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Daniel Ortega

Joining the Sandinistas as a student in 1963, Ortega’s urban resistance activities led to his arrest in 1967.[1] After his release in 1974, he travelled to Cuba to receive training in guerilla warfare from Fidel Castro's Marxist-Leninist government (text in italics from original wikipedia article). He played a crucial role in forming the Insurrectionist faction, which united the FSLN and sparked the mass uprisings of 1978-1979.[2]

In 1984, Ortega, the FSLN candidate, won Nicaragua’s free presidential election with over 60 percent of the vote.[1]

Personal Life

The search for stable employment took the family from La Libertad to the provincial capital of Juigalpa, and then on to a working-class neighborhood in Managua.[3] Daniel Ortega Cedra detested U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua and Washington's support for the Somoza dictatorship, and he imparted the anti-American sentiment to his sons.[3]

In 1964, Ortega travelled to Guatemala, where the police arrested him and turned him over to the Nicaraguan National Guard.[4] After his release from detainment, Ortega arranged the assassination of his torturer, Guardsman Gonzalo Lacayo, in August 1967.[5]

While at El Modelo, his mother helped stage protests and hunger strikes for political prisoners, which improved the treatment of incarcerated Sandinistas.[6]

In the late 1970s, divisions over the FSLN's campaign against Somoza led Daniel and Humberto Ortega to form the Insurrectionist, or Tercerista (Third Way) faction.[2] The Terceristas sought to combine the distinct guerrilla war strategies of the two other factions, Tomas Borge's Guerra Prolongada Popular (GPP or Prolonged People's War), and Jaime Wheelock's Proletarians. [7] The Ortega brothers forged alliances with a wide array of anti-Somoza forces, including Catholic and Protestant activists and other non-Marxist civil society groups.[8] The Terceristas became the most effective faction in wielding political and military strength, and their push for FSLN solidarity received the support of reputable revolutionary leaders like Fidel Castro.[7]

Sandinista revolution (1979-1990)

In September 1979, United States President Carter hosted Ortega at the White House, and warned him against arming other Central American leftist guerrilla movements.[9] At the time, Ortega spoke truthfully by denying Sandinista involvement in neighboring countries.[9] When Ortega questioned the Americans about C.I.A. support for anti-Sandinista groups, Carter and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the reports false.[9] After the meeting, Carter asked Congress for $75 million in aid to Nicaragua, contingent on the Sandinista government’s promise not to aid other guerrillas.[10]

The Sandinista nationalization efforts mostly affected banks and industries owned by the Somoza family.[11] More than half of all farms, businesses, and industries remained in private hands, as the revolutionary government still wanted to preserve a mixed economy and support private sector investment.[11] The Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) opposed the Sandinistas’ economic reform.[12] The main organization of Nicaraguan big business was comprised of prosperous families from the Pacific coast cities, who dominated commerce and banking.[13]

By 1982, the World Health Organization deemed Nicaragua a model for primary health care.[12]

In the early phases of the campaign, Ortega enjoyed many institutional advantages, and used the full power of the press, police, and Supreme Electoral Council against the fractured opposition.[14] In the weeks before the November election, Ortega gave a U.N. speech denouncing talks held in Rio de Janeiro on electoral reform.[15] But by October 22, the Sandinistas signed an accord with opposition parties to reform electoral and campaign laws, making the process more fair and transparent.[16] While campaigning, Ortega promoted the Sandinistas’ achievements, and at a rally claimed that “Democracy is literacy, democracy is land reform, democracy is education and public health.”[17]

Interim years (1990-2007)

Ortega campaigned on the slogan, "Everything Will Be Better," and promised that, with the Contra war over, he could focus on the nation's recovery.[18]

Chamorro's UNO coalition garnered 54 percent of the vote, and won 51 of the 92 seats in the National Assembly.[19]

Immediately after the loss, the Sandinistas tried to maintain unity around their revolutionary posture.[20]

In 1991, Ortega claimed elections were “an instrument to reaffirm” the FSLN’s “political and ideological positions,” and also “confront capitalism.”[20] However, the electoral loss led to pronounced divisions in the FSLN. Some members adopted more pragmatic positions, and sought to transform the FSLN into a modern social democratic party engaged in national reconciliation and class cooperation.[7] Ortega and other party insiders found common ground with the radicals, who still promoted anti-imperialism and class conflict to achieve social change.[7]

From July 19-21, 1991, the FSLN held a National Congress to mend the rifts between members, and form a new overarching political program.[21] The effort failed to unite the party, and intense debates over the internal governance of the FSLN continued. The pragmatists, led by the former vice president Sergio Ramirez, formed the basis of a "renovating" faction, and supported collaboration with other political forces to preserve the rule of law in Nicaragua.[21] Under the leadership of Ortega and Tomas Borge, the radicals regrouped into the "principled" faction, and branded themselves the Izquierda Democratica (ID), or Democratic Left (DL).[21] The DL fought the Chamorro government with disruptive labor strikes and demonstrations, and renewed calls for the revolutionary reconstruction of Nicaraguan society.[22] During the May 20-23, 1994 extraordinary congress, Ortega ran against a fellow National Directorate member, Henry Ruiz, for the position of party secretary-general.[23] Ortega was elected with 287 to Ruiz's 147 votes, and the DL secured the most dominant role in the FSLN.[23]

