Cognitive warfare
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Cognitive warfare (CW) consists of any military activities, conducted in synchronization with other instruments of power,[jargon] to affect attitudes and behaviours, by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual, group, or population level cognition, to gain an advantage over an adversary.[1][2] It is an extension of form of information warfare using propaganda and disinformation.[1]
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) General Paolo Ruggiero distinguishes it from other information-related activities by its objectives: "Its goal is not what individuals think, but rather, the way they think."[3][better source needed] Cognitive warfare refers to the way that human thought, reasoning, sense-making, decision-making, and behaviour may be engineered through not only the manipulation of information, but also by the A.I./ML network of algorithms which push information through the internet.[1] Other methods of Cognitive Warfare include the targeted use of inaudible sound waves (frequency of <20 Hz) and microwaves to incapacitate enemy forces by disrupting the neurological functions of human targets without causing visible injury.[4][5][6] According to the U.S. National Institute of Health, Infrasound’s effect on the human inner ear includes “vertigo, imbalance, intolerable sensations, incapacitation, disorientation, nausea, vomiting, and bowel spasm; and resonances in inner organs, such as the heart." [4][5]
Comparison of cognitive warfare with information warfare
[edit]According to Masakowski, cognitive warfare is an extension of information warfare (IW).[1][better source needed] Operations in the information environment are traditionally conducted in five core capabilities - electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOPs), military deception (MILDEC), operational security (OPSEC), and computer network operations (CNO).[3][7] Information warfare aims at controlling the flow of information in support of traditional military objectives, mainly to produce lethal effects on the battlefield.[3][better source needed] According to Masakowski & NATO Gen Ruggiero, cognitive warfare degrades the capacity to know and produce foreknowledge, transforming the understanding and interpretations of situations by individuals and in the mass consciousness, and has multiple agnostic applications including commercial, political and covert IW and CW military operations.[1][3] The Chinese military refers to operations in the cognitive domain as 'cognitive domain operations (CDO)'.[8]
Cognitive warfare and data
[edit]Using a psychological and psychographic profile, an influence campaign can be created and adjusted in real time by A.I. ML models until desired cognitive and behaviour affects on the individual and/or population are achieved.[9][better source needed] U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency strategy calls for the use of automated biometric systems to separate insurgents and foreign fighters from the general population.[10] In doing so, this helps counterinsurgents leverage the population and operational environment against the threat network.[10]
Decades of peer-reviewed research show that echo chambers, in the physical world and online, cause political polarization,[11] extremism, confusion, cognitive dissonance, negative emotional responses (e.g. anger and fear), reactance, microaggressions, and third-person effects.[12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][excessive citations][verification needed]
And because of these psychological perseverance mechanisms like confirmation bias, this can be very problematic based on the work of Nyhan & Reifler (2010). Nyhan & Reifler found that even attempting to correct false beliefs often reinforces rather than dispels these beliefs among those who hold them most strongly. This is known as the backfire effect – "in which corrections actually increase misperceptions."[25][26][27][28]
Objectives and downstream effects
[edit]According to Masakowski, the objectives of cognitive warfare are to shape/control and enemy's cognitive thinking and decision-making; to manipulate and degrade a nation's values, emotions, national spirit, cultural traditions, historical beliefs, political will; to achieve adversarial strategic geopolitical objectives without fighting; to influence human/societal reasoning, thinking, emotions, et al. aligned with specific objectives; and degrade a populations trust in their institutions.[1] [verification needed][better source needed] In doing so, Masakowski claims that this allows for the weakening/distruption of military, political & societal cohesion; and undermining/threatening of democracy.[1][verification needed][better source needed] Masakowski alleges that cognitive warfare has also been used by authoritarian societies to restructure society and groom populations to accept "continuous surveillance" and that this allows these authoritarian societies to "remove individuals/outliers who resist and insist on freedom of speech, independent thinking, etc."[1][verification needed][better source needed]
References
[edit]- ^ a b c d e f g h Masakowski, Yvonne, PhD. (April 11, 2022). "Newport Lecture Series: "Artificial Intelligence & Cognitive Warfare" with Yvonne Masakowski". YouTube.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ "Cognitive Warfare". NATO's Strategic Warfare Development Command.
- ^ a b c d ""#RigaStratComDialogue | Strategy Talk by NATO General Paolo Ruggiero"". YouTube.
