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English: Sources are in table below, taken from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vote_counting
Date
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Table of examples

Staff Time Needed for Hand Counts[1]
Team (Wall Clock) Minutes per Vote Checked Team Size Staff Minutes per Vote Checked Number of Contests Checked per Ballot Full Precincts /Batches, or Random Ballots Type of Paper Ballot Number of Ballots Checked Total Staff Time, Minutes Year Sources Overheads Excluded & Notes
Butler Cnty, PA, Butler City 0.02 6 0.09 8 Full batches Sheets 600 450 2022 [2][3] 1 reads to 4-7. No report available, so times may be under-reported. Not on graph.
Butler Cnty, PA, Donegal Twp 0.02 4 0.08 8 Full batches Sheets 1,061 660 2022 [2][3] 1 reads to 4-7. No report available, so times may be under-reported. Not on graph.
Dane County, WI 0.04 5 0.20 1 Full sets of images Sheets 1000 200 2015 [4][5] Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision
Mohave County, AZ, experiment 0.05 7 0.34 36 Full batches Sheets 850 10,266 2023 [6] Excludes: detecting & retallying errors missed by team, space rental, paying workers to attend training, entering data on computer for web & SOS, creating blank tally sheets for each precinct. They estimate the following would add 33% to direct tallying cost: supervision, summation, sorting ballots by precinct, guards, transportation, background checks, webcams, recruitment
Maricopa County, AZ recount 0.08 5 0.42 2 Full batches Sheets 1 0.83 2021 [7] Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets
New Hampshire 0.09 3 0.27 20 Full batches Sheets 627 3,360 2007 [8][9] Add 60% to cover: supervision 43% + training 13% + sums 4%
Carlisle, MA 0.11 2 0.22 9 Full batches Sheets 3,670 7,200 2020 8 teams of 2 plus 4 extra
Hancock, MA 0.13 2 0.26 9 Full batches Sheets 513 1,200 2020 Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets (10 teams of 2
Provincetown, MA 0.14 2 0.28 11 Full batches Sheets 2,616 7,980 2020 16 teams of 2+2 runners+4 tallies
Tolland, CT 0.11 7 Full batches Sheets 3851 2,880 2012 [10]
Bloomfield, CT 0.15 7 Full batches Sheets 2272 2,400 2012 [10]
Vernon, CT 0.31 6 Full batches Sheets 2544 4,740 2012 [10]
Bridgeport, CT 0.40 5 2.01 1 Full batches Sheets 23860 48,000 2010 [11] Includes counting number of voters who checked in at polling places, and comparing those counts to ballot counts.
Bibb County, GA 0.18 3 0.54 39 Full batches Rolls 592 12,480 2006 [12]
Camden County, GA 0.11 3 0.33 34 Full batches Rolls 470 5,220 2006 [12]
Cobb County, GA 0.20 3 0.60 42 Full batches Rolls 976 24,480 2006 [12]
San Diego precincts 0.22 3 0.67 19 Full batches Sheets 2,425 30,573 2016 [13]
Clark County, NV 0.72 21 Full batches Rolls 1,268 19,200 2004 [14]
Washington State recount 1.49 1 Full batches Sheets 1,842,136 2,741,460 2004 [14]
Orange County, CA 1.93 1 Full, mostly Rolls mostly 467 900 2011 [15] Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer
Read to Talliers Experiment Second Contest 0.07 4 0.30 1 Full batches Sheets 1800 537 2012 [16] Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets
Read to Talliers Experiment First Contest 0.12 4 0.48 1 Full batches Sheets 1800 861 2012 [16] Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets
Sort & Stack Experiment Second Contest 0.17 3 0.51 1 Full batches Sheets 1920 972 2012 [16] Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets
Sort & Stack Experiment First Contest 0.24 3 0.71 1 Full batches Sheets 1920 1,369 2012 [16] Organizing ballots for review, training, legal, supervision, adding tally sheets
COUNTING BALLOTS IN RANDOM ORDER
Carroll County, MD 1.03 2 2.06 3 Random images Sheets 247 1,526 2016 [17] Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision
Montgomery County MD 0.88 2 1.76 3 Random images Sheets 82 432 2016 [17] Organizing ballot scans for review, training, legal, supervision
Merced County, CA 1.82 2 Random ballots Sheets 198 720 2011 [15] Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer
Humboldt County, CA 5.87 3 Random ballots Sheets 143 2,520 2011 [15] Independent count, done by graduate student on university computer
  1. ↑ Graph drawn at https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jsGUBEqcNuMGJwy26sxlfNjmV0Ag2AHdTwgzZGAEnqo/edit#gid=443969804
  2. ↑ a b McGoldrick, Gillian (2022-08-17). "Butler County finishes its review of 2020 election, finds no inaccuracies among 1,600 ballot". Pittsburgh Post-Dispatch.
  3. ↑ a b McGoldrick, Gillian (2022-08-18). "Butler County Finishes 2020 Election Review After 170 Hours". Governing.
  4. ↑ FOR ELECTION OFFICIALS (in en-US). Wisconsin Election Integrity. Archived from the original on 2022-08-11. Retrieved on 2020-06-25.
  5. ↑ McKim, Karen (January 2016). Using automatically created digital ballot images to verify voting-machine output in Wisconsin. Wisconsin Election Integrity. Archived from the original on 2021-04-13. Retrieved on 2020-06-25.
