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United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy

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United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy
Decided January 16, 1950
Full case nameUnited States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy
Citations338 U.S. 537 (more)
Holding
(a) The admission of aliens to this country is not a right, but a privilege, which is granted only upon such terms as the United States prescribes. P. 338 U. S. 542.

(b) The Act of June 21, 1941, did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to prescribe the conditions under which aliens should be excluded. Pp. 338 U. S. 542-543.

(c) It is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of Government to exclude a given alien.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Fred M. Vinson
Associate Justices
Hugo Black · Stanley F. Reed
Felix Frankfurter · William O. Douglas
Robert H. Jackson · Harold H. Burton
Tom C. Clark · Sherman Minton

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), was a United States Supreme Court case that notably ruled that the executive and legislative branches have the inherent power to exclude immigrants from the United States, that courts lack jurisdiction regarding the deportation of individuals within the United States unless it is explicitly stated in law, and that the Constitution does not grant aliens any protections when trying to enter the United States.[1] In a four-to-three decision, this case firmly demonstrates the plenary powers of Congress and the Executive Branch, as it is one of the first cases that bars the judicial review of executive or legislative orders of exclusion in most circumstances.[2]

Background

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Ellen Knauff, a German national born in 1915, worked as a civilian employee of the United States Army in Germany.[3] In 1948, she married Kurt Knauff, a United States citizen and Army veteran.[4] Knauff traveled to the United States to apply for naturalization under the War Brides Act in order to live in the country with her husband.[3] On August 14, 1948, Knauff arrived in the United States, however, she was detained at Ellis Island and temporarily excluded.[4] Since Knauff was detained, she filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge her detention and exclusion from the United States with a district court, which was denied.[4] She appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which was also denied, so the case went to the Supreme Court.[4]

Decision of the Court

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On January 16, 1950, the Supreme Court delivered its ruling. Justice Minton issued the opinion of the court[1] and found the following:

  • Unless it was explicitly stated in law, courts did not have the jurisdiction to review the deportation of individuals within the United States.[1] Therefore, even if officials provided no explanation for the reasoning behind Knauff's exclusion, besides the assertion that allowing her to enter the country would be "prejudicial", the Supreme Court effectively remains powerless in having oversight of exclusion orders by the executive branch.[2]
  • Knauff can be denied entry into the United States due to the Constitution not containing protections for aliens seeking entry.[2] Thus, the role of the court in this case was to conduct a limited inquiry regarding whether the Attorney General had the authority to order exclusions, not if the rights of Knauff were violated when she was denied a hearing.[2]
  • Presidential Proclamation 2523 gave the Attorney General and the Secretary of State the jurisdiction to exclude aliens, and therefore Knauff was not wrongfully excluded.[2]
  • And, despite Knauff attempting to immigrate into the United States using the War Brides Act,[3] the court determined the legislation did not change Knauff's status as an alien, and therefore she was still held to the Attorney General's authority and could be excluded.[2]

Dissent

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Supreme Court Justice Jackson wrote the primary dissent in this case. He aligned himself with the majority of the court and agreed that Congress did have the authority to regulate who may and may not be excluded from the United States.[1] However, Justice Jackson argued that the executive and legislative branches do not have the authority to exclude Knauff without making her aware of why she is being excluded, the proof of her guilt, and an opportunity for Knauff to respond.[1] Justice Jackson urged the Attorney General to either provide the supporting evidence and justification for Kauff's exclusion or grant her entry into the United States.[1]  

Significance

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The United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy ruling, which bars judicial review for orders of exclusion unless specifically stated in law, is used as the foundation of the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.[2] The doctrine of consular nonreviewability prohibits aliens abroad from disputing decisions made by U.S. consular officers to deny visas based on statutory grounds.[2] Additionally, the rulings held in this case have been utilized in a range of immigration cases, from upholding deportations based on confidential information to preventing a Marxist speaker from entering the country by denying their visa.[4] Further, the ruling embedded the limited judicial review of deportations into law, as well as aliens or noncitizens having no protections under the Constitution in terms of immigration.

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f "U.S. Reports: Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)". Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540 USA. Retrieved September 29, 2023.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h Harrington, Ben (December 30, 2019). "The Power of Congress and the Executive to Exclude Aliens: Constitutional Principles". Congressional Research Service.
  3. ^ a b c Begeman, Jean (January 7, 1952). "What Ellen Knauff Won". New Republic. p. 14.
  4. ^ a b c d e Weisselberg, Charles D. (April 1995). "The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei". University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 143 (4): 933–1034. doi:10.2307/3312552. ISSN 0041-9907. JSTOR 3312552.