- ^ a b "Infrasound: Brief Review of Toxicological Literature" (PDF). U.S. National Institute of Health. November 2001 (PDF).
{{cite web}}:|archive-url=requires|archive-date=(help) - ^ a b Mizokami, Kyle (September 25, 2019). "So What Is This Secretive Chinese Sonic Weapon Exactly?". Popular Mechanics.
- ^ NATO Commander Grostad. "NATO CyCon 2022 DAY 3 Panel: Cognitive Warfare – Hacking the OODA Loop".
- ^ Wilson, Clay, 'Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues', LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2007 Mar 20
- ^ Baughman, Josh. "How China Wins the Cognitive Domain" (PDF).
- ^ ""Target Audience Analysis" – Joint Warfare Center" (PDF).
- ^ a b "Field Manual 3-24 INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES (MCWP 3-33.5)" (PDF).
- ^ Bail, Christopher A.; Argyle, Lisa P.; Brown, Taylor W.; Bumpus, John P.; Chen, Haohan; Hunzaker, M. B. Fallin; Lee, Jaemin; Mann, Marcus; Merhout, Friedolin; Volfovsky, Alexander (September 11, 2018). ""Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization"". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 115 (37): 9216–9221. Bibcode:2018PNAS..115.9216B. doi:10.1073/pnas.1804840115. PMC 6140520. PMID 30154168.
- ^ "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government" | By: Achen CH, Bartels LM | Princeton Univ Press, Princeton | 2016
- ^ "Public Opinion and Policy in the American States" | By: Erikson RS, Wright GC, McIver JP | Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK | 1993
- ^ "When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation" | By: Fishkin JS | Oxford University Press, Oxford | 2011
- ^ "A new era of minimal effects? The changing foundations of political communication" | J Commun 58:707–731 | By: Bennett WL, Iyengar S | 2008
- ^ Sunstein C (2002) Republic.com (Princeton Univ Press, Princeton)
- ^ "The political blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. election: Divided they blog" | By: Adamic, L., & Glance, N. | 2005, August 21 | Paper presented at the 3th International Workshop on Link Discovery (pp. 36–43), Chicago, IL. New York, NY: ACM
- ^ Wollebæk, Dag; Karlsen, Rune; Steen-Johnsen, Kari; Enjolras, Bernard (April 2019). "Anger, Fear, and Echo Chambers: The Emotional Basis for Online Behavior". Social Media + Society. 5 (2). doi:10.1177/2056305119829859.
- ^ Del Vicario, Michela; Bessi, Alessandro; Zollo, Fabiana; Petroni, Fabio; Scala, Antonio; Caldarelli, Guido; Stanley, H. Eugene; Quattrociocchi, Walter (December 21, 2015), Echo chambers in the age of misinformation, arXiv:1509.00189
- ^ "Mapping social dynamics on Facebook: The Brexit debate" | By: Del Vicario, M., Zollo, F., Caldarelli, G., Scala, A., & Quattrociocchi, W. | 2017 | 'Social Networks,' 50, 6–16.
- ^ "The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you" | By: Pariser, E. | 2011 | New York, NY: Penguin Press
- ^ ""The Law of Group Polarization" | By: Cass R. Sunstein | John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 91, 1999".
- ^ ""Unintended Effects of Public Relations in Strategic Communication: A First Synthesis" | By: Jie Xu | 'Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal', 2019, Vol 20, p1 | ISSN: 1440-4389" (PDF).
- ^ Villanova University, USA; Xu, Jie (2020). "Unintended Effects of Advertising: An Updated Qualitative Review". Review of Communication Research. 8: 1–16. doi:10.12840/ISSN.2255-4165.021 (inactive November 1, 2024).
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of November 2024 (link) - ^ ""When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions" | By: Nyhan Brendan, Reifler Jason | 2010 | Political Behavior 32:303–30". doi:10.1177/2378023116689791.
- ^ ""The Backfire Effect" | By: Matthew Wills | April 3, 2017". April 3, 2017.
- ^ "A dissonance analysis of the boomerang effect" | By: Cohen, Arthur R. | March 1962 | 'Journal of Personality' 30 (1): 75–88 | Doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1962.tb02306.x. | PMID 13880221
- ^ "Silverman, Craig (June 17, 2011). "The Backfire Effect: More on the press's inability to debunk bad information". Columbia Journalism Review, Columbia University (New York City)".