Talk:Tawang

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Untitled

Tawang is an town of Indian state Arunachal Pradesh. Then why the Simplified Chinese letters/languages are written in their ? please remove the Simplified Chinese letters. - Madhab Saikia — Preceding unsigned comment added by 106.218.1.24 (talk) 04:08, 27 February 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Please read the lead. Tawang is disputed territory. -Zanhe (talk) 05:51, 27 February 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Summary of territory dispute in lead

To User:Rao Ravindra has repeatedly removed the summary of the territorial dispute from the lead, please read WP:Lead, which says the lead section should "summarize the most important points—including any prominent controversies". Also please refrain from personal attacks. Comments like "Zanhe should stop adding the joke about Taiwan's claim and concentrate on saving his island ROC from PRC" are not helpful. -Zanhe (talk) 14:48, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Any claim by one country on territory controlled by another is significant. Although the Republic of China now only controls Taiwan and other islands, it was this government that negotiated with Britain in 1914 over the boundary, but rejected the Simla Accord, which leads to the current dispute. -Zanhe (talk) 05:28, 27 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Details

Where can I read more details on the military operation in February 1951, [when] Major Ralengnao 'Bob' Khathing led an Assam Rifles column to Tawang town and took control of the remainder of the Tawang tract from the Tibetans, removing the Tibetan administration. TrangaBellam (talk) 13:18, 12 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

It seems to be a Wikipedia creation. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:40, 12 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Nah - this has some basis.

It is however doubtful if he removed any administration (tax collectors - ?) or simply asserted sovereignty over frontier villages, which nobody had cared about in the years since '47. TrangaBellam (talk) 20:47, 12 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Interesting. TrangaBellam (talk) 20:54, 12 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Yeah, he was the Assistant Political Officer for the "Sela subagency" (of the Kameng Frontier Division), i.e., what we now call the West Kameng district. After Tawang was taken over, it became part of the same subagency. So he was the concerned official. The force is said to have been two platoons of Assam Rifles (in which he used to work prior to this position).

He would have indeed "removed" the Tibetan officials. On the previous occasion,

Lightfoot reported that people 'lived in dread' of the Tsona dzongpons, and that the latter's removal would be the 'biggest boon' that could be conferred upon them. (Mehra, p.430)

But Lightfoot wasn't authorised to act on them, whereas Khathing was. Since we don't hear of any clash or conflict, he must have used his tact well. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:57, 12 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Apparently the History section was written based on the Global Times. Its "global" knowledge is clearly visible. No mention of Tsona or Drepung, or even Gelugpa! The whole section needs to be nuked and rewritten. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:16, 13 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Nice. We need to draft afresh. TrangaBellam (talk) 13:29, 13 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

There is also the problem of duplication between this page and Tawang district (which doesn't have the same level of visibility). Some of the problems here were because somebody copied content from there to here. Perhaps we should make this page into the main page on the historical region of "Tawang" as people conceive it in normal parlance. Tawang Town can be a separate page. That and Tawang District can then be regarded as subpages of this one. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:26, 13 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

I have no issues. For now, I suggest that we base the section on van Eekelen (2015) and Reid (1942). Additional stuff can be integrated when they are discovered. TrangaBellam (talk) 14:28, 14 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Where are we on this? K3, do you plan to start drafting? TrangaBellam (talk) 09:02, 25 November 2022 (UTC)[reply]

According to Tsering Shakya

The previous version had the statement:

According to Tsering Shakya, the British records show that the border agreed in 1914 was conditional upon China accepting the Simla Convention. Since the British were unable to get China's acceptance, the Tibetans regarded the MacMahon line "invalid".^[1]

Some variations of this statement currently appear on a lot of pages on Wikipedia, but there are severe problems with it.

In the first place, Tsering Shakya himself did not study any British records. He is merely summarising Alastair Lamb's analysis. But Lamb never said exactly what Tsering Shakya says.

As far as the "conditionality" of the Simla Convention is concerned, there was none in the agreements. Tibet and Britain signed the Simla Convention as it stood, and waited (formally speaking) for China to sign. They also signed a bilateral declaration to the effect that the partially-signed Simla Convention would be binding upon them, and China would be forfeited of its benefits until it signs.^[2] There were no other conditions.

