Battle of Niakhura
| Battle of Niakhura | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Lekianoba | |||||||
.png) Battle of Iori river by Nikolay Samokish | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Russian Empire Kartli-Kakheti |
 Avar Khanate | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Ivan Lazarev Vasily Gulyakov Prince Ioane Prince Bagrat |
Umma Khan (WIA) Prince Alexander (WIA) | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
Georgians 3,000 – 10,000 men Russians 1,224 men |
Avars 18,000 men Georgians 2,000 men | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
|
Russian: 3 men Georgian: 12 men |
2,004 killed and captured[1] 11 banners[2][3] | ||||||
The Battle of Niakhura, also known as the Battle of Iori River or the Battle of Kakabeti, took place on November 7, 1800, during which the army of the Umma Khan, who was together with the opposition Georgian Prince Alexander, invaded the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, suffered a crushing defeat from two Russian battalions of Major Generals Ivan Lazarev and Vasily Gulyakov, together with the Georgian Princes Ioane and Bagrat.
Background
[edit]At the end of the 18th century, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti was the object of frequent attacks from the Persian and Ottoman Empires, as well as systematic raids by North Caucasian mountaineers. This caused irreparable damage to both material and human resources of Georgia. At the same time, in the kingdom itself there was an internecine struggle among the reigning Bagrationi dynasty, which acquired a special turn after the death of King Heraclius II in 1798 and the accession of his son from his second marriage, George XII, to the throne. Despite the fact that the raids of the mountaineers caused significant damage to his kingdom, in order to protect himself from his rebellious brothers, was forced to keep up to 7 thousand of mountaineers (Lezgin corps[4]) in service for a decent salary, ignoring their willfulness (including robberies and violence[5]) even in Tbilisi itself. To the most influential of the Dagestan rulers of that time, Umma Khan V, George was forced to pay an annual tribute in the amount of 5,000 rubles, only so that he would not disturb his kingdom with raids, but individual Dagestani rulers continued to carry out private raids on Georgian lands.[6] The people were subject to excessive taxes, and the centralization of royal power was virtually abolished to the extreme.[7]
At the beginning of 1798, a plague epidemic (pestilence) was rapidly developing in Eastern Georgia. In view of all these hardships, many residents simply left the country.[7][6]
The Russian Emperor Paul I did not yet recognize George as the king of Kartli-Kakheti, contrary to the Treaty of Georgievsk, concluded in 1783 by Catherine II and Heraclius II on the transfer of Georgia to the protectorate of Russia, Paul refused to provide any assistance to the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. In 1798, the Persian Shah Fath-Ali offered George his patronage, otherwise, he made it known that the Persian army would again devastate his land and capital.[8] Not relying on Russia, in the same year George secretly sent Prince Aslan Orbeliani to the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid I with a request to accept Georgia under the protection of the Porte. However, while the latter was still in Akhaltsikhe, George's son David arrived from St. Petersburg to Tbilisi, who informed his father about "the merciful disposition of Emperor Paul towards Georgia." George immediately ordered the return of Orbeliani,[9] and sent the same petition to Paul and, having explained the situation, asked to send 3 thousand (or 5 thousand[10]) Russian soldiers "with weapons and all military equipment".[11]
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Sending Russian troops to Georgia
[edit]On February 23, 1798, the Highest Rescript was issued on sending the General Lazarev Regiment to Georgia. The regiment was equipped and provided with everything necessary (new fittings, ammunition, commissariat allowance, baggage, etc.), and was also thoroughly inspected.[12]
On October 20, 1799 Lazarev with his regiment, a team of Cossacks and an artillery team with 4 guns, as well as with 2 guns for the Georgian troops,[13] set out from Mozdok. The crossing of the Caucasus Mountains was accompanied by great difficulties. There was frost and strong snowstorms in the mountains, and the road itself was not fully adapted for the movement of artillery and carts. During a shootout with the mountaineers (Kists or Ingush), a non-commissioned officer was killed. One officer died of illness.[14][15]
