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English: Mindmelding experiment. (The owner of the brain on top can experience the conscious representations of the owner of the brain on the bottom. What the person on top experiences cannot be his own conscious perceptual representations, which reside in his temporal and parietal lobes, since the connections to those have been severed. Diagram by Katie Reinecke.)
Date
Source

Hirstein W. (2008), Mindmelding: Connected Brains and the Problem of Consciousness. In: Medicine, Mental Health, Science, Religion, and Well-being (A.R. Singh and S.A. Singh eds.), MSM, 6, Jan - Dec 2008, p110-130. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3190544/

doi: 10.4103/0973-1229.38516
Author William Hirstein. Diagram by Katie Reinecke.
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current19:57, 4 November 2015Thumbnail for version as of 19:57, 4 November 2015626 × 648 (100 KB)Was a bee{{Information |Description={{en|1=Mindmelding experiment. (The owner of the brain on top can experience the conscious representations of the owner of the brain on the bottom. What the person on top experiences cannot be his own conscious perceptual rep...

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