Talk:Free will/Archive 17

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Archive 15

Chemical Restraints

In the opening paragraph it is written " physical constraints (for example, chains or imprisonment)". I wish physical "chemical restraints" that affect the brain-mind to be added. Wikipedia has an article on it http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_restraint --Mark v1.0 (talk) 13:50, 29 May 2013 (UTC)

From the content of that article I would think that that would be a means of inducing what is currently described as "mental restraints", and would be best introduced, if at all, in the parenthetical examples following that phrase, as something like "chemical inebriation" or "drug-induced" something, I'm not sure of the best exact phrasing. I'm aiming for something that captures any drug-induced lapse of the faculties that constitute free will, whatever those may be; not just such a state as artificially induced specifically to control someone, as that's a bit too specific. Any suggestions? (e.g. "for example, compulsions or phobias, chemical inebriation, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions").

I am concerned however about that list growing without bound. It is not meant to be an exhaustive list, it is only meant to give a few examples of different kinds of constraints corresponding to notable conceptions of free will, with a few examples of what would count as such a constraint each. I don't think we need to put absolutely anything that could impede free will under some theory or another in there, unless there is some notable discussion in the literature about that thing being a significant impediment to free will. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:39, 30 May 2013 (UTC)

Regarding "notable discussion in the literature about that thing being a significant impediment to free will" , a notable event related to psychiatric chemicals and free will . ON the drug "A Winnipeg teen was driven to commit an unprovoked murder because of the adverse affects of taking Prozac (psychiatric drug)" http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/breakingnews/judge-agrees-prozac-made-teen-a-killer-130010278.html. AND the flip side, being OFF the psychiatric chemicals caused Jordan Ramsay to kill http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2012/07/06/bc-jordan-ramsay-ruling.html . Can't blame the medications http://dailycaller.com/2013/01/16/forbes-withdraws-online-essay-blaming-psychiatric-medications-for-sandy-hook-shooting/ --Mark v1.0 (talk) 19:27, 1 June 2013 (UTC) I am happy with the term "chemical restraint" and the wiki link.--Mark v1.0 (talk) 19:32, 1 June 2013 (UTC)

My suggestion is "...physical constraints (such as chains, chemicals or imprisonment)" with "chemicals" linked to the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_restraint link.--Mark v1.0 (talk) 14:03, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

That doesn't work with the existing sense of the terms used in that sentence though. "Physical constraints" is meant to describe things that prevent your body from doing things, no matter what your brain might tell it to; hence why "chains and imprisonment" are given as examples. What you are describing would fit better under the existing phrase "mental restraints" (what I had before as "psychological constraints"), because the chemicals in question alter one's mental state in a way that affects one's free will. The chemicals themselves are not a mental constraint however, rather they induce a change of mind which constrains one's free will, which is why I was looking for an additional word like "inebriation" -- it is being under the influence of said chemicals which is constraining, not the chemicals themselves which are constraining, e.g. a bottle of Prozac sitting next to you isn't going to literally force your hand in any matter, but the effects of being on it might inhibit your ability to choose what to do. Also, the word "chemical" seems far too broad; hydrochloric acid is a chemical but isn't going to have the effects you're interested in here, it's just going to burn you. Perhaps use the phrase "psychotropic drugs"? That's used in the article you linked to as well and as far as I can tell is unambiguous: it means chemicals which affect your mind.

As to your news articles, I don't think a couple of recent news stories really count as notable discussion in the academic literature about the link between psychotropic drugs and free will. I have no doubt that some theories of free will, e.g. Frankfurt's, would probably accept that psychotropic drugs could impede free will, but without someone explicitly mentioning them as an example I would want to leave that as an implicit possibility rather than start growing this list in the first paragraph without restraint. --Pfhorrest (talk) 18:21, 3 June 2013 (UTC)

---I now do agree the word "chemical" is too unspecific to be placed in the sentence. The drug alcohol like the drug Prozac can inhibit the mind from working. Drunk drivers are held responsible for the choice to drink and drive. The "Psychotropic drug" ( a chemical is a physical object but very small) would have to be involuntarily ingested. You wrote "Physical constraints" is meant to describe things that prevent your body from doing things, no matter what your brain might tell it to do. Someones brain (a part of the body) can not perform or function when a powerful mind-altering drugs like a neuroleptic is in the brain, so the brain can not even have a chance of "free-will" to start off with. "involuntarily psychotropic drug" seems awkward , how about "involuntarily drugged"? this could apply to date rape drugs as well --Mark v1.0 (talk) 00:51, 9 June 2013 (UTC)

The possibility of behavior being influenced by drugs certainly deserves to be discussed in this article, but it would be completely wrong to equate a drug with a physical restraint. They operate in different ways, and raise different issues. Looie496 (talk) 02:03, 9 June 2013 (UTC)

"influenced" is a ridiculous term to be applied to a Psychotropic drug. The human brain can not function when a significant amount of drug is in its synapses altering the normal chemistry , freewill coming from thought no longer exists. In date rape, the woman involuntarily drugged can not say "no" or "yes" to sex, in psychiatry the presumed killer who is involuntarily drugged can not perform the psychiatrists prediction of killing. --Mark v1.0 (talk) 13:12, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

Plain "psychotropics" without indicating who put them in the person would be good for the article "...physical constraints (such as chains, psychotropics or imprisonment)" as psychotropics are a physical object.--Mark v1.0 (talk) 13:17, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

You are reading "physical" far too broadly here. Yes, the psychotropic drug is a physical thing. Other people are also physical things though, so by that broad a reading of "physical", social constraints would all fall under "physical constraints" as well: a cultural determinist would claim that a person who has been conditioned by other people is, in the same sense you use here, physically incapable of doing otherwise, because their neural pathways have been reinforced in a certain way that forces them to behave a certain way. Likewise, genes are physical things, whatever neural structures underlie compusions and phobias are physical things -- on a broad enough reading of "physical" everything can be read as a physical restraint. The intended meaning of it here, and the reason why "chains and imprisonment" are given as examples to clarify that meaning, is "your body is tied or locked up so that gross motor functions you attempt to make are obstructed by other objects outside of your body". Drugging somebody into a stupor puts them into a mental state where they don't even try to move their muscles, and so do not need to be physically restrained, i.e. chained or imprisoned; it is an induced mental restraint, just as much as preexisting neurological conditions due to genetics or experience can also affect mental restraints. --Pfhorrest (talk) 16:29, 14 June 2013 (UTC)

"a cultural determinist would claim" that all he could do, is make the claim. Scientifically every human being on a psychotropic would be unable to have freewill from the chemical reactions in their brain. A chain or a steel bar is on the macroscopic level, a psychotropic chemical is on the microscopic level.--Mark v1.0 (talk) 20:30, 16 June 2013 (UTC)

I found a comic illustration. http://prometheuscomic.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/prometheus-fairy-godmother-invisible-chains.jpg --Mark v1.0 (talk) 13:10, 19 June 2013 (UTC)

Mark v1.0: Your cartoon is excellent. It's too bad that it can't be put into the article. As for your observations about chemical constraints, I agree with you that these are a very interesting form of constraint. There is no fundamental difference between chemical and physical constraints: both interfere with the execution of a decision. The matter can be considered as subsumed in the Frankfurt counterexamples discussed by Fischer (p. 6) and by Bernard Berofsky (2012). "Internal-external distinction". Nature's Challenge to Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 89–92. ISBN 0199640017.. Brews ohare (talk) 16:55, 20 December 2013 (UTC)

Imposing personal aesthetics??

