Itzhak Brik

Itzhak Brik
Itzhak Brik
Native name	יצחק בריק
Born	November 7, 1947 Gal On, Mandatory Palestine
Allegiance	Israel
Service/branch	Israel Defense Forces
Rank	Aluf
Commands	IDF Military Colleges
Battles/wars	Yom Kippur War
Awards	Medal of Courage
Other work	Soldier's Complaints Commissioner (Ombudsman)

Itzhak Brik (Hebrew: יצחק בריק; born November 7, 1947, Gal On) is an Israeli IDF General (reserve). He served in the Armored Corps as a brigade, division and troops commander and served as the commander of the IDF military colleges. He fought as a reserve company commander in the Yom Kippur War and was decorated with the Medal of Courage.

Since his retirement in 2018, Brik has become known as a harsh critic of the preparation of the IDF and the Ministry of Defense to a regional war in the Middle East. Known for his doomsday scenarios, he is considered in Israel as the "prophet of wrath" of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war.

Yitzhak Brik as Chief Ombudsman for Soldiers' Complaints (2009)

Biography

Itzhak Brik was born and raised on Kibbutz Galon to a mother who was a Holocaust survivor from Hungary and a father who immigrated from Poland before World War II and fought in the Palmach. He enlisted in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a combat soldier in 1965 and served primarily in the Israeli Armored Corps, where he worked as a tank gunner in Battalion 82. Later, he participated in a Tank Commander Course and during the Six-Day War, served as a tank commander in Battalion 63 of Brigade 14, which fought under Division 38 in battles in the Sinai Peninsula. After completing an Officers Course, he was assigned to Brigade 7, where he served as a Platoon Commander in the Battle of Karameh. He was later promoted to Company Commander. In 1969, Brik was discharged from the IDF and served as the operations coordinator on his kibbutz. He holds a Bachelor's degree from the Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management at the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology.

During the Yom Kippur War, Brik served as a company commander in Battalion 113 under the command of Asaf Yaguri. The battalion was part of Brigade 217 of Division 162. Brik began the war with his unit in a military warehouse and proceeded with a small force toward the Suez Canal on a night mission. His unit encountered an ambush by Egyptian commandos, and Brik was severely burned in the face by a flash from an anti-tank missile. Despite his injury, he took command of the tank again and, along with his comrades, destroyed the commando platoon. On October 8, 1973, his unit participated in the failed Israeli counterattack of that day. After the retreat, Brik organized several tanks and launched another assault to rescue tanks and casualties. In the battle, they destroyed 25 tanks and halted the advance of Egyptian forces. Later in the war, Brik participated in the Battle of the Chinese Farm and the Crossing of the Suez Canal. By the end of the war, after changing tanks seven times, he remained one of the few able-bodied soldiers from his battalion, which initially numbered more than 200 men. For his actions, he was awarded the Medal of Courage.

After the war, Brik continued to rise in the ranks in the reserves and served as the commander of Battalion 9214 in Brigade 459. In 1980, he returned to active service and was appointed commander of Brigade 786. Brik planned to stay in the military for only two years, but the outbreak of the First Lebanon War kept him in the army. In the following years, he was promoted to deputy division commander of a regular division and later became commander of Brigade 14. In 1988, he was appointed commander of Etgar Formation – a reserve division in Northern Command. In 1990, Brik was appointed commander of Ga'ash Formation, and later, he served as deputy commander of the Northern Corps. In 1994, Brik was appointed commander of the IDF Military Colleges and was promoted to the rank of major general. In addition, in 1995, he was appointed commander of the Southern Corps – Corps 441. He retired from regular service in 1999 but continued to serve in the reserves as corps commander until 2005.

After his military service, Brik worked on the development of the Negev and Galilee. He was appointed an advisor to industrialist Stef Wertheimer and served as strategic development advisor for the periphery on behalf of the Sacta-Rashi Foundation. In 2000, he was appointed chairman of the executive committee of the Jezreel Valley College. In 2004, he was among the signatories of a letter of support from senior Israeli Defense Force personnel for the Gaza Disengagement Plan, which stated that the plan was essential for Israel's security.

He served as the Soldiers' Complaints Commissioner from December 2008 to December 2018.

In 2016, Brik was awarded the Honorary Citizen of Hadera on the city's 125th anniversary. In 2019, he received the Shield of Quality Government award in the auditing authority category.

Brik is a trained industrial engineer, a graduate of the National Security College, and holds a master's degree in Public Administration from Tel Aviv University. He is married, has three children, and resides in Hadera.

