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1982 Ethiopian–Somali Border War

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Ethiopian–Somali Border War
Part of the Ethiopian–Somali conflict and the Somali Rebellion

Somali soldier stands between two captured Ethiopian BTR-60 armored carriers that were disabled in battle
DateJune 1982–August 1983
Location
Hiran and Mudug regions, Somalia
Result

Somali victory[1][2]

Territorial
changes		 Ethiopian army and SSDF temporarily occupy the border towns of Galdogob and Balanbale[6]
Belligerents
Ethiopia
Puntland SSDF		 Somalia Somalia
Commanders and leaders
Mengistu Haile Mariam
Puntland Abdullahi Yusuf		 Somalia Siad Barre
Somalia Ali Samatar
Somalia Yusuf Ahmed Salhan
Somalia Mohamed Farrah Aidid
Strength
10,000-15,000[7] Ethiopian soldiers
2,000–5,000 SSDF militia[8][9]		 2,500 Somali National Army soldiers[10][11]
Casualties and losses
383 killed, 998 wounded (Ethiopian claim)[12] 3,506 killed, over 9,500 wounded (Ethiopian claim)[13]

The Ethiopian–Somali Border War occurred from June 1982 to August 1983 when Ethiopia, sending a 10,000-man invasion force backed by warplanes and armoured units, supported by thousands of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) rebels, invaded central Somalia.

The Ethiopians and SSDF guerillas failed in their objective of advancing on the cities of Galkayo and Beledweyne, as the initial invasion was largely repulsed.[14][15] A military stalemate ensued at the border towns of Galdogob and Balanbale.[16][17]

Background

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In 1977, Somalia attempted to regain control of the Ogaden region with the support of the Soviet Union.[5] In 1978, backed by Soviet weaponry and Cuban reinforcements, Ethiopia regained control of Ogaden. This resulted in the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somali men and women immigrating from the Ogaden region to the Somali borders.[18] Somalia, despite losing the 1977–78 war, never recognized the international border that places the Ogaden region, with its ethnic Somali population, in Ethiopia.[17]

Following the Soviet Union's change of allegiance from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1978, the United States became allies with Somalia. The U.S. originally was aligned with Ethiopia, but stopped supplying and equipping the country with support and aid. The U.S. originally thought that in the long term Ethiopia would be a more valuable ally due to its geographical position, its size and influence. Somalia and Ethiopia being in close proximity to western oil routes, peaked the interests of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.[17]

1978 coup and SSDF

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During the Ogaden War, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf had served as a commander in the Somali National Army. After the war he deserted the army,[19] and led the failed 1978 coup attempt following which he had immediately fled to Ethiopia.[20]

In Ethiopia, Yusuf set up base for a new rebel organization called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which he led and soon after began fighting with Ethiopian forces against the Somali army.[21] The SSDF possessed little autonomy over Ethiopian security forces,[22] as it was 'created, organized, trained and financed by Ethiopia'.[23] The guerrillas were trained by Ethiopian officers and during the 1982 invasion, SSDF forces were directly integrated into much larger Ethiopian army units.[22]

Forces involved

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In 1982, approximately 10,000 to 15,000 Ethiopian troops, equipped with Soviet-supplied MIG fighters and T-55 tanks, launched an invasion.[24][25] They were accompanied by 2,000 to 5,000 Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) rebels, who were similarly armed with tanks and received support from Ethiopian artillery and air forces.[25][26]

The Somali National Army (SNA) committed only 2,500 troops to the border battle.[25][10] The commander of the Somali forces defending the border regions was General Yusuf Ahmed Salhan, and his subordinate, Brigadier General Mohammed Farah Aidid, who commanded the central sector military zone.[27] Western diplomatic sources estimated the SNA's overall total strength to be around 50,000 at the outset of the campaign. The SNA was severely under-equipped and ill-prepared for conflict following serious losses in early 1978 at the end of the Ogaden War.[17] The Somali army suffered significant ammunition and communications equipment shortages, all while lacking both anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry.[27]

Border war

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In late June 1982, 15,000 Ethiopian army troops and thousands of SSDF rebels invaded across the border in the Hiran and Mudug region. The offensives initially aimed for Galkayo in the north-east, and Beledweyne in central Somalia. According to Gérard Prunier, "The plan was to cut Somalia into two by driving the troops all the way to the ocean, but the plan backfired."[28] The Ethiopian army intended to us the SSDF to overthrow Barre and install a friendly regime.[29]

