relief column.[24] The troops tried to regroup, but mortar bombs both 3-inch and 2-inch caused heavy casualties, wounding Brigadier Faqir Singh in the face and shoulder.[24][27]

State troops enter site planned for ambush by Gilgit scouts

Despite the attack, the relief column returned fire and managed to hold their positions, preventing further Scout advances until dusk, though they were forced to leave behind their dead.[27] The bombardment continued with mortar fire and constant shooting, aimed at preventing any regrouping of troops near Brigadier Faqir Singh.[26] Defeated, the remaining forces retreated towards Kargil, spending the night at Totli on 18 March and the column finally reached Kargil on 21 March.[27] Brigadier Faqir Singh handed over command to Indian military advisor Major Coutts before returning to Srinagar for medical treatment.[27]

The ambush on the relief column caused significant confusion and resulted in heavy casualties. Some troops attempted to escape by diving into the water, abandoning their supplies, which included three mortars, light machine guns, rifles, a Bren gun, a Sten gun, grenades, .303 rounds, and 20 wireless sets, according to Ahmad Hasan, Dani.[17] Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf reported that the Scouts captured 75,000 rounds of .303 ammunition, along with two or three mortars, medium machine guns, rifles, Sten guns, and various civilian supplies. Out of 350 men, 150 were reported dead on the spot, with only 75 believed to have survived.[6]

S.N. Prasad provided a different account, stating that the relief column suffered 18 injuries, seven missing persons presumed dead, and 26 deaths. The Scouts captured 27 rifles, five Sten guns, two Vickers Berthier machine guns, 64,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 84 hand grenades, 51 high-explosive bombs for the 2-inch mortar, and 204 HE bombs for the 3-inch mortar.[28] According to a Government of India publication, Indian casualties were 26 killed, seven missing and presumed dead, and 18 wounded, with their ammunition and baggage looted.[29]

On 18 March, Colonel Thapa assembled a small force of two weakened platoons and set out to receive Brigadier Faqir Singh, as directed by Srinagar Headquarters. However, Thapa's group was ambushed by Gilgit scouts but managed to escape without any casualties. After advancing a bit further, they were informed by local villagers of the defeat of the relief column.[14]

The fact that column had had to turn back after reaching so close to Skardu was most tragic. The tragedy was all the more heightened after it became known that the Skardu Garrison had sent out two platoons under Lieutenant Ajit Singh (accompanied by Major Thapa himself) towards Gol to receive the relief column half way, but unfortunately this was done on 18 March which happened to be a day too late.[30]

— k. Brahma Singh

Aftermath

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Map illustrating the successful ambush by the Gilgit Scouts on the relief forces and their retreat.

After the defeat of the relief column and the success of the Gilgit Scouts near Gol, the fleeing troops were pursued by Jamadar Ismail Khan[f] and the Scouts, who also increased pressure on the Skardu garrison.[31] As the retreating troops made their way to Kargil, they were harassed by both the Scouts and local Muslims, resulting in further casualties.[26] The Gilgit Scouts, anticipating that reinforcements might be sent from Srinagar, intensified their efforts to capture Skardu swiftly before such reinforcements could arrive.[3]

A machine-gun which wrought havoc on the Enemy was brilliantly manned by Havildar Muhammad Nazir. The success of the ambush and its extent may well be judged from what the Indians have themselves admitted in their account of the fighting in Kashmir, contained in the book "DEFENDING KASHMIR"[32]

— Saraf

Both the Brigadier and the Major failed to follow the elementary principles of fire and movement tactics, and this failure proved very costly to the men of the column. The Brigadier who was also wounded handed over command to Major Coutts and returned to Srinagar. Thus ended the second attempt to reinforce Skardu.[33]

— M. N. Gulati

Following the engagement, Major Ehsan recruited local youths and secured sufficient supplies from the relief force to arm them. With this increase in strength, attacks on the Skardu garrison intensified, as did the shelling of the cantonment.[17] On March 26, the Scouts launched a night attack on the Skardu garrison, resulting in heavy crossfire, though the outcome remained inconclusive.[26] Major Ehsan learned that further reinforcements, designated as Z Brigade and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kripal Singh, were being dispatched to consolidate at Kargil. In response, he decided to split his forces and send a contingent to Parkutta to counter this new threat.[17]