The campaign lasted 36 days. When on November 26, 1799, the regiment numbered 885 people during the parade, he was 3 versts from Tbilisi; George XII, accompanied by princes, secular and spiritual retinue, came out to meet him. More than 10 thousand residents gathered to watch the arrival of the Russian regiment. The regiment lined up and greeted King George with a loud “Hurray” to the beat of drums. The people, “no longer holding back the surging feelings, swept over the rangers in a living wave, disrupted their ranks and greeted those who came with a brotherly kiss”.[16] On the same day, the regiment entered Tiflis to the sound of bells and gun salvoes.[17]
The Persian Shah Fath-Ali continued to consider the territory of Georgia to be the possession of the Persian Empire, intending to attack Tbilisi again. The plenipotentiary minister, state councilor Peter Kovalensky, who was there, sent letters to Tehran in which he expressed hopes for maintaining friendly relations between the two powers, and, referring to the Treaty of Georgievsk, warned against the invasion of Persian troops into Georgia.[18] However, the Persian army, under the formal leadership of Abbas Mirza, nevertheless set out in the direction of Transcaucasia. The opposition Prince Alexander (brother of George XII), who had previously been in Kars, arrived at the Persian camp in the hope of solving his problems in Georgia with the help of Persian troops.[19] On June 10, 1800, ambassadors from Abbas Mirza arrived in Tbilisi with a firman from Fath-Ali Shah. The ambassadors insisted on a secret audience with the king, but George refused them this, and received them in Kovalensky's house in the presence of Lazarev and all the officers of the Jaeger regiment. Then the ambassador openly set out the Shah's demands for Georgia to be completely subjugated to him, otherwise threatening another invasion of Tbilisi by Persian troops.[20][21]
Immediately after this became known in Saint Petersburg, the head of the Caucasian division, Lieutenant General Karl Knorring, on July 10, received an order to prepare 9 infantry battalions, 10 squadrons of dragoons and artillery for sending to Georgia.[22] However, it soon became known that the Persian army, having limited itself to plundering the Etchmiadzin monastery, turned back and went beyond the Araxes river.[23] At the same time, P.I. Kovalensky, in his letter dated August 21 to Privy Councilor Sergey Lashkarev, expressed the opinion that there are clearly not enough Russian troops in Georgia.[16]
Soon it was decided to send only the musketeer regiment of General Gulyakov with a Cossack hundred and 4 guns to Georgia. In case of emergency, part of the Russian troops on the Caucasian line near Mozdok remained in full readiness for immediate action.[24] On August 25, 1800, Gulyakov set out from Mozdok and on September 23 arrived in Tbilisi. The musketeer regiment was greeted no less solemnly than the Jaeger regiment that arrived before it.[25]
The presence of Russian troops in Georgia was intended solely to protect it from external enemies. In the same case, if internecine strife begins in it, then, in order to avoid the involvement of Russian units in them, the rescript of October 29 ordered their immediate withdrawal from Georgia.[26]
Umma Khan's request for admission to Russian citizenship
[edit]At the beginning of August 1800, his ambassador Hadji Musa arrived from Umma Khan in Mozdok with a request addressed to Emperor Paul to accept the Avar Khanate under the protection of Russia. In a report dated August 3, Knorring asked Paul for permission to send an Avar ambassador to him,[27] and with a rescript dated September 7, Paul gave permission for the latter to arrive in St. Petersburg. At the same time, it was decided that in the event that Umma Khan and his possessions entered into Russian citizenship, the amount (5 thousand rubles) that the Georgian king paid him annually would be paid by the Russian government as a lifelong pension, as a "reward for his fidelity". However, at the end of August, precisely at the time when this permission was already on the way, Umma Khan and his army moved to the Georgian borders.[28][29]
Plan to capture Tbilisi
[edit]A plan for an attack on Tbilisi was drawn up, according to which: Alexander with 2 thousand was supposed to capture Sagarejo, the rest of the army was divided into two groups, one of which was supposed to go directly to Tbilisi and try to take it, and the other, crossing the Kura river and united with the troops of the Imeretian king Solomon II, the opposition brothers of George, Iulon, Vakhtang and Parnaoz, with joint forces to approach Tbilisi from the west. If the first group could not take it, it was planned to do this together with the combined forces of the second.[30][29]
Lazarev's correspondence with Umma Khan and Alexander, and the movement of their troops
[edit]In mid-October, Umma Khan sent a letter to the Georgian prince David, in which he called George's failure to pay the tribute due to him the reason for his "hostile" actions against Georgia.[31]