A field officer with the Somali National Army stops his Land Rover while carrying out a reconnaissance mission to observe advancing Ethiopian armor near Galdogob (1982)

The invasion was launched on the night on 30 June 1982.[30] The first offensive came at the border town of Ferfer near Beledweyne, in an attempt to capture the high ground overlooking a vital roadway connecting north and south Somalia. Initially the Somali army only had 1,800 troops in the region where the invasion occurred, but were soon reinforced. Despite heavy ground and air attacks, the Somali army garrison stationed nearby at the town of Beledweyne inflicted heavy losses on the invading forces and repulsed the Ethiopians. Soon after a stalemate ensued.[16] Over the following month armed conflicts were reported in almost all border regions, including Gedo, Bakool, Hiiraan, Mudug and Toghdeer. The SSDF claimed responsibility for all these attacks, an assertion deemed implausible given the group's limited military capacity and its primarily localized operations near Galkayo in the Mudug region.[31]

The next incursion occurred further north at Balanbale.[16] On 10 July 1982, the Ethiopians launched an offensive on the town, surprising and overrunning the defenders.[30] An Ethiopian armored column of 30 to 45 T-55 tanks backed by two artillery battalions overran the town and advanced 11 km into Somalia. The Somali army commander at the town of El Dhere organized a counter-attack and pushed the offensive back to 3 km outside Balanbale. The Ethiopians held and fortified the town.[16] To the surprise of many observers, the invasion was vigorously repulsed by the Somali National Army.[14] In spite of losses taken four years earlier during 1978 from the Ethiopian-Cuban counter offensive during the Ogaden War, the Somali army had regrouped and the invasion led to a large increase in volunteers joining the army. The Ethiopian/SSDF attack had played out to Barres advantage,[14] as his declining regime found a significant upsurge in support.[32] Limited confrontations took place at several other points further north, while the Ethiopian Air Force bombed and strafed Galkayo airport.[16]

The Ethiopian and SSDF forces never reached their objectives of Galkayo and Beledweyne, but were instead halted to a stalemate at border towns of Balanbale and Galdogob.[33] This marked the first time since independence that Ethiopian troops successfully held territory over the border.[27] The SSDF denied the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, an assertion was disputed by foreign diplomats who observed that the SSDF had given only 'token participation' to the operation.[34] The Somali rebels operating with Ethiopian troops primarily operated as reconnaissance.[27] It was persistently rumored the Barre had allowed the occupation of the two towns in order to drum up a case for further foreign military aid deliveries.[35] After the seizure of Balanbale and Galdogob, Siad Barre and his government declared a state of emergency.[26] In front of SSDF personnel, including the groups chairman Abdullahi Yusuf, the Ethiopian army commander ordered his troops to raise the Ethiopian flag over the occupied towns. Disputes began between the SSDF and Ethiopian forces, who consequently began eliminating SSDF officials.[36]

During September 1982 there was further heavy fighting near Balanbale, which continued into October. Over the following months sporadic skirmishes continued.[37] By the end of 1982, some Ethiopian forces entrenched 32 km over the border.[38] In mid-June 1983 the Somali army repelled a large scale Ethiopian offensive at Galdogob, inflicting heavy losses. During July and August 1983 the Ethiopian army launched further incursions in central and northern Somalia that were also repulsed.[37]

Foreign Support

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Barre appealed for western military aid to repel the invasion,[26] but received most arms during December 1982. The arms included anti-tank and anti-air weaponry, along with some US Patton tanks.[16] By August 1982, apart from several radios, no American military had appeared on the front.[27] Only in the aftermath of the conflict was US military aid to Somalia significantly increased.[39] The United States sped up the delivery of light arms which had been previously offered in 1980.[26] US military assistance to Somalia rose from US$20 million in 1981 to US$51 million in 1983.[40] From 1979 to 1983, Somalia had imported US$30 million worth of American arms.[41] While the conflict had attracted the attention of the Reagan administration,[40] the US response was delayed as the conflict was overshadowed by the 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and the Iran–Iraq War. On the day Barre had informed Washington about the invasion (July 16), Iran had launched a major counteroffensive against Iraq.[41] China delivered fighter jets at the end of 1982 to cover heavy losses taken during the Ogaden War.[16]

No foreign troops were known to be directly engaged in the fighting during 1982, though the Ethiopians saw Cuban and South Yemeni military assistance confined at the division level.[16] On several occasions, Somali army technicians and intelligence officers intercepted Spanish and Russian radio traffic during Ethiopian military operations.[37]