On September 9, 1994, Ortega gained more power after taking over Sergio Ramirez’s seat in the Asemblea Sandinista (Sandinista Assembly).[21] Ramirez had served as chief of the FSLN’s parliamentary caucus since 1990, but Ortega came to oppose his actions in the National Assembly, setting the stage for Ramirez’s removal. [23] Historic leaders, such as Ernesto Cardenal, a former minister of culture in the Sandinista government, rejected Ortega’s consolidation of power: “My resignation from the FSLN has been caused by the kidnapping of the party carried out by Daniel Ortega and the group he heads.”[23] The party formally split on January 8, 1995, when Ramirez and a number of prominent Sandinista officials quit.[21]

In the 1996 campaign, Ortega faced the Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal), headed by Arnoldo Aleman Lacayo, a former mayor of Managua.[24] The Sandinistas softened their anti-imperialist rhetoric, with Ortega calling the U.S. “our great neighbor,” and vowing to cooperate “within a framework of respect, equality, and justice.”[24] The image change failed, as Aleman’s Liberal Alliance came first with 51.03 percent of the vote, while Ortega’s FSLN secured 37.75 percent.[25]  

In the run-up to the 2006 elections, Ortega displayed his ties to the Catholic Church by renewing his marriage vows before Cardinal Miguel Obanda y Bravo.[26]

After sealing the agreement in January 2000, the two parties controlled the three key institutions of the state: the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Electoral Council.[21]

2001 presidential election

Under Ortega’s direction, the FSLN formed the broad National Convergence (Convergencia Nacional) coalition to defeat the PLC in the 2001 elections.[27] Ortega abandoned the revolutionary tone of the past, and infused his campaign with religious imagery. In speeches, he gave thanks to “God and the Revolution” for the post-1990 democracy, and claimed a Sandinista victory would enable the Nicaraguan people to “pass through the sea and reach the Promised Land.”[28] The U.S. opposed Ortega’s candidacy from the beginning. The U.S. ambassador even made an appearance with the PLC’s Enrique Bolanos while distributing food aid.[29] The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks doomed Ortega’s chances, as the threat of a U.S. invasion became an issue. Bolanos convinced many Nicaraguans that the renewed U.S. hostility towards terrorism would endanger their country if the openly anti-U.S. Ortega prevailed.[30] Bolanos ended up with 56.3 percent of the vote, and Ortega won 42.3 percent.[31]

At the Fourth Ordinary Congress of the FSLN, held March 17-18, 2002, Ortega eliminated the National Directorate (DN).[21] Once the main collective leadership body of the party, and comprised of nine members, the DN no longer met routinely, and only three historic members remained.[21] Instead, the body just supported decisions already made by the secretary-general.[21] Ortega sidelined party officials and other members while empowering his own informal circle, known as the ring of iron.[21]

2006 presidential elections

Ortega personally attacked Lewites’ Jewish background, compared him to Judas, and warned he “could end up hanged.”[32]

Ortega emphasized peace and reconciliation in his campaign, and selected a former Contra leader, Jaime Morales Corazo, as his running mate.[33]

Second presidency (2007-present)

Ortega placed the first lady, Rosario Murillo, in charge of the Citizens’ Power Councils (CPCs), designed to implement his anti-poverty social policies.[21] The CPCs also undermined municipal autonomy, as they effectively functioned as local governments by determining the distribution of public goods and services.[34]

Before the National Sandinista Council held in September 2009, Lenin Cerna, the secretary of the party organization, called for diversifying its political strategies.[21] He declared the FSLN’s future depended on implementing new plans, “so that the party can advance via new routes and in new ways, always under Ortega’s leadership.”[21] Ortega gained power over the selection of candidates, allowing him to personally choose all candidates for public office.[21]

Throughout 2010, court rulings gave Ortega greater power over judicial and civil service appointments.[34]

During the election, the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) blocked both domestic and international poll observers from multiple polling stations.[35] According to the Supreme Electoral Council, Ortega defeated Fabio Gadea, with 63 percent of the vote.[35]

The constitutional reforms also gave Ortega the sole power to appoint military and police commanders.[35]

The Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) reported Ortega and Murillo won 72.4 percent of the vote, with 68 percent turnout.[36]

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent

In 2014, Pakistan Navy lieutenant Zeeshan Rafiq and former lieutenant Owais Jakhrani joined al-Qaeda's Waziristan branch with plans to attack US Navy ships in the Arabian Sea.[37] They decided to hijack PNS Zulfiqar, a frigate carrying C-802 cruise missiles and a tactical nuclear warhead, and use the ship's armaments to fire on nearby US and NATO vessels.[37] On September 6, 2014, the AQIS militants, including Rafiq and Jakhrani, failed in their attempt to seize the PNS Zulfiqar after a firefight broke out, leaving eleven attackers dead.[37]