A and B Companies of the 7th Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, led by Captains Davinder Singh and Durga Singh, were also ordered to reinforce the Skardu garrison.[34] They joined Major Coutts and other members of the previous column at Kargil, advancing towards Parkutta to await reinforcements from the 5th Jammu and Kashmir Rifles.[34] Lieutenant Babar Khan was left in charge of the Skardu siege while Major Ehsan departed for Parkutta on April 29.[17] After Ehsan's departure, Babar Khan moved towards Ladakh, and the siege at Skardu continued under Colonel Mataul of Chitral. The Royal Indian Air Force also began providing support to the besieged forces at Skardu.[35]

See also

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Sources

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Notes

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  1. ^ The Jammu and Kashmir force is also referred as State troops or forces
  2. ^ The Inscription written at the monument built in Thorgo refers to it as the Thorgo incident, however the inscription written in Urdu refers it as (معرکہ تھورگو) which means Battle of Thorgo.
  3. ^ The word Pari means Peak in Urdu spelled using Indian English.
  4. ^ The Jammu and Kashmir force is also referred as State troops or forces
  5. ^ Subedar is a military rank which is classed as a junior commissioned officer rank in India and Pakistan.
  6. ^ Jemadar is a title used for various military and other officials in the Indian subcontinent mostly for lower ranks.

Citations

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  1. ^ Prasad (1987), pp. 288–289 :Dani (1989), pp. 386–387
  2. ^ a b Dani (1989), p. 387
  3. ^ a b Prasad (1987), p. 289
  4. ^ Palit (1972), p. 233
  5. ^ a b c d Dani (1989), p. 386
  6. ^ a b Saraf (2015), p. 280
  7. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288
  8. ^ Jaffri (2019), p. 30
  9. ^ Suharwardy, Tragedy in Kashmir (1983), p. 155
  10. ^ Dani (1989), p. 369
  11. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253
  12. ^ Prasad (1987), pp. 287–288
  13. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Dani (1989), pp. 387
  14. ^ a b c Prasad (1987), p. 288 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  15. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 289 : Singh (2010), p. 253
  16. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253 : Dani (1989), pp. 387
  17. ^ a b c d e Dani (1989), pp. 387
  18. ^ a b Palit (1972), p. 231 :
  19. ^ a b c d Prasad (1987), p. 288 :
  20. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 383–384 :
  21. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 385–386 :
  22. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386
  23. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 :
  24. ^ a b c d Dani (1989), pp. 386–387 : Prasad (1987), p. 288
  25. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 386–387
  26. ^ a b c d Suharwardy, Tragedy in Kashmir (1983), p. 156
  27. ^ a b c d Singh (2010), p. 253 : Palit (1972), p. 233
  28. ^ Prasad (1987), p. 288
  29. ^ Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (1949), p. 67
  30. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253
  31. ^ Singh (2010), p. 253 : Dani (1989), pp. 387–388
  32. ^ Saraf (2015), p. 280
  33. ^ Gulati (2000), p. 68
  34. ^ a b Palit (1972), p. 234
  35. ^ Dani (1989), pp. 387–388

Works Cited

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  • Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf (2015) [first published 1979 by Ferozsons], Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2, Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, archived from the original on 2021-03-29
  • Gulati, M. N. (2000). Military Plight of Pakistan: Indo-Pak War, 1947-48, Volume 1. Vol. 1. Manas Publications. ISBN 9788170491231. Archived from the original on 2017-01-18.
  • Jaffri, Imran Haider (Summer 2019). "Captain Hussain Khan, Fakhr-i-Kashmir, OBI, shaheed: A Forgotten Hero of Kashmir Liberation War-1947/48". Bugle and Trumpet. 1 (2). Army Institute of Military History, Pakistan. Archived from the original on 2024-02-25 – via Aimh.
  • Palit, D. K. (1972). Jammu and Kashmir Arms: History of the J & K Rifles. Palit & Dutt. ASIN B0006C8HKM. Archived from the original on 2000-01-20.
  • Dani, Ahmad Hasan (1989). History of Northern Areas of Pakistan. National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. ISBN 9789694150161. Archived from the original on 2022-12-15.
  • Prasad, S.N (1987). History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-48. History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2017-01-15.
  • Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India (1949). Defending Kashmir. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. Archived from the original on 2014-10-26.
  • Suharwardy, Abdul Haq (1983), Tragedy in Kashmir, Wajidalis
  • Singh, K.Brahma (1990). History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, 1820-1956 The State Force Background (Hardcover). Lancer International. ISBN 9788170620914.
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