Aftermath

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Following the border war, President Siad Barre received some verbal support at the Arab League summit in 1982.[26] But ultimately year after year Somalia was challenged by war and economic trouble. Newly formed regional clan and guerrilla groups revolted and challenged the Siad Barre government.[42] Because of the invasion, Barres shaky hold on power during 1982 was temporarily strengthened.[27]

As a result of the 1982 invasion, the Somali Army adopted the US FIM-43 Redeye surface-to-air missile.[43]

During 1982, the Barre regime successfully split the SSDF and most its members surrendered to the government following an amnesty and payment offer.[44] By 1983 the bulk of the SSDF had rejoined the regime.[45] Irritated by this development, the Ethiopian government put the head of the SSDF Abdullahi Yusuf in jail, where he remained until the Fall of the Derg regime in 1991.[46] During SSDF internal fighting during 1983 and 1984, Ethiopian security forces entered their camps and arrested the rebels central committee members.[22] After the rebels had no longer become useful to Mengistu, he had members of the organization killed, imprisoned or dispersed.[47] The SSDF did not recover as an organization until relations with Ethiopia normalized during the tenure of Meles Zenawi.[48]

Reprisals

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The SSDF was primarily composed of the Majerteen clan, and following the invasion the Somali army carried out reprisals against civilians from the clan in Mudug, Nugaal and Bari regions. The reprisals included the raising of eighteen villages and the destruction of water reservoirs.[49]