Views on the IDF’s Performance

Prior to the Iron Swords War

In 2018, Brik published a scathing critique of the IDF's readiness for war. The military establishment rejected his criticism, and Brik continued to raise alarms, fighting against the IDF's resistance to his critiques. In an interview on the program "Zman Emet" ("Real Time") on Kan 11, Brik stated, "If a war breaks out today, the Yom Kippur War will feel like a walk in the park."

In an article he published in April 2020, Brik lamented the "loss of fighting spirit in the IDF." His criticisms faced opposition, with detractors accusing him of fear-mongering and populism.

Brik's critique of the IDF spanned numerous areas, including the army's organizational structure, cultural norms, senior appointments, procurement processes, and the disconnection between the military and political leadership.

According to Brik, by early 2023, the ground forces, due to their small size, would not be able to respond to multiple threats simultaneously. The air force was unprepared to deal with precise missile and drone attacks on its bases. He also pointed out significant logistical issues in the IDF, stemming from the extensive privatization of services, which were now outsourced to civilian companies. The home front was unprepared for the daily onslaught of thousands of missiles.

In his view, an Israeli National Guard comprising at least 50,000 army veterans should be established to handle domestic unrest, similar to the 2021 Israel riots.

Brik believes that the process for appointing IDF chiefs of staff is deeply flawed, as it is conducted in secrecy based on the subjective criteria of the defense minister. He argues for a more transparent process, with clear, unchanging standards, regardless of the defense minister's preferences. He has called for the creation of a professional committee of former defense officials to select multiple candidates for the government to choose from, rather than the current system, in which the defense minister presents a single nominee.

Regarding the IDF's organizational structure, Brik argues that there is an anomaly in the structure of the IDF branches. While the air and naval branches have direct commanders with authority and responsibility, the ground forces' direct commander is the IDF chief of staff, who oversees the entire military and is supposed to focus on planning and strategy. Thus, he lacks the time and ability to manage the ground forces effectively. The deputy chief of staff, who is often focused on becoming the next chief of staff, also does not have the desire to manage the army. Brik proposes appointing a ground forces commander, under whom the regional commanders and the commander of the ground forces command would serve. This commander would report to the chief of staff, whose role would be to synchronize all branches. As an interim solution, he suggests appointing a retired general as a deputy chief of staff and CEO of the IDF, someone with civilian management experience, to serve for at least five years. This person would manage the army's budgets, manpower, and resources.

Brik also criticizes the IDF's organizational culture, which he describes as one of deception, sweeping problems under the rug, and a lack of accountability. He argues that investigations are often whitewashed, there is no continuity in processes, and the IDF lacks organizational memory. Officers' tenures are too short, and there is no proper transition of responsibility when positions change hands. All these issues, in Brik's view, require "reinventing the wheel." He also blames the IDF's emphasis on youth for diminishing professional expertise, as talented officers are prematurely pushed into civilian life, leading to a shortage of qualified mid-level officers.

Brik asserts that the IDF's outdated security doctrine, established in the mid-20th century, must be revised. This doctrine focuses on transferring the war to enemy territory, allowing Israeli citizens to live in relative peace. In recent years, however, Israel has become the most threatened nation in the world, in Brik's view. The ground forces are not built to handle five theaters of war simultaneously. Without an appropriate security doctrine, each chief of staff improvises his own plan. Since 2006, the Middle East has changed, with new threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, the West Bank, Syria, and internal Israeli conflicts. Israel faces 250,000 rockets and drones, which the air force cannot adequately counter. The Iron Dome and Arrow missile systems with their limited stockpiles cannot intercept missiles for more than a few weeks, leaving Israel's skies vulnerable to enemy attacks. Brik believes that Israel needs to upgrade its military capabilities in surface-to-surface missiles, lasers, mobile anti-aircraft missiles, and ground forces. He calls for the establishment of a missile corps to counter mobile rocket launchers, while the air force focuses on strategic targets.

Another criticism from Brik concerns the lack of continuity in building the military from one chief of staff to the next. Each chief cancels the previous plans and implements new ones without oversight from the security cabinet, which Brik describes as a rubber stamp. Instead of building the military to address Israel's many threats, Brik claims that chiefs of staff have been preparing for an unrealistic scenario involving one and a half theaters of war, ignoring the threats from Syria and the possibility of a third Intifada in the West Bank.

