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Attack on Doboj and Gradačac offensive (1994)

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Attack on Doboj and Gradačac
Part of the Bosnian War
Date15 October – 10 November 1994
Location
Result ARBiH made initial gains, but were contained by the VRS defenders
Belligerents
 Bosnia and Herzegovina  Republika Srpska
Commanders and leaders
Unknown
Casualties and losses
Unknown Unknown

The attack on Doboj and Gradačac was the second attempt by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) to capture the town of Doboj in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Bosnian War. While the ARBiH captured ground in early attacks, they were unable to expand these gains against the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) defenders.

ARBiH offensive operations

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The 2nd Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) planned a significant offensive against the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) "Doboj" Operational Group 9 in the DobojGradačac sector. It included attacks along three axes: towards Doboj; towards Modriča; and towards Obudovac-Pelagićevo. While all in the same region, the three axes do not appear to have been mutually supporting or to have had a single objective. The operations began on 15 October with a 2nd Corps Operational Group 2 assault towards the Skipovac area, north of Vis Hill, which quickly captured 20 km2 (7.7 sq mi) of territory. Two days later, the 2nd Corps attacked at Gradačac and Doboj, and ARBiH elements penetrated 4 km (2.5 mi) into the territory held by VRS Tactical Group 4 defences north east of Gradačac. With reinforcements arriving, VRS elements were able to contain the ARBiH advance over the following week, although the attacking forces held onto most of their initial gains. However, the attack towards Doboj itself did not make any headway against the defenders in a week of fighting. A further assault during 8 to 10 November also failed to make any gains in that sector.[1]

References

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  1. ^ Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict. Vol. 1. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis. 2002. p. 236. ISBN 978-0-16-066472-4.