Snowded has imposed his personal taste 1 2 3 for brevity upon the section Free will and views of causality. Among other matters he has suppressed commentary on Kant's views by philosophers today made by Velasquez and Suppes He also has removed reference to the extensive discussion of Hume's work by Russell.

His rationale is that these observations are "over elaboration", "too discursive" and "excessive essay writing".

To my knowledge WP is not intentionally governed by one editor's personally held aesthetics of style or brevity. Rather, WP is based upon utility for the reader, and that includes guidance to the pertinent literature.

The subsection before Snowded's changes can be seen here. Brews ohare (talk) 17:28, 19 December 2013 (UTC)

Learn to work with other editors Brews. You made a series of inserts and I modified them. Not only that this is material you have been trying to put into other articles which has been disputed there. Its all an too familiar pattern, the only question is which article you will move to next. ----Snowded ^TALK 19:54, 19 December 2013 (UTC)

We must all, everyone of us, editors and readers, meekly submit to Snowded's exalted subjective judgments of tasteful style. His personal criticisms that the article possessed "over elaboration", was "too discursive," and contained "excessive essay writing" are to be considered universally binding by all readers. Too much elaboration cannot be tolerated. Excessive discursiveness is highly repugnant. Essay writing that is judged to be prolonged is a deadly sin for any Wikipedia article.Lestrade (talk) 20:21, 19 December 2013 (UTC)Lestrade

Indeed; we can only wonder where Snowded's unequaled expertise will next be displayed in his courageous crusade to expunge superfluous sourcing. Brews ohare (talk) 00:00, 20 December 2013 (UTC)

My view is that Brews's edit was much too long and contained quite a bit of OR, so I'm supportive of Snowded's changes. Looie496 (talk) 01:13, 20 December 2013 (UTC)

Looie: Please don't think of citing sources as OR, especially when no such claim was made by Snowded, and no indication on this Talk page or any others suggest the references cited were claimed to support anything approaching OR. You are off-target here, Looie. Brews ohare (talk) 01:44, 20 December 2013 (UTC)

Just because something is sourced it is not automatically included. Your original opening paragraph was opinion as I said in the edit summary. Otherwise style comes from style guides and from consensus. If you disagree Brews then you know the routes available to you as you have been down them oh so many times before on oh so many articles. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:02, 20 December 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, it is a common problem in discussing matters with yourself that you fail to address the issues raised. In the present case, if you read back, the issue raised is your removal of philosophical commentary by Velasquez and Suppes and Russell. This commentary is substantial, interesting, relevant, useful and on topic. Its inclusion is simply reporting observations on the subject of Kant and Hume by published modern sources.

As an apologia for yourself, Snowded, I believe you might have trouble with distinctions and articulation of your thoughts. So you made a blanket removal of everything without distinctions and then articulate criticisms that might conceivably apply to a portion of what you removed, but certainly do not apply to the content of sources. Brews ohare (talk) 16:31, 20 December 2013 (UTC)

Personal attacks again I see Brews. If I have that problem then I seem to share it with most of the other editors you encounter on Wikipedia; there just might be a message for you there. And if you both to check I left a lot of your material, only removing that 'proportion' to which my comments applied. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:17, 21 December 2013 (UTC)

Snowded; not the issue raised, not responsive. Your criticisms might conceivably apply to a portion of what you removed, but certainly do not apply to the content of sources. Brews ohare (talk) 14:17, 21 December 2013 (UTC)

I have reverted the recent changes by Brews for the following reasons:

The english spelling of realise is appropriate for a quote from Hume not the american one
Hume's views on the role of human character are not central to a summary of his position on free will
The addition of Pinker's views has been disputed on related articles and continues Brew's attempt to make a personal point about the role of science and philosophy which is a borderline breech of his arbcom restriction. There is a case for adding material from modern Philosophers of Mind, such as the Churchlands and others but lets have some mainstream Philosophers if we are adding material here.

An overall problem here is that Brews appears to have a body of material that he has not in varying forms attempted to introduce onto various philosophy articles which, while containing references, is idiosyncratic or partial in nature. Frequently is represents an essay type digression from the subject of the article concerned.----Snowded ^TALK 06:52, 22 December 2013 (UTC)

Snowded:Thanks for taking the trouble to explain your reverts. Here is a response:

1. English: The quote is from Kane: talk to him about spelling ' color ' . Anyway, simply a quibble on your part.

2. You are mistaken about the relevance of 'character' to free will. The retained discussion of Hume explains his view of causality, leaving the impression that he supported the notion of 'free will', which is not the case. Rather, he thought that at a minimum deliberated decisions were dictated by character, and not a matter of free choice. Consequently this material should be restored to convey Hume's position.

3. There is no dispute over what Pinker's views are, and Velasquez has accurately reported them. You personally have disputed whether Pinker's views are worthwhile reporting, but that is simply your personal position, and one clearly not shared by Velasquez and, to be sure, very many others. In addition, of course, the quote from Velasquez only mentions Pinker in a more complete commentary that addresses Kant, Darrow, and Sartre. You have not provided a basis for removal of this material. Brews ohare (talk) 16:53, 22 December 2013 (UTC)

No Brews, we disagree about the relevance of your addition on character. It is also your personal view that Pinker should be included, you have no special authority here. Lots of authors can be referenced who quote lots of others but out task here is to create an encyclopaedia not a set of essays expanding on any material we find. I have provided a basis for removal of the material, you disagree with that basis. Fine, lets see if anyone else wants to engage ----Snowded ^TALK 23:49, 22 December 2013 (UTC)

I have indeed provided a basis: I have cited the opinions of published sources. In contrast, you have added your personal opinions. This difference is not a disagreement between editors. It is a disagreement between Snowded and published sources. When sources and Snowded disagree, according to WP policies, which is to be preferred?? Brews ohare (talk) 05:24, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

You keep assuming that anything you can source should be added, regardless of context. That is a basic misunderstanding of how wikipedia works and is something that I, and other editors have tried to explain to you. Your failure to understand the means that you pose false questions such as those above. ----Snowded ^TALK 06:47, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

Of course, that is not my opinion. My view is that reporting what sources say that is on topic should not be removed because Snowded doesn't like it. Your wandering off into false generalities that do not apply doesn't help. Brews ohare (talk) 07:09, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

So anything that any source says on the subject should be included? Absurd ----Snowded ^TALK 15:27, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

To go back to specifics, what is absurd about including Velasquez' comments about Kant's and Pinker's view that moral decisions are not governed by the 'causal' laws of material things? Brews ohare (talk) 15:47, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

Stop the personal attacks Brews, you have a poor track record on blocks you don't want to add to it. Nothing is absurd about his Velasquez's comments. Neither are the comments of any number of commentators. Kenny has some good stuff as do others. What is absurd is your argument that anything which is referenced should be included. I have been specific in my objections above, try and deal with arguments rather than attacking other editors or misrepresenting their position. You have not made the case (i) for expanding this section into a general discussion of the subject and (ii) even if that was agreed for using Velasquez ----Snowded ^TALK 16:14, 23 December 2013 (UTC)

