Šventoji, Lithuania
Šventoji | |
---|---|
Coordinates: 56°1′31″N 21°4′54″E / 56.02528°N 21.08167°E | |
Country | Lithuania |
Ethnographic region | Samogitia |
County | Klaipėda County |
Municipality | Palanga City Municipality |
Eldership | Šventoji eldership |
Capital of | Šventoji eldership |
Time zone | UTC+2 (EET) |
• Summer (DST) | UTC+3 (EEST) |
Website | http://www.sventoji.lt |
Šventoji (Samogitian: Švėntuojė; Latvian: Sventāja) is a resort town on the coast of the Baltic Sea in Lithuania. Administratively it is part of Palanga City Municipality. The total population of Šventoji as of 2012 was 2631. The town is located about 12 km north of Palanga center and close to the border with Latvia. Further north of the town is Būtingė and its oil terminal. Šventoji River flows into the Baltic sea at the town. The town also has a famous lighthouse, which is located 780 meters from the sea. Its height is 39 meters. The town is a popular summer resort for families, during summer it has many cafes, restaurants and various attractions for the visitors.
Šventoji is an important archaeological site as the first artefacts are dated about 3000 BC. A famous cane shaped as moose head was also found in the town. It is a former fishing village now turned into a tourist town. The town always struggled to develop a port, which had to compete with nearby Klaipėda and Liepāja. A larger port was constructed in the second half of the 17th century, especially since 1679, when it was leased to English merchants. It was destroyed in 1701 during the Great Northern War. During the times of the Russian Empire (1795–1915) the port was moribund.
In 1919, after the breakup of the Russian Empire, Šventoji became a part of Latvia, like the rest of the Courland Governorate. In 1921 the town was peacefully transferred to Lithuania following a Lithuanian-Latvian treaty.[1]
After the territorial transfer, the town became crucially important for Lithuania as one of its few points of access to the sea. The sea port began developing again: two piers were constructed, but they were frequently covered in sand.
Thus, it never grew into a bigger port, although Šventoji briefly became vital to Lithuania in the brief period between the German occupation of Klaipėda (March 1939) and Lithuania's incorporation into the Soviet Union (June 1940).
On 17 November 2024, Arelion detected damage to its undersea cable with internet communications between Šventoji and Gotland, Sweden, causing the internet capacity in Lithuania to be reduced by a fifth. According to Andrius Šemeškevičius who is the chief technology officer for Telia Lietuva, Telia has three undersea cables between Sweden and Lithuania which means that the internet bandwidth was reduced by one-third due to the incident: however, the connection was restored to users after bypassing the fault. He added that the damaged cable is quite old and there have been several faults related to it, but no cases of sabotage have been recorded so far.[2][3][4][5][6][a][b]
Notable people from Šventoji
[edit]- Evaldas Kairys (born 1990), professional basketball player
Notes
[edit]- ^ On 19 November 2024, the Helsinki based state controlled Finnish firm Cinia detected the C-Lion1 undersea cable which began operations in the spring of 2016 and carries internet communications between Finland at Hanko and Santahamina in Helsinki and Rostock, Germany, was severed between Gotland and Kaliningrad near the southern tip of Sweden's Oland Island.[2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9] The C-Lion 1 is the only undersea cable that runs directly between Finland and Germany and central Europe.[7] Later, Samuli Bergström, who is the communications chief at the Finnish National Cyber Security Centre (Finnish: Kyberturvallisuuskeskus) under Traficom, verified the break.[8] The Russian telecom operator Avelacom and the data centre operators TeliaSonera and Hetzner Online use the C-Lion 1 cable.[8] According to the Finnish government cybersecurity expert Samuli Bergstrom, internet traffic was routed to other undersea cables which prevented any reduction in internet capacity between Finland and Germany.[2] According to Andrius Šemeškevičius, who is the chief technology officer for Telia Lietuva, the C-Lion 1 undersea cable and the undersea cable between Gotland and Šventoji intersect in an area of only 10 square meters.[4][5] The C-Lion 1 undersea cable follows a similar route about several hundred metres from the Russia-to-Germany Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines which were sabotaged on 26 September 2022.[5][7][10]
- ^ Russia has a fleet of suspected intelligence vessels including the Yantar (Russian: Янтарь), which, as of 15 November 2024, had been north of Dublin in the Irish Sea travelling with both the Russian warship Admiral Golovko and the Russian tanker Vyazma,[9][11][12][13] in Nordic waters which could target undersea cables.[3][14][15]
References
[edit]- ^ Latvijas iegūtās un zaudētās teritorijas, NeoGeolv, November 10, 2011]