What Lamb had described, as did many other scholars, is that the Tibetans came to believe by 1938 that they had agreed to the McMahon Line agreement with the expectation that Britain would get China's agreement to the Simla Convention. And, since Britain had failed to get China's agreement, the boundary agreement had lapsed. By this time Lonchen Shatra as well as the 13th Dalai Lama had died. So there was nobody to confirm or deny their understanding within Tibet. But it is wrong to describe it as "conditionality" of the boundary agreement.

Of course, Tibet was a sovereign country in 1938 and it was very well able to repudiate any agreement it had signed. And, equally such repudiation would have invited retaliation from Britain. But, in the event, no such thing happened. Tibet never repudiated the agreements nor declared the agreements "invalid".

In 1944 the Tibetan Foreign Office, though not wishing to dispute "the validity of the McMahon Line as the limits of the territory ... in which India and Tibet respectively are entitled to exercise authority," requested the British Government to postpone extension of their regular administration up to the McMahon Line.^[3]

This is a very direct contradiction of Tsering Shakya's conclusion by a foreign policy expert.

So, using the Tsering Shakya's view in the form done here is a violation of WP:NPOV, on this page as well as all others. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:02, 13 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Where is the primary source for such a significant statement? TrangaBellam (talk) 14:36, 14 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Ah, that is the difference between a specialist and a mere Wikipedian! "A photostat of the document was supplied by the Indian side". [1] But, please don't read too much into it. My point is merely that the claims that Tibet regarded the McMahon Line as "invalid" are an overstatement. Very likely, they needed to buy time until the 14th Dalai Lama would take charge of the affairs. The Kashag would have been split right down the middle. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:30, 14 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

References

^ Shakya 1999, p. 279.
^ Smith, Tibetan Nation 1996, pp. 200–201: "We, the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Tibet, hereby record the following Declaration to the effect that we acknowledge the annexed Convention as initialled to be binding on the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet, and we agree that so long as the Government of China withholds signature to the aforesaid Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom."
^ Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute (1967), pp. 168–169. (The phrase "up to the McMahon Line" here means basically the Tawang district. Everything else was already under British administration.)

Reading this column, I feel like Shakya writes more gossip than history. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:17, 18 November 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Bibliography

This section is pinned and will not be automatically archived.

Goldstein, Melvyn C. (1991), A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State, University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-91176-5
Maxwell, Neville (1970), India's China War, Pantheon Books, ISBN 978-0-394-47051-1 – via archive.org
- Maxwell, Neville (1972). India's China War. Anchor Books.
Mayilvaganan, M.; Khatoon, Nasima; Bej, Sourina, eds. (2020), Tawang, Monpas and Tibetan Buddhism in Transition: Life and Society along the India-China Borderland, Springer Singapore, ISBN 9789811543463
Mehra, Parshotam (1974), The McMahon Line and After: A Study of the Triangular Contest on India's North-eastern Frontier Between Britain, China and Tibet, 1904-47, Macmillan, ISBN 9780333157374 – via archive.org
Richardson, Hugh (1984). Tibet & Its History (2nd ed.). Boston: Shambhala Publications. ISBN 0-87773-376-7.
Shakya, Tsering (1999), The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947, Columbia University Press, pp. 279–, ISBN 978-0-231-11814-9
- Shakya, Tsering (2012), Dragon In The Land Of Snows: The History of Modern Tibet since 1947, Random House, ISBN 978-1-4481-1429-0
Shukla, Sonia (2012-11). "Forging New Frontiers: Integrating Tawang with India, 1951". China Report. 48 (4): 407–426. ISSN 0009-4455. {{cite journal}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
Smith, Warren (1996), Tibetan Nation: A History Of Tibetan Nationalism And Sino-Tibetan Relations, Avalon Publishing, ISBN 978-0-8133-3155-3
- Smith, Warren (2019), Tibetan Nation: A history of Tibetan nationalism and Sino-Tibetan relations, Taylor & Francis, ISBN 978-1-00-061228-8
Van Eekelen, Willem Frederik (1967), Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, Springer, ISBN 978-94-017-6555-8

Status in Tibet

Coming back to the subject after a few days, I am disinclined to believe that pre-'51 Tawang was just another place in Tibet.