Hmm... I don't see any personal attack here. So apparently my presentation of Velasquez strikes you as insufficient, but your dismissal of Velasquez is definitive, although consisting of nothing but expression of your desire to dismiss it? You call that specific?? All you say is "Lots of authors can be referenced who quote lots of others". I'd suggest that some indication that Pinker supports Kant's views does suggest that Kant retains some currency in the 21st century. You seem to prefer Kenny, but do not indicate just why or what. Putting together some such commentary is what collaboration on WP presentation means. How about it?? Brews ohare (talk) 02:05, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

Read your edit summary for the personal attack, not to mention multiple other ones above. I do not prefer Kenny, try reading the phrase "Neither are the ...." which precedes this. Also try and realise that here (as elsewhere) your penchant for extended commentary is the problem not the specific references you find. Until you realise that and listen to what you have been told by many editors on many articles we are not going to get anywhere. Adding references to other main stream philosophical schools might be useful, expanding on what is already there is excessive. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:56, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

I see, Snowded, that your basis for reversion of Velasquez' attempt to relate Kant to the modern context is that it is an 'expansion' of what is already in the article, and so somehow an 'excessive elaboration'. You might understand that WP is not intended only for skim reading, but for in-depth treatment, and there is nothing in WP policy that suggests comments assessing the applicability of Kant's views from the stance of modern authors is unworthy of inclusion.

I see also that you do not care to specify what it is from Kenny that you compare with Velasquez, and are completely uninterested in collaboration to craft a more complete view of the modern assessment of Kant's views on causality and their relation to decision making. Brews ohare (talk) 06:36, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

I have no intention of specifying anything about Kenny because I am not and have never proposed their inclusion, I used it to make the point that there were many many authors who could be cited and that citation itself was not sufficient reason. This is an article on Free will, like the article on the Dillema was an article on the Dillema. An encyclopaedia needs to stay focused, our job is to provide the in depth treatment of a text book or for that matter the explorations of a subject by an amateur. ----Snowded ^TALK 09:22, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

We'll, as you cannot say how your example of Kenny supports your dismissal of Velasquez, your argument is lost. Your bromides about 'staying focused' are vague, unrelated to the specifics here. You are, it would seem, uninterested in any joint attempt to get down to details. As this thread began by pointing out, Snowded, you are imposing your personal aesthetics, and even these you misapply by misinterpretation of what you read. Brews ohare (talk) 15:43, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

You either obdurately choose not to understand the point, or you genuinely don't get it. Whatever, all I can do is to refer you to my previous arguments. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:36, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

I'm happy to refer to your previous arguments, if you will point them out. Where are they? Brews ohare (talk) 20:22, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

Matthew 7:7 ----Snowded ^TALK 23:54, 24 December 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I bothered to look up your biblical text, "Keep on seeking, and you will find." Hasn't worked with you so far. Here is what I have found from you:

"Kenny has some good stuff as do others." Probably referring to Anthony Kenny, possibly to What I believe.

"The addition of Pinker's views has been disputed on related articles and continues Brew's attempt to make a personal point about the role of science and philosophy[...]There is a case for adding material from modern Philosophers of Mind, such as the Churchlands and others but lets have some mainstream Philosophers if we are adding material here."

Apparently the unstated premise is that some unspecified works of Kenny (probably Anthony Kenny) and the "Churchlands" (probably Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland) are more useful than Velasquez, and Velasquez' text is to be dismissed. Velasquez' discussion of Pinker is somehow "Brews' attempt to make a personal point". There is some discussion of Kant in these works, but it doesn't address Velasquez' points. Snowded, are you interested in assisting with the task of such additions, or at least pointing out what material is pertinent, or are you just namedropping here as a substitute for directly confronting Velasquez? Brews ohare (talk) 00:23, 25 December 2013 (UTC)

Perverse, the issue is additions in the first place and that has been very clear. The names, dropped or listed are illustrations of just how many people could be as or more relevant to the subject overall rather than a narrow expansion of one (Kant) through one set of eyes (Velasquez). Its Christmas and I am between stages in getting the turkey on before going back to bed so in the Christmas spirit I will also refer you to Mark 4:5. I have cast enough explanation on the stony ground of your understanding and nothing so far has sprouted. So that is the end my generosity in explaining the same point oh so many times. Now and for the future: I refer you to my previous answers. ----Snowded ^TALK 04:44, 25 December 2013 (UTC)

As I guessed, but was uncertain about, you are not at all serious; your contributing to this article is an anathema for you. Brews ohare (talk) 05:39, 25 December 2013 (UTC)

As a BTW Snowded, you argue that there are many authors that could be quoted or cited besides Velasquez and Suppes, and seem to suggest that is a reason not to mention these two. On that basis many articles on WP would be blanked when topics with multiple possible sources were dropped rather than choose among the citation possibilities. On the other hand, there may be authors superior to Velasquez and Suppes, but to use them instead, Snowded, you would then have to make an assessment and comparison on this Talk page, something you have been invited to do several times without result. Brews ohare (talk) 19:26, 25 December 2013 (UTC)

Your other argument is that the evaluation of Kant in a modern context is an unnecessary elaboration, which is, of course, your opinion, and has the advantage that it requires no further thought from you about content or sources, but your opinion of irrelevance is not that of the cited published works. Brews ohare (talk) 19:28, 25 December 2013 (UTC)

The answer to the query: ¿Imposing personal aesthetics? is, it seems, ¡¡Yes!! Brews ohare (talk) 19:18, 26 December 2013 (UTC)

Understanding the concept?

"Free Will"....a concept I had first learned from religious sources. Since then, it has remained as an often misunderstood characterization of human trait. I found it quite interesting, but of course, certainly, it is meant to be a continued embattlement of discussion and debate since the topic encases both spiritual and scientific aficionado's. Clearly though, just what it might entail?

Is it not the perception of mankind, that once any topic and agreement has remained elusive enough for such periods, that any clear and decisive plausible answer can never be determined as accurate?

As an example....."why did the chicken cross the road?". Since we have never been a chicken, we can hardly see through the chicken's perspective, and therefore insert from our own consciences and perceive our self determinations for making such a decision "as" a chicken, and imagine all sorts of variables from our own real life scenario's. The question put before us, suggest that the chicken understands a roadway....in our minds. So, the most probable and logical answer, "the chicken was simply already headed in that direction, and did not recognize the roadway as an obstruction".... will fail to put the questioning to rest. Albeit simple, and straightforward. Sometimes, the more simple, the more elusive. Especially when we have regulated ourselves for a far more undertaking of a task.

Free will, then, "unconstrained"......has but one attribute, as being a quality (more or less) of mankind alone, and while opinions may vary several degrees, it can be quite apparent that mankind possesses little, to no, contributing "original" instinctual behavioral genetics that limits their behavior to fall within the boundaries of indigenous species. example:......most natural species, with few natural predators, "instinctively" take measures (behavior) to limit their population to a size that their habitat/territory will support. "Domesticated" animals, are those that have been cross bred/interbred, (genetically altered) to remove "instinctual" "undesirable" behavioral traits (aggressive), and, as an added benefit to mankind, reproduction increases sharply.