Brik advocates for specialized training for all ministers involved in defense matters. He criticizes the fact that the National Security Council is staffed by former IDF officers who were part of the problems facing the army. Instead, the council should be made up of experts from various fields, independent of the prime minister. These experts should receive threat assessments from the Shin Bet, the Mossad, and IDF Military Intelligence, and then present a work plan to the chief of staff, who would determine the necessary budget. This would allow chiefs of staff to build on each other's work rather than starting from scratch.

In an interview, Brik revealed that he had met with Benjamin Netanyahu during his tenure as prime minister in the 35th government of Israel and presented him with a report he had prepared on the IDF's readiness for war. According to Brik, Netanyahu promised to establish an investigative committee on the issue.

On the eve of Yom Kippur in 2023, two weeks before the surprise attack on Israel, Brik published an article in Haaretz warning of an impending regional war. He urged Benjamin Netanyahu to halt the "judicial overhaul" and prioritize national security.

During the Iron Swords War

Following the outbreak of the Iron Swords War with the surprise attack by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad on Israeli towns surrounding Gaza, which resulted in the deaths of around 1,200 Israelis and the kidnapping of 251 hostages, many pointed to the strong similarities between the events of the attack and one of Brik's doomsday scenarios. Among his warnings was the claim that settlements would not be able to rely on IDF assistance in the early hours of an attack and would only survive if they could defend themselves using local emergency squads.

Brik's strategic approach during the early weeks of the war was presented in several interviews across various media platforms. According to Brik at the time, the IDF should impose a siege on Gaza and deliberately prolong the conflict over weeks or months rather than seeking a quick resolution. Brik cited several reasons for this. First, a rapid ground incursion by the IDF into Gaza could provoke a response from Hezbollah and other actors, triggering a multi-front regional war. Second, a swift entry into Gaza would put IDF soldiers at greater risk, as the enemy remained relatively strong. Third, Brik suggested that the enemy should be weakened by being trapped in its tunnels and hideouts until its supplies of water, food, and fuel were depleted.

Nine days into the war, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu summoned Brik for a meeting to hear his opinions and seek his advice. In his meeting with Netanyahu, Brik recommended thorough preparation before any ground invasion of Gaza.

Throughout the war, Brik continued to give numerous interviews in mainstream and independent media, on websites, podcasts, and more. Brik expressed his belief in the media that the main culprits behind the failures that led to the war were the head of IDF Intelligence and the commander of Southern Command, and he called for their immediate resignation, even while the war was ongoing. He later stated that the prime minister, the government, the professional leadership, and the military leadership all shared responsibility for the situation. Brik became a regular guest on TOV Channel hosted by Elazar Shtorm, where he continued to criticize the IDF and its current and former leaders, as well as the IDF Spokesperson's Unit and, at times, the political system.

Three months into the war, Brik published an article warning that IDF positions in northern Israel were not adequately prepared for a significant confrontation with Hezbollah. He emphasized that he had warned senior IDF and political leaders about this lack of readiness years earlier and believed the situation had worsened since then. Later in the war, Brik called for the immediate resignation of the prime minister, the defense minister, the IDF chief of staff, and several general staff officers.

In early April 2024, Brik published an article arguing that Prime Minister Netanyahu was ignoring strategic threats to Israel – the nuclear threat from Iran and the conventional threats from Iran and its proxies (missiles, rockets, and drones) – while choosing to emphasize the secondary threat posed by Hamas. In early May, Brik wrote that ending the war in Gaza was essential for rebuilding Israeli society and predicted that this would not happen as long as Netanyahu remained in power. Brik strongly opposed waging war simultaneously in the north against Hezbollah, warning that a multi-front war would bring disaster upon Israel.

Medal of Courage

Description of the act: Major Yitzhak Barik served as a tank commander throughout the war. In the Battle of Tishrei 1973 (October 7, 1973) his tank was hit, and he was wounded and badly burned in the face; despite this, he refused to be evacuated, and continued to command his unit. On October 8, 1973, after the failure of the attack on the Fardan bridge, he returned and charged towards the canal to rescue tanks and casualties as he organized the rest of the force and stopped the Egyptian counterattack. Until the end of the fighting, he continued to command his unit, replacing seven tanks who were hurt and serves as an example in his courage, his adherence to his mission and his leadership ability. For this act he was awarded the decoration of courage.

Further Reading

• Itzhak Brik, Brik – A Fighter Without Compromise, Niv Books, 2022
• Tomer Lewisman, In the Battlefield of Memory, Kinneret Zmora-Bitan Dvir, November 2020, p. 447

External links

Media related to Itzhak Brik at Wikimedia Commons