  6. ↑ Note this line includes 7-person teams to tally: 1 reader+2 watchers, 2 talliers+2 watchers; plus 3 people to enter write-ins @30 seconds per write-in, 15% write-ins. https://resources.mohave.gov/Repository/Calendar/08_01_2023BOSAgenda0fe47379-660b-465f-a8b5-4eb9fc976f30.pdf p.4 says 46 errors were missed by tally team, and only known because the 850 test ballots had been repeatedly counted in Logic & Accuracy Tests. "Some of the observed errors included:
    • Caller called the wrong candidate and both watchers failed to notice the incorrect call;
    • Tally markers tried to work out inconsistencies while tallying;
    • Tally markers marked a vote for an incorrect candidate and the watchers failed to notice the error;
    • Caller calling too fast resulted in double marking a candidate or missed marking a candidate;
    • Caller missed calling a vote for a candidate and both watchers failed to notice the omission;
    • Watchers not watching the process due to boredom or fatigue;
    • Illegible tally marking caused incorrect tally totaling;
    • Enunciation of names caused incorrect candidate tally; and
    • Using incorrect precinct tally sheets to tally ballots resulted in incorrect precinct level results
  7. ↑ Polletta, Maria and Piper Hansen (2021-04-28). "Here's what happened at the Arizona election audit of Maricopa County ballots". Arizona Republic.
  8. ↑ pp.21-22,44 Tobi, Nancy (2007-09-06). Hands-on Elections: (Condensed Version). web.archive.org. Archived from the original on 2008-09-19. Retrieved on 2021-05-20.
  9. ↑ Tobi, Nancy (2011) Hands-on elections : an informational handbook for running real elections, using real paper ballots, counted by real people : lessons from New Hampshire (2nd ed.), Wilton, N.H.: Healing Mountain Publications ISBN: 978-1-4528-0612-9. OCLC: 816513645.
  10. ↑ a b c Antonyan, Tigran et al. (2013-06-21). "Computer Assisted Post Election Audits". State Certification Testing of Voting Systems National Conference. Archived from the original on 2015-09-22. Retrieved on 2022-10-27.
  11. ↑ Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition (2011-01-12). Report and Feedback December 2010 Bridgeport Connecticut Coalition Recount. Archived from the original on 2012-04-19. Retrieved on 2023-03-11.
  12. ↑ a b c Georgia Secretary of State, Elections Division. (2007-04). " (April 1, 2007). Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail Pilot Project Report. Pages 18-22, 42-63.. Archived from the original on November 26, 2008. Retrieved on August 17, 2019.
  13. ↑ Lutz, Ray (2019-01-28). White Paper: Election Audit Strategy. Citizens' Oversight Projects. Retrieved on 2021-04-13.
  14. ↑ a b Theisen, Ellen (2004). Cost Estimate for Hand Counting 2% of the Precincts in the U.S.. votersunite.org. Retrieved on May 4, 2018.
  15. ↑ a b c Bowen, Debra (2011-03-01). AB 2023 (Saldaña), Chapter 122, Statutes of 2010 Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program March 1, 2012, Report to the Legislature. California Secretary of State. Retrieved on 2021-05-30. and California Secretary of State (July 30, 2014). Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program 2011-2013, Final Report to the United States Election Assistance Commission. Internet Archive. Archived from the original on 2019-06-02. AND California Secretary of State (July 30, 2014). "Appendices, Post-Election Risk-Limiting Audit Pilot Program 2011-2013 Final Report to the United States Election Assistance Commission." Pages 81-90". Internet Archive. AND Overview. The time estimates of other California counties in the study included time to scan ballots to enable ballot comparison audits, so their costs were not comparable. None of the 11 California counties doing audits chose a close race or needed a 100% hand-count.
  16. ↑ a b c d Goggin, Stephen N. et al. (March 2012). "Post-Election Auditing: Effects of Procedure and Ballot Type on Manual Counting Accuracy, Efficiency, and Auditor Satisfaction and Confidence". Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 11 (1): 36–51. DOI:10.1089/elj.2010.0098. ISSN 1533-1296.
  17. ↑ a b Maryland State Board of Elections (October 21, 2016). Post-Election Tabulation Audit Pilot Program Report. elections.maryland.gov. Retrieved on June 29, 2019.

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Minutes of staff time to hand count, per vote

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Date/TimeThumbnailDimensionsUserComment
current04:11, 28 February 2024Thumbnail for version as of 04:11, 28 February 2024752 × 786 (42 KB)NumbersinstituteTeam time is more comparable than staff time
08:31, 27 October 2022Thumbnail for version as of 08:31, 27 October 2022756 × 1,074 (92 KB)Numbersinstituteupdated labels, added CT
01:33, 2 June 2021Thumbnail for version as of 01:33, 2 June 2021721 × 1,134 (86 KB)Numbersinstituteadd Humboldt+MA+fix rounding errors
21:12, 20 May 2021Thumbnail for version as of 21:12, 20 May 2021727 × 1,159 (72 KB)NumbersinstituteAdded AZ+NH, switched axes
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