Upon receiving the first news of the movement of Umma Khan, George sent his sons Ioane and Bagrat with 2 thousand troops, "the best among the Georgians," to the Kakheti in Sighnaghi. There, the princes began to gather local militia. Lazarev himself, however, at first did not attach much importance to the movement of Umma Khan, believing that the latter did not yet know about the retreat of the Persian troops and the arrival in Tbilisi of the Jaeger Musketeer Regiment to reinforce the Jaeger Musketeer Regiment. But soon, having received information about Umma Khan's plans, Lazarev and Gulyakov, each with a battalion from his regiment and a Cossack team (1224 people with 4 guns), set out to meet him on October 28. The remaining units, under the leadership of Colonel Pavel Karyagin, were left in Tbilisi to maintain order and prevent "internal threats" in the capital itself. On October 31 Umma Khan crossed to the left bank of the Alazan river at the ford of Urdo and settled down with his army on the plain near the Top-Karagach tract. The next day, a Russian detachment arrived in Sighnaghi. By that time, under the command of Bagrat, there were already 3 thousand Georgian troops there, which continued to be replenished with newly arriving militia.[32]
Lazarev sent Umma Khan a letter with urgent advice to leave the borders of Georgia, which was under the protection of Russia, pointing out that the actions of the "high-ranking khan" were not comparable with his request for the protection of Russia, which had already been promised to him by the emperor.[33] Umma Khan replied to Lazarev that he did not want to have any "hostility" towards Russia, "except for a single friendship," but having received prince Alexander, out of duty of hospitality, he considered it necessary to provide him with assistance. Umma Khan also noted that he would be sincerely glad if Alexander reconciled with his older brother George.[34] Then Lazarev turned to Alexander with a request and advice to return to Tbilisi and reconcile with his brother, for his part promising full assistance. Alexander, however, remained adamant.[35]
On November 4, the Russian-Georgian army moved further and, reaching the village of Prasiani, stood up for bivouac. The next day, Lazarev decided to attack the enemy and approached him at a distance of 6 miles. Before the attack, he again appealed to Umma Khan with the demand, in order to avoid bloodshed, to leave Georgia within 24 hours.[36] The parliamentarian (Georgian service captain Kalantarov) was ordered to return with an answer no more than 3 hours later, but he was detained in the Umma Khan camp.[37] The latter, meanwhile, having given his troops instructions to avoid a direct clash with the Russian detachment, on the night of November 6, bypassed his camp and moved towards Sagarejo. In the morning, the envoy returned without definite results, and Georgian mounted pickets informed about the movement of the highlanders. The Russian-Georgian army immediately left the bivouac and moved in the opposite direction along the already traveled path parallel to the army of Umma Khan with the goal of hitting him in the flank and forcing him to take battle. To avoid difficult terrain, the convoy, built by Wagenburg under the cover of 100 rangers and musketeers with 2 officers, was left near Prasiani. By evening, the Russian-Georgian army entered a spacious valley and stopped for the night in a convenient place with a water source,[38] while Umma Khan's army, meanwhile, settled down along the edge of the forest near the village of Kakabeti on the right bank of the Iori River.
Location of the battle
[edit]The location of the battle was an open plain. The Iori River flowed to the south of it, and a ditch ran from the west. To the north of the plain there were low mountains stretching towards Telavi, and to the east there were mountain streams flowing from the Telavi heights to Iori.[39][40]The very area where the battle took place is called Niakhura.[41]
Strength
[edit]Russians and Georgians
[edit]Russians
[edit]The total number of the Russian detachment that set out on October 28 to meet the army of Umma Khan was 1224 men (including 129 non-combatants) with 4 guns.[42][43]
Some sources round up the size of the Russian detachment to 1,200 people.
The total number, 102 people (10 people from each chasseur and musketeer companies with 2 officers) were left to guard the convoy in Prasiani[ka] and did not take part in the battle.
Georgians
[edit]The exact number of Georgian forces remained unknown. In different sources it varies from 3 to 10 thousand men. It is known that by November 2 , prince Bagrat had up to 3 thousand men. Later, both princes (Bagrat and Ioane) already had 4 thousand men. Subsequently, the Georgian army was replenished with hastily assembled militia, which by the time of the battle could reach up to 10 thousand people.
However, a significant number of Georgian militias in manpower did not provide a corresponding advantage, since most of them did not have not only firearms, but also effective bladed weapons. For every 10 people they had 2 guns, and the rest were armed with "whatever they had," most of which had only burnt dogwood "sticks".