Food for thought then. The underlying concept of religion, is to offer up "rules", or "standards" to "regulate" human activity....because.....humans have Free Will......or, insufficient genetic behavioral instruction to live within nature successfully, (as a balance). Of course, there exists ample evidence to support this, albeit in itself nothing to support one philosophy or science over the other. As we know for certain that abundant genetic abnormalities are derived from interbreeding. Fossil and climate records, along with genetic data, indicate that a human population "bottleneck", indeed did take place. Causing the isolated population to interbreed, possibly excessively, for many generations.

The Russian Domesticated Fox experiment, expanded to have the trained staff attempt to raise wild wolf pups under controlled circumstances to raise more data for comparison. Once the wild pups reached a certain size, the experiment ended. The pups became too large and difficult to handle. Despite being in a warm indoors with food and water plentiful, they had simply no interest in living outside their natural world. Being unable to correspond to "natural" tendencies left them more aggressive and rebellious to their handlers. In short, with genetic behavioral "instinct" in place, their is no appeal, in defying it. Modern humans lost theirs through genetic mis-hap, therefore allowing for continued exploitation of the defect.

JayArden (talk) 23:21, 29 December 2013 (UTC)

Jay: I've tried to format your comment to be readable on a laptop. If errors were made, please fix them. Cheers. Brews ohare (talk) 06:43, 30 December 2013 (UTC)

Thank you. Very much appreciated. JayArden (talk) 10:02, 30 December 2013 (UTC)JayArden

Hi Jay: Your suggestion seems to be (please clarify if necessary) that 'free will' is a supplement to 'instinct' made necessary by the (perhaps damaging) evolution of of our genes that emasculated the normal instincts that suffice for other life forms that do not need to 'think-over' their actions because their instincts suffice to guide their actions. Have I got the gist? You suggest that the 'free will' issue cannot be resolved, and possibly is just a symptom of genetic damage? Jay, can you comment?

As you may be aware, to appear in the WP article this (or whatever you wish to say here, if I've got it wrong) requires supporting sources where these views can be found. Brews ohare (talk) 15:51, 30 December 2013 (UTC)

Brews ohare: Yes, you have the gist. It can be argued that modern humans share several similar findings as in the Russian Fox eperiment headed by the geneticist Dmitry K. Belyaev, such as hair transformations, pigmentation loss, and loss of the seasonal rythm of reproduction. 1 To compound the issue in humans, it is noted that we also interbred with existing neanderthal and Denisovan populations. Even further complicating the sanctity of our original gene pool.2 JayArden (talk) 00:44, 31 December 2013 (UTC)JayArden

Maybe we should distinguish between free will and conscious will. Given the laws of physics it is doubtful whether anything in the universe is completely unconstrained and free in that sense.However recent experiments demonstrate that the conscious exercise of the will depletes energy, and effectiveness of the will can be restored by intake of glucose. This indicates that the conscious will is not a phantasm, a non-scientific concept that is none the less popular in some scientific and philosophical circles. Persephone19 (talk) 17:39, 12 February 2014 (UTC)

Stress on philosophy

The Introduction to the article focuses upon constraints, and lists physical, mental, social, and metaphysical constraints. The consideration of actual ascertainable facts about constraints, such as they may be, is found in Free_will#In_science, suggesting that this article is not intended to be just a philosophical discussion. However, the second and third paragraphs of the introduction narrow the focus to only philosophical schools of thought, and the section Free_will#In_Western_philosophy with its 12 sub-subsections constitutes most of the article.

The narrow focus upon philosophical aspects in most of the Introduction is a case of an undue emphasis in this section. This narrow view detracts a great deal from the appeal of this article to the general reader, who is unlikely to be moved by semantic considerations of definition and usage described under numerous headings like metaphysical libertarianism and so forth . The Introduction should be rewritten to introduce all aspects of the topic. In particular it should (i) provide a more balanced view that introduces the scientific questions about constraints and their observation and (ii) address the concerns of the general reader, which are likely to be more about the factual than the linguistic niceties. Brews ohare (talk) 15:06, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

its a philosophy article and you are banned from any editing whatsoever to do with physics so be careful ----Snowded ^TALK 20:07, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: So, in your opinion, as a strictly philosophy article, the first paragraph of the article which strays far outside philosophy, namely:

"Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism),[1] physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions). The principle of free will has religious, legal, ethical, and scientific implications.[2] For example, in the religious realm, free will implies that individual will and choices can coexist with an omnipotent divinity. In the law, it affects considerations of punishment and rehabilitation. In ethics, it may hold implications for whether individuals can be held morally accountable for their actions. In science, neuroscientific findings regarding free will may suggest different ways of predicting human behavior."

is not really introductory to the article, and its mention of social, psychological, and neurological issues are some kind of window dressing? And the section Free_will#In_science and more particularly its subsections on emergence, neuroscience and so forth are mistaken inclusions? Brews ohare (talk) 22:01, 28 February 2014 (UTC)

Brews, I have run out of all patience with you. One mention of physics however construed and this goes to Arb. enforcement. They normally double the time of the last ban for recidivists ----Snowded ^TALK 07:32, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: It is interesting that you think of yourself as having a great capacity for patience that has now 'run out'. That is not the case. What you have is no patience for attention to content, and a great love of belligerence. Brews ohare (talk) 17:28, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

Ah Brews, ever the victim. The reality is you have made multiple content proposals on multiple articles which have nearly always been rejected by other editors. You contest any rejection interminably to the point where many editors have lost patience with you. But you don't see it so the warning stands ----Snowded ^TALK 17:45, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

The bulk of the article by length is about philosophy, so it's fitting that the bulk of the lede be about philosophy, as the lede is a summary of the article.

An additional paragraph at the end of the lede summarizing the much smaller science section of the article could be appropriate, but I'm not really sure what it would need to say. Perhaps an introductory sentence of some sort, and a sentence for each of the science subsections: physics has things to say about determinism, genetics has things to say about nature vs nurture, etc etc.

As for what the general reader would be more interested in, that'd a rather hard question to settle and maintain a neutral point of view, but I will say this: the "linguistic niceties" you dismiss are a necessary question to settle before any sense can be made of the science. If you want to investigate whether people have free will, you first need to understand exactly what question you are asking and investigating answers to -- what do you mean by "free will"? What exactly is it that you are looking for to see if it's there or not -- is the thing you're looking for even a coherent idea, and if so, what would its observable implications be? That's what all the "linguistic niceties" in the philosophy section are talking about, and every scientific investigation purporting to discover something about free will presumes some answer or another to those philosophical questions. --Pfhorrest (talk) 04:22, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: There are a few things to clear up here. One is the role of 'philosophy' regarding 'free will'. The subject of 'free will' certainly comes up in philosophy, but it is not the only field where it arises. The introduction suggests it has "religious, legal, ethical, and scientific implications", which is about as vague as saying the term 'free will' shows up in English in various contexts. What exactly is the 'philosophical' role in these other arenas: I'd suggest that its role is twofold: (i) providing various definitions of the term 'free will' and related concepts like 'choice' and (ii) pointing out the various logical interconnections between these definitions and related concepts. I'd suggest further that when these various other disciplines use the philosophical material it is simply for the clarification of terms and logical interconnections. Of course, as Wittgenstein and Pinker and Chomsky have pointed out, we cannot think without language, but there is still the question of which language applies in any given context, and that is a matter for the disciplines to decide, not the philosophers.