- ^ a b c Astier, Henri; Kirby, Paul (19 November 2024). "Germany suspects sabotage behind severed undersea cables". BBC. Archived from the original on 19 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b c Lyons, Emmet (19 November 2024). "European governments hint at possible Russian sabotage". CBS News. Archived from the original on 19 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b c "Undersea cable between Lithuania and Sweden damaged – Telia: Following Finnish media reports that an unexplained failure of an undersea telecommunications cable has disrupted communication services between Finland and Germany, Telia's Chief Technology Officer Andrius Šemeškevičius says that the communications cable between Lithuania and Sweden was also damaged". LRT TV (LRT.lt). 18 November 2024. Archived from the original on 18 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b c d Giordano, Elena; Jochecová, Ketrin (18 November 2024). "New Baltic Sea mystery as probe begins into two damaged cables: Network company executives refuse to rule out sabotage to submarine infrastructure. The cable follows a similar route to the Russia-to-Germany Nord Stream gas pipelines, which exploded in September 2022 in an apparent act of sabotage". Politico. Archived from the original on 18 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b Ahlander, Johan; Lehto, Essi; Sytas, Andrius (18 November 2024). "Two undersea cables in Baltic Sea cut, Germany and Finland fear sabotage". Reuters. Archived from the original on 19 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b c Karjalainen, Elina; Vanhala, Akseli; Hautanen, Suvi (18 November 2024). "Suomen ja Saksan välinen merikaapeli on katkennut: Vian seurauksena merikaapelissa kulkevat tietoliikenneyhteydet ovat poikki. IS:n tietojen mukaan hallitus ei ole aikeissa kokoontua maanantaina" [The submarine cable between Finland and Germany has broken: As a result of the fault, the communication lines running on the submarine cable are cut off. According to IS information, the government does not plan to meet on Monday.]. Ilta Sanomat (www.is.fi) (in Finnish). Archived from the original on 18 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b c "Telecoms cable break reported between Finland and Germany: All telecommunications running on the submarine cable have been cut off. A cybersecurity expert tells Yle that the cable break is likely to be intentional". Yle. 18 November 2024. Archived from the original on 19 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ a b Chan, Ryan (19 November 2024). "Map Shows Telecoms Cable Between Two NATO Allies Mysteriously Cut". Newsweek. Archived from the original on 19 November 2024.
- ^ "Suomen tietoliikenneyhteydet suojattu monin tavoin: Itämeren pohjassa rikkoutuneet Nord Stream -kaasuputket ovat herättäneet huolen siitä, voisiko samoin käydä Itämeren pohjassa kulkeville tietoliikennekaapeleille. Kansainvälisiä tietoliikenneyhteyksiä kuitenkin suojataan monin tavoin, ja yhteyksien katkeamiseen vaadittaisiin useampia samanaikaisia poikkeamia" [Finland's telecommunications connections protected in many ways: The ruptured Nord Stream gas pipelines at the bottom of the Baltic Sea have raised concerns about whether the same could happen to the telecommunications cables running along the bottom of the Baltic Sea. However, international telecommunications connections are protected in many ways, and interruptions would require several simultaneous deviations.]. National Emergency Supply Agency (Huoltovarmuuskeskus) (HVK) (www.huoltovarmuuskeskus.fi). 30 September 2022. Archived from the original on 19 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ Coughlan, Mark; Galvin, Joe (15 November 2024). "Russian spy ship confirmed to be operating near cables off Dublin". RTÉ (www.rte.ie). Archived from the original on 19 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ "Russian Spy Ship Yantar Raises Security Alarms Near UK and Ireland". msn.com. 19 November 2024. Archived from the original on 19 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ O'Carroll, Lisa (16 November 2024). "Russian spy ship escorted away from area with critical cables in Irish Sea: Yantar intelligence ship was seen operating drones in an area containing subsea energy and internet infrastructure". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 16 November 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ Sciutto, Jim (6 September 2024). "Exclusive: US sees increasing risk of Russian 'sabotage' of key undersea cables by secretive military unit". CNN. Archived from the original on 6 September 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- ^ Ahlskog Hou, Li-Lian; Goodwin, Allegra; Chernova, Anna; Cotovio, Vasco (19 April 2023). "Fleet of Russian spy ships has been gathering intelligence in Nordic waters, investigation finds". CNN. Archived from the original on 7 August 2024. Retrieved 19 November 2024.
- Semaška, Algimantas (2006). Kelionių vadovas po Lietuvą: 1000 lankytinų vietovių norintiems geriau pažinti gimtąjį kraštą (in Lithuanian) (4th ed.). Vilnius: Algimantas. pp. 497–498. ISBN 9986-509-90-4.