The Georgian army also had 2 guns.
Dagestanians Georgians
[edit]The exact number of troops of Umma Khan of the Avar Khanate at the time of the battle remained unknown, and in different sources it varies from 15 to 20 thousand people. This is primarily due to the fact that his army was not concentrated anywhere in one place, but, lacking provisions and forage, as a rule, was scattered to search for them, and at the same time was systematically replenished.[44]
It is known that the opposition Prince Alexander (brother of George XII) with 2 thousand Georgian cavalry also took part in the battle together with Umma Khan. Ali-Sultan of Mehtuli, his brother Hadji-Ahmed Khan of Dzhengutay, Musa-Hadji of Aksay, Qadi of Tabasaran Kazi-mullah, son of Surkhay Khan II of Kazikumukh and other Dagestan rulers joined Umma Khan.[30]
Primary sources
[edit]On November 1, General Lazarev, in his report to Lieutenant General Knorring, reported that the number of Umma Khan's troops "according to rumors" ranges from 7 to 8 thousand people.[45] The day after the battle (that is, November 8) Lazarev wrote that "according to the latest rumors," Umma Khan's army extended to 12 thousand. In a detailed report dated November 14, he reported that the total number of troops Umma Khan and his allies were "...at least up to 15 thousand".[30]
On November 17, George XII wrote to Emperor Paul that Umma Khan invaded their possessions with a 20,000-strong army.[46]
Mirza Adigozal bey, who was in Tbilisi at that time, also reported that Umma Khan had an army of 20 thousand.[47]
Battle
[edit]Troops approaching
[edit]On 7 November 3 hours before dawn the Russian-Georgian army left the bivouac and after a forced march of 15 miles stopped for a short rest. Continuing its movement, in an hour it came to the open steppe on the left side of the river Iori, from where the army of Umma Khan, who was marching on the opposite side of the river, could be seen. Within 2 hours both armies were marching parallel to each other, approaching each other at a distance of up to 2 versts. Having reached the village of Kakabeti, the army of Umma Khan settled down along the forest for a bivouac. Part of his cavalry dispersed to occupy the neighbouring villages for the purpose of extracting provisions and forage.[48][40]
Meanwhile, both Russian battalions in two columns turned off the road in the direction of Iori and, having quickened their step, moved to approach the enemy. The right column (flank) was a battalion of the Yeager Lazarev Regiment, the left - a battalion of the Musketeer Guliakov Regiment. In the centre behind the two Russian columns were Georgian infantry and cavalry of prince Ioane and Bagrat. Each of the three columns had two guns.[48][49]
Awards
[edit]General Gulyakov's Musketeer regiment was granted by Emperor Paul Maltese banners with the inscription: "For the capture of a banner from the Avar troops at the river Iori on 7 November 1800."
As for their victory, Ioane, Bagrat, Lazarev, and Guliakov were awarded the Order of Saint-John of Jerusalem by Emperor Paul. All the lower ranks who took part in the battle received a silver rouble per man.[50]
Legacy
[edit]
In 1901, on one of the hills on the plain near the Iori River and the village of Kakabeti, on the initiative of officers of the Erevan and Kabardian regiments, a monument was erected in honor of the battle. The commander of the Caucasus Military District, General of the Infantry, Grigory Golitsyn, having learned about this project, not only approved it, but also provided great financial support. The consecration of the monument took place on October 1, 1901.[51][52][53]
References
[edit]- ^ Акты, собранные Кавказской археографической комиссией / Под ред. А. П. Берже. — Тф.: Тип. Глав. управ. наместника кавказского, 1866. — Т. 1. — 816 с.
- ^ Maltese banners were issued to the participants of the battle and awards were given for: «За взятіе у Аварскихъ войскъ знамени, при рѣкѣ Iорѣ 7-го Ноября 1800 года»
- ^ Служба Ширванца 1910, p. 8.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 426.
- ^ Dubrovin 1897, p. 67.
- ^ a b HSCW 1899, pp. 314–315.
- ^ a b Dubrovin 1897, pp. 62–64.
- ^ HSCW 1899, pp. 317.
- ^ Dubrovin 1897, pp. 61–62.
- ^ Dubrovin 1897, p. 70.
- ^ Dubrovin 1886, p. 241.