In particular, when neuroscientists engage in free will commentary, they need not ask what philosophy can add to the laboratory study of brain circuitry, which is a matter for the laboratory and scientific methods. The application of neuroscience to mental disorders is not philosophy, although philosophy can discuss the purely logical connections between the terms used in the science when it discusses such matters.

So the leading sentence:

""Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism),[1] physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions)."

is a bit misleading as it seems to bring up the question of what are the constraints upon our choices? while philosophy does not do this. Philosophy deals with the following: Let us suppose there are various kinds of constraints. Then what are the logical consequences for certain ideas of choice of these hypothetical constraints?

This emphasis upon constraints in the introduction is actually too narrow, as the philosophical subject of free will goes far beyond discussing categories of 'constraints' as might be identified by science, for example. The philosophical subject of 'free will' (and the WP article too) is very largely about debate over what one might mean by 'choice', and by 'freedom of choice', and also about various conceptions of the 'laws of nature' (for example, that they might be 'deterministic' or 'random', quite apart from what these laws actually are according to the scientists who use, invent, and verify them; and apart from whether scientists find these myopic descriptions useful) and whether these hypothetical conceptions of the 'laws of nature' are compatible with the various hypothetical meanings of 'free will' and 'choice'. These philosophical discussions are not about what we know about actual constraints, or what we know about actual laws of nature, or about what we actually know about choice. These philosophical exercises are about only hypothetical circumstances, and it is for the various disciplines that choose to use these maunderings to decide whether they have any practical use at all in guiding their thinking about their disciplines. Perhaps poetically speaking, the philosophical work is nothing more than a smorgasbord of (hopefully internally consistent) languages, like branches of mathematics, and each discipline can decide using their expertise just which particular form of 'mathematics' works for them.

Bottom line: the introduction does not serve the philosophical framework of 'free will', and tends to confuse matters of fact with matters of clarification of hypothetical constructs. Brews ohare (talk) 17:28, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

BTW, there are various views of philosophy discussed in metaphilosophy,1 2 and epistemology,3 and model-dependent realism,4 but if this article on free will fits with a different view than the one outlined above, the article should make that connection. Brews ohare (talk) 21:16, 1 March 2014 (UTC)

Brews, as we've been over many times before on this article, the first few sentences are the way they are only because we cannot without bias give a concise single sentence definition of what free will is to open the article with, because that matter is contentious. So for our opening definition we have to be very broad and vague, and then give a short list of different opinions on the specifics. That does not put any kind of weight at all, undue or otherwise, on the definitional issues; is merely avoids taking a stance on them, as any other kind of opening definition would.

The rest of the first paragraph is not about those definitional issues, but more general introductory kinds of statements as found on many other articles, giving an broad view of the significance of the topic to be discussed.

The next two paragraphs summarize the philosophy section which composes the bulk of the article, which is entire appropriate as the lede should summarize the article.

And as I just said yesterday, I agree an additional paragrsph summarizing the smaller science section would be warranted too.

What is absolutely not warranted is rewriting the lede in any way which biases the article toward one position or another on the controversial definitional issues, just so you can move on to more quickly talking about the kind of free will you think is most interesting and the research being done on it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 01:23, 2 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: Let's look at a couple of your sentences here:

"Brews, as we've been over many times before on this article, the first few sentences are the way they are only because we cannot without bias give a concise single sentence definition of what free will is to open the article with, because that matter is contentious."

Now I'd agree that there has been millennia of debate over free will that cannot be summarized in a paragraph. However, the problem is that the focus on 'constraints' is presented in such a way that this paragraph doesn't frame the philosophical issues correctly, never mind avoiding bias. I have explained the framework problems in more detail above, and will try to repeat that in different words if you wish.

"The rest of the first paragraph is not about those definitional issues, but more general introductory kinds of statements as found on many other articles, giving an broad view of the significance of the topic to be discussed."

Again, I agree that the first paragraph seems not to be about definitional issues, but seemingly and wrongly is about various facts about constraints, when what the philosophy of free will is about is various abstract issues that do not depend upon any 'facts' at all, but are about definitions and logic. The philosophical issues could be expanded to include very much deeper matters like the problem of consciousness and the mind-body problem and just where does this intuition of 'free will' come from. That expansion of subject would be a very much more interesting article than the present one, which makes no such attempt.

"I agree an additional paragraph summarizing the smaller science section would be warranted too."

Actually I'd agree with that only if the 'science' aspect were restricted to the usage of the term 'free will' in the sciences, and refrained from attempts to evaluate what science has to say about the facts of 'free will', for example, as to the bearing of dopamine production or the Libet experiments, because crossing that line into claims about the 'facts' of constraints would mean this article would become a more general article on 'free will', not a philosophical article in the way it is presently conceived. That enlargement of subject would require a very different organization. For one thing, the introduction would have to point out that these two approaches to the topic are largely disjoint and based upon different ideas of how things are to be established. Brews ohare (talk) 04:55, 2 March 2014 (UTC)

I'm finding it hard to discern a point in all of that, but I feel like you are getting caught up on some kind of significance you are reading into the word "constraints" that is not intended.

To open the article, we need to say what free will is.

What free will is, is a controversial matter.

What's not controversial about it is:

It's some kind of ability
It's an ability to choose in some way
It's an ability to choose in some way which is free from something that might otherwise limit that ability to choose

Exactly what it is that one must be free from in order to have free will is the controversial point in defining it.

The intent of the word "constraint" is merely to name a thing-which-might-otherwise-limit-that-ability-to-choose, so that we don't write something stupid-sounding like "Free will is the ability to make choices free from some kind of thing or another. Things that some people have said it's important to be free from include...".--Pfhorrest (talk) 08:34, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: I guess this outline is supposed to boil things down to basics, but it has a bunch of built-in viewpoints. It really isn't up to WP editors to say things like 'free will is an ability' . It is our job to say what sources say about it. Many sources can be reported as saying 'free will' is a widely held intuition. Some entertain the description of this intuition, search for its origin, ask whether it is part of the way our brain works, or is a cultural matter, or a superstition. Some spend all their effort trying to reduce this intuition to some form of words and then argue over the wording. Some invent a simplistic version of science and then search for the limitations their view of science places upon human actions.