The system of governance was radically different —probably designed to satisfy a frequently rebelling population— and quite noble features like custom taxes were in place. I have doubts on whether there were any substantial Tibetan administration to remove, when the Indian troops landed. More soon. TrangaBellam (talk) 07:57, 28 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Bhuban's Singh biography of Khathing Sing is interesting but one of Khathing's expedition-mates reviewed the episode of integrating Tawang to be filled with myths and exaggerations. TrangaBellam (talk) 09:15, 28 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

K3, did you read this? TrangaBellam (talk) 09:16, 28 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Indeed, it was never a place "in Tibet", but Tibet exerted some form of control over it. When Olaf Caroe tried in 1935, they refused to relinquish that cotrol and perhaps doubled down on it.

As far as I can make out, the local nobility answered to the Tawang Monastry to the point of becoming defunct themselves. The Tawang Monastery answered to Drepung via Tsona Dzong. So, it was Tsona Dzongpons that were present in Tawang in 1951, whom the Indian force "removed". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:16, 28 October 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Postcolonial integration

Gohain, Swargajyoti (2021), Ibrahim, Farhana; Kothiyal, Tanuja (eds.), "Embattled Frontiers and Emerging Spaces: Transformation of the Tawang Border", South Asian Borderlands: Mobility, History, Affect, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 102–122, ISBN 978-1-108-84451-2, retrieved 2021-11-24

While doing my doctoral fieldwork (conducted in different phases from 2008 to 2013), elderly Monpa villagers told me that the local population was glad when Indian forces got rid of the Tibetan tax officials in 1951. The Tibetan tax-collector retains the image of a cruel master in Tawang’s collective memory. Older people in their 80s recalled the dread that these Tibetan agents would arouse in them when they arrived for collection. Punishments would range from beatings, starvation and jailing for even the most trivial follies, such as failure to feed the horses on time.
A common local narrative is that the Monpas had requested the Indian state to occupy their areas since they wanted to be free of Tibetan rule. While I am not completely sure whether the discursive element of ‘request’, whereby the Monpas’ wishes are seen as being taken into account, is a later addition to local legend mediated by official representations, it does hint at the fissures that existed between the local lay people and an extractive monastic system.

TrangaBellam (talk) 06:52, 24 November 2021 (UTC)[reply]

User:Kautilya3, Gohain is quite pioneering on the changing relationships between the Tawang monastery and the "subjects", with the penetration of Indian State into the region. Yet to some across a similar work. TrangaBellam (talk) 07:01, 24 November 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Yeah, glad to hear about this. My plan is to create a page called "Tawang Tract" as it was called during the British Raj, and more or less supervised by the Tawang monastery. The prominent sections are to be:

Geography
History prior to the British Raj
History during the British Raj
Indian integration

I think we have enough sources now and can easily counter Alastair Lamb's speculative ruminations. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:03, 25 November 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Reaction of Lhasa

I wonder how Lhasa reacted to Khathing's expedition? Though, by that time, they had far bigger issues to worry about. Maybe, we will never know until and unless the provincial archives are re-opened. TrangaBellam (talk) 06:14, 21 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

They complained to the Indian MEA, whose minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, defended the Indian take-over. Nehru's letters, which have been publicised recently, give us a fair idea of how Lhasa reacted. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:54, 21 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

[FOOTNOTEShakya1999279-1] Shakya 1999, p. 279.

[2] Smith, Tibetan Nation 1996, pp. 200–201: "We, the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Tibet, hereby record the following Declaration to the effect that we acknowledge the annexed Convention as initialled to be binding on the Governments of Great Britain and Tibet, and we agree that so long as the Government of China withholds signature to the aforesaid Convention, she will be debarred from the enjoyment of all privileges accruing therefrom."

[3] Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute (1967), pp. 168–169. (The phrase "up to the McMahon Line" here means basically the Tawang district. Everything else was already under British administration.)

[1]

[2]

[3]