- ^ Bobrovsky 1893, pp. 91–94.
- ^ Bobrovsky 1893, p. 96.
- ^ Dubrovin 1886, p. 251.
- ^ Bobrovsky 1893, pp. 97–98.
- ^ a b HSCW 1899, p. 320.
- ^ Dubrovin 1897, p. 81.
- ^ Dubrovin 1886, p. 291-292.
- ^ Dubrovin 1897, pp. 123–124.
- ^ Dubrovin 1897, pp. 125–130.
- ^ HSCW 1899, pp. 325.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 106-107.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 142.
- ^ Popov 1931, p. 118.
- ^ HSCW 1899, pp. 326–327.
- ^ Butkov 1869, p. 324.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 108.
- ^ Dubrovin 1886, pp. 319–320.
- ^ a b Bobrovsky 1893, pp. 105–106.
- ^ a b c ACAC 1866, p. 170.
- ^ Dubrovin 1897, p. 150.
- ^ Butkov 1869, p. 457.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 165-166.
- ^ ACAC 1866, pp. 166–167.
- ^ Dubrovin 1897, pp. 151–153.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 168.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 171.
- ^ Bobrovsky 1893, p. 107.
- ^ Bobrovsky 1901, p. 9.
- ^ a b Dubrovin 1897, pp. 154–155.
- ^ Vateishvili 1973, p. 389.
- ^ Khabalov 1888, p. 582.
- ^ HSCW 1899, p. 328.
- ^ Dubrovin 1886, p. 323.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 167.
- ^ ACAC 1866, p. 178.
- ^ Adigozal 1950, p. 92.
- ^ a b ACAC 1866, pp. 172–173.
- ^ Bobrovsky 1893, pp. 307–308.
- ^ Butkov 1869, p. 456-459.
- ^ Kaffka 1902, pp. 8–10.
- ^ Potto 1906, pp. 83–86.
- ^ Sokol 2006, p. 197.
Sources
[edit]- Adigozal, Mirza (1950). Garabaghname. Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences.
- Berge, Adolf; Kobyakov, Dmitry (1866). Acts collected by the Caucasian Archaeographic Commission (in Russian). Main Directorate of the Viceroy of the Caucasus.
- Bobrovsky, Pavel (1893). History of His Majesty's 13th Life Grenadier Erivan Regiment for 250 years. Saint Petersburg: Balasheva.
- Bobrovsky, Pavel (1901). On the centenary of the annexation of Georgia to Russia, September 12, 1801. The sad state of Georgia under King George XII. Battle of the Iora River near Kagobet November 7 (19), 1801. Kavkazskiy Vestnik.
- Butkov, P.G. (1869). Материалы для современной истории Кавказа, 1722–1803 [Materials for the Modern History of the Caucasus, 1722–1803] (in Russian). Saint Petersburg.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - Dubrovin, Nikolay (1886). History of the war and Russian rule in the Caucasus. Saint Petersburg: Department of Appanages.
- Dubrovin, Nikolay (1897). George XII, the last king of Georgia and its annexation to Russia. Saint Petersburg: Chichinadze.
- Kaffka (1902). Consecration of the monument on the Iori River.
- Khabalov, Sergey (1888). Iora. Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences.
- Popov, Konstantin (1931). Temple of Glory: in 2 parts. Paris: Renaissance.
- Potto, Vasily; Tomkeev, Vladimir; Veidenbaum, Evgeniy (1899). Historical sketch of the Caucasian wars (in Russian). Chancellor Chief citizen partly in the Caucasus.
- Potto, V. A., ed. (1906). Памятник на реке Иоре [Monument on the river Iore]. Памятники времён утверждения русского владычества на Кавказе [Monuments of the time of the establishment of Russian rule in the Caucasus] (PDF) (in Russian). Vol. 1. Tbilisi: Caucasus Military District Headquarters. pp. 79–86.
- Sokol, K. G. (2006). Монументальные памятники Российской империи: каталог [Monumental memorials of the Russian Empire: catalog] (in Russian). Vagrius Plus.
- Vateishvili, Juansher (1973). Russian social thought and press in the Caucasus in the first third of the 19th century. Nanuka.
- Служба Ширванца: 1726—1909 г. [Service of Shirvanets: 1726-1909] (PDF) (in Russian). Tbilisi: С. Быхова. 1910. Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 March 2016.