WP editors don't have to settle these matters. But they shouldn't be sucked into accepting one way of framing things, which is what has happened so far. There is lots of literature that adopts the 'deterministic/random' view of nature's laws and spends its time trying to reconcile intuition with this pseudo-science. Fine,it can be summarized. There are those that think brain scans will tell us whether we can make decisions. We can report that. There are those that predict the expansion of science to contain intuition within its domain. That can be reported too. There are those that think we are genetically programmed to have such an intuition, and those who think it is a matter for cultural psychology. And on, and on. Can't this article be opened up? Do we have to accept the idea that Fischer Harris, Dennet, are onto something with their endless nitpicking over minutiae of usage and some reductionist program to subject 'free will' to unexamined simplifications of nature's laws? Brews ohare (talk) 13:11, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

On a different matter, this is a general article on all things to do with free will. This is not just "free will as discussed in philosophy", with material on free will as discussed in other field to go elsewhere. It all goes here. But free will is predominantly discussed as a philosophical matter, those philosophical matters are still open questions, and every scientific investigation about anything to do with free will has to take some position on the philosophical matters for granted in order to proceed, but this article can't do that and still remain neutral on its philosophical content. So the lede, defining the subject, has to touch on some of the philosophy at least briefly, enough to be clear that the exact definition is controversial and to give some ideas as to what those controversial positions are. That is not an opening to go into more general philosophical matters right there in the lede; we just have to touch on a few of them very briefly to maintain neutrality, and then move on. And that's what we do in the first paragraph: two sentences to give the uncontroversial part of the definition and then the different controversial options, then we move on to more general comments. Then later we come back to summarize the philosophy section in other paragraphs. A paragraph summarizing the science section would fit perfectly right right in there.

I honestly can't tell if you are complaining that there's too much philosophy in the lede, or too little. It sounds like you want this article to either set aside the stupid philosophy stuff and get straight to the important science, or make this the philosophy getto (filled with tangentially related philosophical matters) and go build a "real" free will article on scientific investigations (biased toward one philosophical position or another) elsewhere. --Pfhorrest (talk) 08:34, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest: You are proposing that this article concerns all aspects of 'free will', not just philosophical aspects, and go on to observe that mostly the concept is ignored outside philosophy. But even within the framework of philosophy itself, the focus of this WP article is overly narrow. If 'free will' is a fundamental intuition, it can be commented upon from many more angles than whether it is compatible with or incompatible with some (debatable) view of nature's laws. And even with a more accurate view of 'nature's laws', it may be noted that 'nature's laws' are an invention of the human mind that correlate a very limited set of observations filtered through an idealistic notion of 'objectivity'. Brews ohare (talk) 13:41, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

Basically I view the first paragraph of the introduction as a stalking horse introducing constraint as the main issue under the disguise of being an 'unbiased view' that allows all kinds of constraints, but then the subject is steered in paragraphs two and three toward limiting constraints to the 'constraint of dominant concern' being the popular notion that science denies the reality of 'free will' beyond some psychological disorder that can be explained away by sophistry. Brews ohare (talk) 16:24, 4 March 2014 (UTC)

Another problem with the 'constraint' approach, beyond its narrow focus on the 'constraint of dominant concern', is that a 'constraint' is a seemingly objective entity that can be dealt with from that perspective. In contrast, the view of 'free will' as an intuition places the subject in a context where 'objectivity' is harder to achieve, as it is with other obscure phenomena like art, religion, music, and so forth. Brews ohare (talk) 14:33, 5 March 2014 (UTC)

I'm having trouble finding much coherent point in all this and I'm too overworked right now to put effort into looking for one, but I want to address this one specific thing about calling free will an "intuition". People no doubt have an intuition that free will exists and they have it. But the definitional question asks what is the thing that people have an intuition about? And the general answer from all parties is that it's some kind of unconstrained ability to choose, of some sort or another... the details of which then get controversial. People have an intuition that their ability to choose is, in some important way, not bound, limited, restricted, or constrained. Then they argue about which way exactly is the important one, and whether their ability to choose really is constrained in that way or not. Saying that what free will is is "an intuition" says nothing about it at all; you might as well say it's "a belief" or "an opinion". An intuition, belief, or opinion, that what? What is it that is intuited? --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:53, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

Saying 'free will' is an intuition is an assertion that it is not simply summarized and immersed in a fog of verbiage. It ups the ante on 'the definitional question' which must capture what is going on and not settle for easy but inadequate encapsulation. As you well know, some philosophers have taken the view that the onus upon discussion of 'free will' is to come up with an adequate understanding of it, and not to engage in the fruitless exchange over how a simplistic view of science seemingly rules it out as near dementia . If we are ready to admit to the real variety of views, maybe it's time to look at the subject in all it's complexity and apportion unbiased attention to all its aspects, as you say is the intention of this article, but is so far unrealized.Brews ohare (talk) 16:07, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

We might begin by outlining the shortcomings of a reductionist approach based upon an erroneous conception of science and it's domain of applicability, now the focus of this article. Brews ohare (talk) 16:13, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

Or we could begin by outlining the alternatives to this unsatisfactory approach. There are three approaches:

(i) 'Free will' is a phenomena addressable by science. With this view, we may ask what scientific approaches are considered candidates for explanation. There are several. One is the view that brain scans and neuroscience will elaborate the mechanisms behind free will. Another is that the understanding of complex systems and multi-pathed feedback systems will push science into a new category of explanations, perhaps emergence, and 'free will' will be discovered in the operation of such systems. And there is, of course the simplistic view of the present WP article that each and every occurrence is either determined by past occurrences or a throw of the dice, and 'free will' must be understood from this perspective.

(ii) 'Free will' is a phenomena outside the domain of science. This view has deep roots in philosophy, in Kant, Wittgenstein, Chomsky and Pinker. Basically it is a chapter of the mind-body problem. It places free will among those phenomena that science cannot reach because the role of objectivity in science, its focus on results that are publicly verifiable and reproducible, precludes examination of the subjective.

(iii) Both the above alternatives adopt the view that 'free will' is extant and is to be explored as such. That is a view irrelevant to a third view that focuses upon constructing a variety of internally consistent axiomatic systems, all of which employ the words 'free will' with one or another definitions, and each of which logically connects its chosen definition with other definitions about 'freedom', 'choice', 'ability to do otherwise', and so forth. The ultimate question of how to establish whether any of these axiomatic systems connects to reality is put aside as an empirical matter that isn't part of the semantic construction project. Brews ohare (talk) 17:11, 6 March 2014 (UTC)

A reformulation of the proposed change to the Introduction:

The following is a revised version of the change in the introduction suggested in the above thread:

"Free will is the common intuition (whether valid or not) that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of psychological and other conflicting influences.^1,2,3,4,5 Although sufficient to identify this intuition, this description is only indicative, and there is much more to say about free will and how to put this intuition into words and how to assess it. In particular, as part of the assessment of this intuition, free will is widely discussed in terms of constraints, that is, various factors that may limit the ability of agents to make choices. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints..."

----

Sources

¹ "One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing." Corliss Lamont as quoted by Gregg D Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books. pp. p. 8. ISBN 0739171364. {{cite book}}: |pages= has extra text (help)

² "The freedom in question is a property, real or imagined, that nearly all adult human beings...believe themselves to possess. To say that one doesn't understand what it is, is to claim to lack the most basic understanding of the society one lives in, and such a claim is not believable." from Galen Strawson (2010). Freedom and Belief. Oxford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 0199247501. Quoted by The Information Philosopher and accessible on-line in Amazon's 'look inside' feature.

³ "All normal humans experience a kind of basic, on-the-ground certainty that we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts." from Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher (2009). "Introduction". In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks, Shaun Gallagher, eds (ed.). Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?. MIT Press. p. 1. ISBN 0262512572. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

⁴ "The experience of being able to act differently in similar situations is certainly a main source of our intuition that we possess free will." Henrik Walter (2001). Neurophilosophy of Free Will: From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of Natural Autonomy. MIT Press. p. 48. ISBN 0262232146.