References

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  1. ^ Langellier, Jean-Pierre (14 November 1982). "Somalis and Ethiopians slog it out to stalemate". Le Monde. p. 12.
  2. ^ Cowell, Alan; Times, Special To the New York (8 October 1982). "ETHIOPIAN DRIVE AGAINST SOMALIA BOGS DOWN". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 8 May 2024.
  3. ^ Laitin, David D.; Samatar, Said S. (1987). Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. Profiles. Avalon Publishing. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-86531-555-6. Yet Siyaad surprised friends and foes alike by turning both events to advantage. His army vigorously repulsed the invaders...
  4. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9.
  5. ^ a b "Somalia: Status of the Armed Forces" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. March 1982. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  6. ^ "Recent Trends in the Horn of Africa" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. 15 December 1983. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  7. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9. In late June 1982, 15,000 regular Ethiopian army troops and 2,000 SSDF guerrillas attacked Somalia
  8. ^ Langellier, Jean-Pierre (14 November 1982). "Somalis and Ethiopians slog it out to stalemate". Le Monde. p. 12. On one side is a combined fighting force of between 6,000 and 10,000 men, most of whom are regular Ethiopian army troops backing up some 2,000 dissidents belonging to the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF).
  9. ^ Yuusuf (Dhegey), Sayid-Axmed M. (19 January 2015). Milicsiga Dagaalkii Dhexmaray Xukuumaddii Maxamed S. Barre iyo Jabhaddii SNM: Sababihii Dagaalka iyo Saamayntii uu ku yeeshay Jamhuuriyaddii Soomaalida. BoD – Books on Demand. ISBN 9789174635782.
  10. ^ a b "Somalia: Taking Stock". Africa Confidential. 23 (17): 8. 25 August 1982. ...the Somalis have about 2,500 men (631 men per battalion)
  11. ^ Langellier, Jean-Pierre (14 November 1982). "Somalis and Ethiopians slog it out to stalemate". Le Monde. p. 12. On the other side, the Somali army has fielded only 2,500 men. Its artillery is so-so and it has no air support.
  12. ^ Tareke, Gebru (2009). The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. Yale University Press. p. 393. ISBN 978-0-300-15615-7.
  13. ^ Tareke, Gebru (2009). The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. Yale University Press. p. 393. ISBN 978-0-300-15615-7. They claimed to have killed 3,506, wounded three times as many, and captured 62.
  14. ^ a b c Laitin, David D.; Samatar, Said S. (1987). Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. Profiles. Avalon Publishing. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-86531-555-6. Yet Siyaad surprised friends and foes alike by turning both events to advantage. His army vigorously repulsed the invaders...
  15. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9. Ethiopian Army troops and about 2,000 SSDF guerrillas attacked Somalia across the Mudug border, aiming for Galkayo in the north-east and Beletweyn in the centre. The plan was to cut Somalia into two by driving troops all the way to the ocean
  16. ^ a b c d e f g h Woodward, Peter; Forsyth, Murray Greensmith (1994). Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and Its Alternatives. Dartmouth Publishing Company. pp. 112–113. ISBN 978-1-85521-486-6.
  17. ^ a b c d Cowell, Alan; Times, Special To the New York (8 October 1982). "ETHIOPIAN DRIVE AGAINST SOMALIA BOGS DOWN". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 8 May 2024.
  18. ^ "HISTORY OF SOMALIA". www.historyworld.net. Retrieved 23 October 2018.
  19. ^ Gebrewold-Tochalo, Belachew (2009). Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p. 193. ISBN 978-0-7546-7528-0.
  20. ^ Amare Tekle, ed. (1994). Eritrea and Ethiopia : from conflict to cooperation. Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea. p. 149. ISBN 978-0-932415-96-7.
  21. ^ Gebrewold-Tochalo, Belachew (2009). Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p. 193. ISBN 978-0-7546-7528-0. In 1982 SSDF was commanded by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who was commander of the SNA (Somali National Army) during the Ethiopian-Somali War. After deserting the Somali Army, he began to fight together with Ethiopia against the Somali army.
  22. ^ a b c Clapham, Christopher, ed. (1998). African guerrillas. Indiana University Press. pp. 75–77. ISBN 978-0-85255-816-4.
  23. ^ Northeast African Studies. Vol. 11. African Studies Center, Michigan State University. 1989. p. 92.
  24. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9.
  25. ^ a b c Langellier, Jean-Pierre (14 November 1982). "Somalis and Ethiopians slog it out to stalemate". Le Monde. p. 12.
  26. ^ a b c d e Metz 1993, p. 47.
  27. ^ a b c d e f "Somalia: Taking Stock". Africa Confidential. 23 (17): 8. 25 August 1982.
  28. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9.
  29. ^ "Somalia: Taking Stock". Africa Confidential. 23 (17): 8. 25 August 1982. the Ethiopian aim was to provide the DFSS with the wherewithal to overthrow President Siad Barre
  30. ^ a b Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia, 1982-83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somali Democratic Republic. 1983. p. 6.
  31. ^ Renders, Marleen (20 January 2012). Consider Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions. BRILL. p. 71. ISBN 978-90-04-21848-2.
  32. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9.
  33. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9.
  34. ^ "Ethiopian-backed guerrillas claimed Thursday they routed Somali forces". UPI. 15 July 1982. Retrieved 8 May 2024.
  35. ^ Laitin, David D.; Samatar, Said S. (9 March 1987). Somalia: Nation In Search Of A State. Avalon Publishing. p. 99. ISBN 978-0-86531-555-6.
  36. ^ Dool, Abdullahi (1998). Failed States: When Governance Goes Wrong!. Horn Heritage. pp. 240–241. ISBN 978-0-9525241-9-9.
  37. ^ a b c Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia, 1982-83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somali Democratic Republic. 1983. p. 10.
  38. ^ Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia, 1982-83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somali Democratic Republic. 1983. p. 7.
  39. ^ Ehteshami, Anoushiravan; Murphy, Emma C. (1 March 2013). The International Politics of the Red Sea. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-67073-2. only in the aftermath of the 1982 Ethiopian–Somali border conflict that US military aid to Somalia significantly increased
  40. ^ a b Ehteshami, Anoushiravan; Murphy, Emma C. (1 March 2013). The International Politics of the Red Sea. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-67073-2.
  41. ^ a b Lefebvre, Jeffrey Alan. Arms for the horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 228–230.
  42. ^ Metz 1993, p. 48.
  43. ^ "Ethiopia bombs Somali towns". United Press International. 25 May 1984. Retrieved 16 May 2024.
  44. ^ Dualeh, Hussein Ali (1994). From Barre to Aideed: Somalia : the Agony of a Nation. Stellagraphics Limited. p. 137. ISBN 978-9966-834-40-9.
  45. ^ Ingiriis, Mohamed Haji (1 April 2016). The Suicidal State in Somalia: The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969–1991. UPA. p. 199. ISBN 978-0-7618-6720-3.
  46. ^ Mukhtar, Mohamed Haji (25 February 2003). Historical Dictionary of Somalia. Scarecrow Press. p. 16. ISBN 978-0-8108-6604-1.
  47. ^ Clapham, Christopher, ed. (1998). African guerrillas. Indiana University Press. p. 80. ISBN 978-0-85255-816-4.
  48. ^ Gebrewold-Tochalo, Belachew (2009). Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p. 193. ISBN 978-0-7546-7528-0.
  49. ^ Ciisa-Salwe, Cabdisalaam M. (1994). The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy. A.M. Issa-Salwe. p. 131. ISBN 978-1-912411-46-7.

Bibliography

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