Amrullah Saleh

After Saleh sent Pashto-speaking agents to infiltrate the Taliban's operations in Pakistan, the NDS gathered information on militants' homes, mosques, businesses, and families.[38] In the spring of 2006, Saleh conducted numerous interviews with Taliban commanders, and determined ISI began increasing aid for the militants the year before.[38] Based on the evidence, Saleh predicted that by 2009, the Taliban would mount assaults on major southern cities and wage a full-fledged insurgency.[38]

President Obama visited Kabul in late March of 2010 to address the Afghan cabinet and repair ties with Hamid Karzai. Obama reiterated US commitment to Afghanistan, saying, "The United States does not quit once it starts on something."[39] Saleh explained to Obama that the "Pakistanis believe the West has lost" in Afghanistan, and that ISI seeks to exploit "division between Europe and the United States."[39] He recommended "intense cooperation" between the US and Afghanistan to prevent extremist groups from regaining power.[39]

National Directorate of Security

After the ouster of the Taliban in 2002, the NDS warned ISI about exiled militants commanders and al-Qaeda operatives hiding in Pakistan.[38] In early 2006, intelligence gathered from NDS detainees suggested Osama bin Laden resided in the western Pakistan town of Mansehra.[38] A classified NDS paper completed in May, titled "Strategy of the Taliban," claimed ISI and Saudi Arabia restarted active support for the Taliban in 2005.[38] Pakistan's military leadership sought to weaken and delegitimize Hamid Karzai's government, in order to prevent an alliance between Afghanistan and India.[38]

In 2007, Amrullah Saleh's NDS used arrests and interrogations to discover the majority of suicide bombings in Afghanistan originated among Paushtuns from Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.[40]

During the April 2014 Afghan Presidential Election, the NDS, under Rahmatullah Nabil, collected thousands of signals intelligence indicating Ashraf Ghani's allies organized massive electoral fraud.[41]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Helicon, ed. (2016). Ortega Saavedra, Daniel. Abington: Helicon. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
  2. ^ a b Motyl, Alexander, ed. (2000). Ortega, Daniel. Oxford: Elsevier Science & Technology. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
  3. ^ a b Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 186.
  4. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 187.
  5. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 187.
  6. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 188.
  7. ^ a b c d Perez, Andres (1992). "The FSLN after the Debacle: The Struggle for the Definition of Sandinismo". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 34: 111–139 – via JSTOR.
  8. ^ DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 258.
  9. ^ a b c Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 80.
  10. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 81.
  11. ^ a b DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 263.
  12. ^ a b DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 264.
  13. ^ Baumeister, Eduardo (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 250.
  14. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 242.
  15. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 244.
  16. ^ McConnell, Shelley (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 127.
  17. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 246.
  18. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (1991). Blood of Brothers: Life and War in Nicaragua. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. p. 389.
  19. ^ Marti i Puig, Salvador (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 30.
  20. ^ a b Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 70.
  21. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Marti i Puig, Salvador; Wright, Claire (2010). "The Adaptation of the FSLN: Daniel Ortega's Leadership and Democracy in Nicaragua". Latin American Politics and Society. 52: 79–106 – via JSTOR.
  22. ^ DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 276.
  23. ^ a b c d Marti i Puig, Salvador (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 35.
  24. ^ a b Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 72.
  25. ^ Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 73.
  26. ^ Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,. p. 81.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  27. ^ Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 76.
  28. ^ Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 77.
  29. ^ McConnell, Shelley (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 142.
  30. ^ DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 280.
  31. ^ McConnell, Shelley (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 143.
  32. ^ Baltodano, Andres Perez (2012). Close, David; Marti i Puig, Salvador; McConnell, Shelley (eds.). The Sandinistas & Nicaragua Since 1979. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p. 83.
  33. ^ DeFronzo, James (2011). Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (4th ed.). Boulder: Westview Press. p. 281.
  34. ^ a b Thaler, Kai (2017). "Nicaragua: A Return to Caudillismo". Journal of Democracy. 28: 157–169 – via Project MUSE.
  35. ^ a b c Thaler, Kai (2017). "Nicaragua: A Return to Caudillismo". Journal of Democracy. 28: 157–169 – via Project MUSE.
  36. ^ Thaler, Kai (2017). "Nicaragua: A Return to Caudillismo". Journal of Democracy. 28: 157–169 – via Project MUSE.
  37. ^ a b c Coll, Steve (2018). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Penguin Press. pp. 653–660. ISBN 9781594204586.
  38. ^ a b c d e f g Coll, Steve (2018). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Penguin Press. pp. 214–217.
  39. ^ a b c Coll, Steve (2018). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Penguin Press. pp. 434–437.
  40. ^ Coll, Steve (2018). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Penguin Press. pp. 260–265.
  41. ^ Coll, Steve (2018). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. New York: Penguin Press. pp. 649–653.
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