⁵ "Free will does exist, but it is a perception, not a power or driving force. People experience free will. They have the sense that they are free." An often-quoted remark by Mark Hallett, researcher with the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stoke. Quoted, for example, by Richard McKenzie Neal (2008). The path to addiction and other troubles we were born to know. AuthorHouse. p. 45. ISBN 1438916752.

Comment: In response to an observation by Pfhorrest, 'free will' is identified as a particular intuition, a phenomenon of the mind that is widely recognized, and not simply a 'reference to' this intuition. The intuition is first identified, and then immediately qualified by the subsequent discussion of constraints. Brews ohare (talk) 16:58, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

The fact that many articles reference the common intuition does not mean that free will is defined by it. The citations you give are mainly commentaries not definitions. ----Snowded ^TALK 23:08, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

That the 'intuition of having a capacity' is acknowledged by many reputable sources holding a wide variety of views about that intuition indicates that the intuited capacity is a subject of discussion. In fact, some say that were it not for this intuition, there would be very little interest in this topic of 'free will', even among philosophers. There is no assertion that the intuition of free will is 'defined' by simply identifying the intuition among the many intuitions humankind entertains. In fact, to some degree, an 'intuition' defies definition, inviting a variety of interpretations corresponding to a variety of contexts. A good part of the philosophical and of the scientific discussion is about just which aspects of the intuition are adequately captured by various attempts at putting the intuition into words. Brews ohare (talk) 01:09, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Brews, as above, there is no objection to mentioning the fact that there is a commonly-held intuition that we have free will, or that that is a motivating factor in the discussion of the topic, or anything substantial like that. It is a linguistic problem. You are confusing an attitude with the object of that attitude.

To illustrate this, let's take one of those sources you quote, and stick your proposed definition of free will in place of the words "free will" in that sentence.

Let's take your quote from Henrik Walter, which speaks of "our intuition that we possess free will".

Now let's take your definition of free will, "the common intuition that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions", and stick that in there.

Do you think Walter is speaking of "our intuition that we possess the common intuition that one has complete control to choose among alternative actions"?

Or is he speaking of "our intuition that we possess complete control to choose among alternative actions"?

Do you see how the first possibility there is a completely screwy way to speak? Talking about the intuition of having an intuition? Obviously he means something more like the second. So when we say "free will is...", we need to finish that sentence with something like what we replaced the words "free will" with in the second paraphrase there. "Complete control to choose among alternative actions" is a possible definition of free will that does not commit the error I'm harping on right now. (It may have other problems). It would also be fine to say somewhere prominent that there is a common intuition that we have such control. But trying to define free will as the intuition that we have such control, rather than as such control itself, just plainly abuses language, all substantial matters aside. Do you see that? --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:55, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Pforrest: Let me first explain how to avoid this screwy way to speak, and then get to the real issue of presenting the topic of 'free will' here.

(i) Suppose that we regard the unit of discourse to be some combination like "the intuition that we have control over our actions". The italicized words simply identify which intuition we are talking about, separating it from things like "the intuition that there is a God" . So Walter's statement ""The experience of being able to act differently in similar situations is certainly a main source of "our intuition that we possess free will." cannot be rewritten to repeat the word 'intuition'. That would be like speaking of "I don't mean the wagon that is red, but the red wagon that is red". You take the view that the 'intuition of free will' is circular; so one has the "the intuition of the [[intuition of [the intuition of...] ]]. You can view Walter's statement that way if you like, but I take his "intuition that we possess free will" as a short-hand label selecting among intuitions the 'intuition that one is capable of choice' (or something similar). That is,'free will' in the phrase the 'intuition that we have free will' is only a tag to select among intuitions, and there is no implication that the word 'red' in the phrase 'the wagon that is red' describes everything about the wagon, defining 'wagon'. It just designates it. I've reworded the proposal to make this point more obvious. You might take another look at it.Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

(ii) Here is what I think is the problem with this article, whether or not 'intuition' helps to solve it. There are many pieces to the 'free will' discussion: (a) the standard arguments about compatibilism, incompatibilsm and so forth (b) the dualist point of view of Pinker and Kant (c) the Libet experiments and neuroscience in general (e) the emergence viewpoint based on hoped-for qualitatively new developments in the understanding of feedback systems (f) the hypothesis of free will as a powerless conscious concomitant of unconscious processes that actually decide things (an epiphenomenon, or 'ghost in the machine') (g) the religious viewpoints.

The idea of an intuition of free will fits with any of these viewpoints and does not weight the discussion in any direction. The present article mixes up the empirical with the logical, the pursuit of facts with refinements in usage, and above all (IMO) ignores the fact that reductionism is a belief, not a verifiable position, so the whole emphasis of the discussion upon consideration of determinism is just one (silly) point of view that does not even employ a viable idea of what constitutes a 'law of nature'.

What can be done? Brews ohare (talk) 05:11, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

I don't want to get off onto a discussion of this much larger reorganization you are proposing until we can settle the much smaller issue already under discussion of the problems with your proposed introduction, which were, to repeat succinctly:

The use-mention distinction error in using the word "refers", now fixed.
The confusion of intentional attitudes and their objects in defining "free will" as an intuition, where we are just starting to make progress in another section above -- let's consolidate discussion of that up there instead of continuing it here.
The undue weight of singling out psychological influences alone to mention amongst all possible conflicting influences.
The fact that's what left of your proposal after fixing those things is virtually identical to what we already have, so what's the point?

On that last point, let me take a virtual editor's pen to your latest proposal to illustrate:

Free will is ~~the common intuition (whether valid or not) that one has~~ ^{[see discussion]} complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of ~~psychological and other~~ ^{[moved to later list]} conflicting influences.^1,2,3,4,5 ~~Although sufficient to identify this intuition, this description is only indicative, and there is much more to say about free will and how to put this intuition into words and how to assess it.~~ ^{[unnecessary]} ~~In particular, as part of the assessment of this intuition, free will is widely discussed in terms of constraints, that is, various factors that may limit the ability of agents to make choices.~~ ^{[redundant with "conflicting influences"]} Factors [i.e. influences] of historical concern have included [psychological, and social, and physical, and yes also] metaphysical constraints [i.e. conflicting influences]..."

So now we have:

Free will is complete control to choose among alternative actions, even in the face of conflicting influences. Conflicting influences of historical concern have included conflicting psychological influences, conflicting social influences, conflicting physical influences, and conflicting metaphysical influences.

Compared to what we had already:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints, physical constraints, social constraints, and mental constraints.

I've taken the liberty of eliding the examples given of each kind of constraint for the sake of comparison. (Note also, FWIW, that "mental constraints" used to say "psychological constrains" until an earlier bout with you led to a lot of shuffling of the lede).

Where exactly is the improvement in your version?

--Pfhorrest (talk) 03:06, 13 March 2014 (UTC)

The scientific approach to 'free will'?

A description of how a scientist might approach the phenomenon of the intuition of free will is found in Pockett. It consists of questions like: "Why do people feel free in their choices although they may not be?" "Under what conditions do healthy minds develop intuitions of free will?"

