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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
Argued December 3, 1985
Decided June 25, 1986
Full case nameJack Anderson, et al. v. Liberty Lobby, Incorporated, et al.
Citations477 U.S. 242 (more)
106 S. Ct. 2505; 91 L. Ed. 2d 202; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 115; 54 U.S.L.W. 4755; 4 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1041; 12 Media L. Rep. 2297
Holding
Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is "genuine," that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr. · William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
MajorityWhite, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor
DissentBrennan
DissentRehnquist, joined by Burger
Laws applied
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), is a United States Supreme Court case articulating the standard for a trial court to grant summary judgment. Summary judgment will lie when, taking all factual inferences in the non-movant's favor, there exists no genuine issue as to a material fact and the movant deserves judgment as a matter of law. Because courts almost always cite Liberty Lobby in their opinions for the standard regarding motions for summary judgment, Liberty Lobby is the most cited Supreme Court case.[1]

Background

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The Investigator, an investigative news magazine, published three articles about the Liberty Lobby, calling the organization and its founder Willis Carto antisemitic, racist and Fascist. Liberty Lobby and Carto sued Investigator Publishing and its publisher, journalist Jack Anderson for libel. The defendants moved for summary judgment under the standard set by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which requires a plaintiff to prove with clear and convincing evidence that a defamatory statement was made with actual malice. The District Court ruled that The Investigator had duly researched its statements and granted the motion. Summary judgment was reversed on appeal with respect to some of the alleged defamatory statements, with the Court of Appeals stating that evidence need not be clear and convincing for the purpose of summary judgment.

A majority of the Supreme Court held that when a "clear and convincing" standard applies, it applies as well to summary judgment. It vacated the Court of Appeals' ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justices Rehnquist, Burger and (separately) Brennan dissented on the grounds that the Court's reasoning was too abstract to provide the necessary guidance to lower courts.

See also

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References

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  1. ^ Steinman, Adam (March 27, 2016). "The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?". Vanderbilt Law Review. 69 (333): 68. SSRN 2753142.
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