On the other hand, general questions like "Do the laws of nature contradict the possibility of mental acts to control events?" are not answerable by science and can only be conjectured upon. A more specific question like "Do the laws of neuroscience (or psychology or sociology or ...; name your field) as presently understood contradict the possibility that mental acts might control events?" would have to be answered in the negative because the chosen theory does not encompass the relevant experimental domain and is not applicable without extrapolation beyond the realm where it is verified.

The present WP article, with its emphasis upon various philosophical positions regarding the import of the archaic notion of determinism (simply a gussied-up version of fatalism) and its bias toward reductionism is framed outside both the possibility of an extra-scientific approach (for example, Pinker or Kant), and even the scientific approach itself.

The weighting of the article toward the battle with determinism is indicative of a great deal of philosophical debate, but that preoccupation is very one-sided and should be better balanced to represent a wider and more pertinent perspective. Brews ohare (talk) 19:16, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Wrong type of source. The Machines like us hypothesis is one take (and a controversial one), you need a general summary of scientific approaches not one that pops up on a google search. There is no one clear way of understanding scientific approaches to free will, look at the controversy over Freeman's work as one example and then we have the whole autonomic v novelty receptive debate In practice science and philosophy are hopefully entwined on this subject at the moment and creating a dichotomy is not helpful. ----Snowded ^TALK 22:43, 8 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: Not the point, which is rather that no scientific theory as we know it today can make the claim that minds can or cannot control even one of our decisions. That claim requires extrapolation beyond what is so far established. So the arguments about the implications of determinism that dominate this article are not about any realistic claim, and should not be the preponderance of the article. In its place should be a discussion of the intuition of free will, its possible origins (genetic? sociological? psychological?), its connection with morality and the law, and so on.

The focus in this article on determinism and incompatibilism or compatibilism is only a facet of the topic and not a practically interesting one except to those who for some reason or another think that determinism (or its variant that allows chance as well) is not only a viable view of the actual laws of nature as we know them, but that it applies to everything, not just scientific subjects, a gross exaggeration that cannot be justified.See, e.g., JT Roberts Brews ohare (talk) 00:37, 9 March 2014 (UTC)

we need secondary sources Brews not your summaries of what you have found on google searches. You make the classic Cartesian error above for example. You really do not understand this subject and you are not well enough read to summarise if. Work from secondary sources not partial pricey ones and you might, just might get somewhere. Otherwise your ar just waiting everyone's time. ----Snowded ^TALK 20:03, 9 March 2014 (UTC)

So entertaining talking with you Snowded. I am prepared to learn more about this subject, but I'm unprepared to take your say-so about my misunderstandings. Perhaps you could elucidate, or point at some relevant source? As you know, even were you to establish credentials in this area, which isn't going to happen, WP is designed to avoid attaching any credibility based solely upon say-so, regardless of reputations always in the real world. So let us hear more. Brews ohare (talk) 21:10, 9 March 2014 (UTC)

sorry Brews, other editors may be prepared to give you a 101 course in philosophy through the talk pages. I am not. My point was that interaction over primary sources is not what Wikipedia is about. You either learn that or you will continue to have little or no impact on content. As to my opinion, your concept of physics is clearly an engineering one and your knowledge of philosophy is so biased towards a limited range of.sources that your contributions are nearly always deeply problematic . But that is my opinion, you will doubtless ignore it, and ignore the advice of many another editor. You are a time waster ----Snowded ^TALK 19:32, 10 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: For one conversant with the subject, as you claim to be, it is but a moment of your time to draw some few words from your memory to identify the problem as you see it and provide a source for my further education. And perhaps improve WP content? Brews ohare (talk) 20:02, 10 March 2014 (UTC)

Pfhorrest perplexes you, I obviously irritate you and wikipedia overall has got oh so many things wrong; per you multiple essays on your talk page. Maybe there is a lesson there. As to a source for your further education I suggest using the time your retirement has provided to go to a local community college and do a 101 Philosophy course, it would get you started. ----Snowded ^TALK 06:44, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded, for an amateur philosopher your imprecise use of English is surprising. It's pretty obvious that it is not Pfhorrest that perplexes me; quite the contrary; but his argument. This example (and many others where you have had to backtrack), and your reluctance to say anything of consequence in this instance, suggests that your claimed insight into this matter is not something you wish to put to the test. Brews ohare (talk) 14:45, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Just remind me Brews. How many of your edits on Philosophy articles have been accepted? ----Snowded ^TALK 22:20, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: So this discussion of 'free will' has boiled down to which of the two of us is 'bigger'? Very pertinent. But you lose. Brews ohare (talk) 22:54, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

You may wish to see it that way Brews, but the point (which you are ignoring) is that you cannot write essays based on primary sources. That has resulted in a zero acceptance rate for your substantial edits over many articles. Now you can learn from that or you can ignore it. Your call ----Snowded ^TALK 23:07, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

→ Snowded: You raise as the main issue this point: "you cannot write essays based on primary sources". This remark is another dodge to avoid saying what you think is wrong with proposed content, or proposing alternatives to it. Instead of providing a better summary of sources, or additional sources with other ideas, you wish to divert attention to an abstract policy issue divorced from specific content, and therefore requiring no understanding from you of the subject at hand. Brews ohare (talk) 04:02, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

No Brews, it is a refusal to engage in an under graduate discussion of the subject. Here we use secondary sources. You are the one who advocates change, you have to provide material to support the need. At the moment, as I said before, if you want these sort of discussions enrol in your local community college don't waste people's time----Snowded ^TALK 07:08, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: You cannot point to any Talk-page discussion of the content of this article made by yourself, nevermind an elementary one. Brews ohare (talk) 15:08, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Correct Brews, because I am not prepared to talk about primary sources ----Snowded ^TALK 17:01, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

And we are back to the diversion from content to policy issues. It is obvious that primary sources can be presented if their views are accurately reported, and if there is controversy the primary sources with differing views also should be presented. What is disallowed is for a WP editor to referee such differences of opinion - they only can be reported, not adjudicated. Your unwillingness to engage in this kind of presentation of views is not because of policy, but because you don't feel like it. Brews ohare (talk) 17:06, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

No Brews, you don't get Wikipedia, what you choose or present from primary sources has to be a result of a secondary source. Until you get that (or are prepared to listen) you will get no where ----Snowded ^TALK 17:35, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

This point is clearly made on WP:Primary: a secondary source is needed only to establish the importance of a topic, particularly for justification of an article. As for subsidiary topics within an article, there is no such requirement. And, as you also know, there rarely are truly 'secondary' sources for philosophy articles. The Internet Encyclopedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia and the Oxford Companion all have articles written by a single author and are no more scrutinized than other published works.

All of which has no place here in a Talk page (supposedly) devoted to the drafting of a presentation of the subject of Free will. Brews ohare (talk) 18:27, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Content is determined by policy and your attempts to use policy discussion groups to support your view on primary sources failed, as did your RFAs Brews. Otherwise I find it highly ironic that you are concerned about misuse of talk pages, and simply unbelievable that you think there are few secondary sources for philosophy articles. ----Snowded ^TALK 19:27, 12 March 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: I think content is determined by accurate reporting of published sources, not policy. Of course, policy is supposed to assist this undertaking, while in your hands it is mainly useful for other purposes, for which it is not intended. Brews ohare (talk) 05:34, 13 March 2014 (UTC)